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Executive Summary 
 
Background to the Study 
 
This is a report of a qualitative study of the impact of training and regulation on the 
management and delivery of civil legal advice and representation, the fieldwork for which 
was conducted from 2005-6. 
 
Since the mid 1990s, but particularly since the reform of legal aid signalled by the 
Access to Justice Act (AJA) 1999, contracts for the delivery of publicly funded legal 
advice services have been held not only by private solicitors’ firms, also known as the 
For Profit (FP) sector, but also by a range of Not-for-Profit (NFP) organizations, such as 
Citizens’ Advice Bureaux (CABx), and national VCOs.   
 
However, the FP and NFP sectors are characterised by very different regimes of 
regulation and training.  The FP sector is heavily regulated, and solicitors are subject to 
lengthy periods of training and extensive assessment before qualification.  By contrast, 
NFP advice workers are not required to possess any formal qualifications, and are 
subject to a variety of training regimes. They experience the comparatively light 
regulatory regime overseen by the Charity Commission.   
 
The divergence between the extent and quality of the regulatory and training regimes of   
the two sectors raises both questions about the respective value of their divergent 
approaches, and concerns about the levels and consistency of quality in the publicly 
funded sector as a whole.  The introduction of a rigorous quality standard for publicly 
funded legal advice work, the Specialist Quality Mark (SQM), and the systematic audit 
and management of contract by the LSC has sought to address some of these concerns.  
However the impact of this form of performance management on firms and agencies 
raises issues about the policy objectives of the current regulation of the sector, and the 
levels of quality and efficacy of the legal advice and representation it is able to deliver.  
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Results 
 
Respondents in both the FP and NFP sectors stressed a number of non-regulatory 
factors which affected their service delivery, and which therefore amount to informal 
regulation.  These included non-economic values, such as commitment to social justice 
or to their client base. These values, they said, derived either from prior commitment or 
had been instilled by their vocational training.  Other informal aspects of both training 
and regulation were argued to be significant, such as the ethos of their organization. 
 
All respondents were subject to multiple forms of formal regulation. These included 
statutory regulation and professional regulation by the Law Society, quasi-regulation (for 
instance Citizens Advice quality marks), and the contractual regulation which 
accompanied LSC funded legal advice work. With the exception of the oversight of the 
Charity Commission, the NFP sector was less likely to be subject to statutory regulation 
of the kind applying to all practising solicitors. 
 
The majority of respondents considered that in the past many forms of regulation and 
oversight by funding bodies had lacked rigour, either because audit and inspection was 
infrequent, or because there was a  high threshold for failure.  By contrast, their 
responses indicated that the LSC contract had become the most significant influence on 
their day to day practice. Respondents in both FP and NFP sectors were unequivocal in 
their support of the effect of the SQM on their LSC contracted work. Furthermore, they 
reported that compliance with the SQM had a ‘ripple effect’ on the functioning of 
organizations, resulting in better service to clients ineligible for legal aid. 
 
However, practitioners reported spending an undue amount of their time meeting the 
demands of inspection, reporting and audit, rather than delivering front line services, and 
some, especially in the NFP sector, felt that this was distorting the culture and mission of 
their organisation.  Respondents were also generally unhappy about contract 
compliance auditing, the process whereby their performance was judged according to 
under- or over-performance on the contract.  The NFP sector felt that the exclusion  of 
activities which had traditionally been a key part of their work, and the effects of ‘ring-
fencing’ contracted workers, was accentuating the impact which the contract was 
 v
already having on their mission and internal organization. The FP sector reported that 
the gap between legal aid and the private client rate caused internal tensions in mixed 
practices, as a consequence of the cross-subsidy involved.  Respondents from both 
sectors also expressed doubts about the reliability, objectivity and expertise in legal 
advice of auditors’ judgements in the time standards and contract compliance auditing 
process.   
 
Respondents in the FP sector regarded their initial training and the current provisions for 
Continuing Professional Development (CPD) as a necessary but not sufficient guarantee 
of competence. Many complained about the focus on commercial law and relative 
neglect of welfare law and skills on the qualifying law degree and Legal Practice Course 
(LPC).  Supervisers and supervisees identified a minimum of two years’ closely 
supervised work-based learning as the most important means of developing and 
sustaining competence in advice and representation work. 
 
The quality of supervision during the Training Contract period reported in the FP sector 
was very variable. The supervision requirements of the SQM were seen as a positive 
benefit, but respondents identified the quality of supervision as more important than the 
quantity or the formal regularity. Respondents identified a range of skills and qualities 
which were insufficiently embedded in the existing training of solicitors in the FP sector.  
Specifically, there were weaknesses in preparing solicitors to work with socially excluded 
clients, and in preparing all workers to manage the requirements of the LSC contract. 
 
Both FP and NFP sector respondents were concerned about future labour supply, based 
on the age profile of the current workforce, and difficulties experienced in recruitment 
and the tightening of resources were held to have an adverse effect on training. 
 
Training in the NFP sector was based to a greater extent on the needs of the 
organization, and was more tightly defined by the competence demanded in the role, 
particularly in the highly developed training offered by Citizens Advice.  The ladder of 
training was generally designed to allow progression from volunteer to specialist status, 
regardless of previous formal educational qualifications.  Training was supplied by 
specialist charities with a national standing, such as Citizens Advice and Shelter, but 
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specialist NFP advisers also made extensive use of second tier advice services provided 
by telephone and the internet, and saw these services as training resources.   
 
Another form of training in the NFP sector was the sharing of expertise as a result of 
inter- and intra-agency networking.  Both of these forms of training and sharing of 
expertise were seen to be at risk from the form of contractual management used by the 
LSC at the time of the research. 
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Chapter One Introduction 
 
1.1 Background to the study 
 
The significant involvement by the NFP advice sector in the delivery of publicly 
funded legal advice was initiated in 1997 with the contracting pilots for Advice and 
Assistance services, previously provided under the Green Form1 and ABWOR 
(assistance by way of representation)2 schemes.  As noted four years later, ‘the 
difference between professional lawyers operating under a judicare, private practice 
scheme and non-lawyer, NFP advisers is an important area of policy theory and 
research’ (Moorhead, 2001, p 1).  The two sectors appear at first sight to be 
characterised by a number of fundamental differences. The highly trained, highly 
regulated FP sector contrasts with a relatively lightly regulated NFP sector which has 
few formal barriers to entry.  The business orientation of the private firm contrasts 
with the social mission of the NFP sector, and the specific technical focus of the FP 
sector contrasts with the ‘holistic approach’ of the NFP sector.    
 
However the distinctions between the two sectors may have been overstated, for 
reasons that we will discuss in the body of the report, and both have been subjected 
to the discipline of the quality management regimes represented by the Legal Aid 
Franchising Quality Assurance Scheme (LAFQAS) and its successor, the Quality 
Mark (QM).  Nevertheless, the simple fact of this dual-sector provision continues to 
raise questions.  What kind of training is most appropriate to prepare advisers to 
provide an appropriate quality of advice to clients?  How should advisers be 
regulated in order to deter them from offering unnecessary or inappropriate advice?  
Is the advice system organized in such a way as to maximise the social benefit: do 
advisers take into account the needs of those in the queue for services, as well as 
those with whom they are face to face?  Will the application of contracting and quality 
assurance models based on an economic interpretation of human agency undermine 
the ethical foundation of publicly funded legal advice?  Is there a tension between the 
                                                 
1 Under the Legal Aid Act (LAA) 1988, Part III, the provision of general legal advice by  a solicitor, writing letters, negotiating, 
preparing a case in writing for a tribunal could be undertaken to a maximum of two hours’ work (three hours for divorce and separation 
petitions) and could be funded as legal advice and assistance, subject to eligibility rules. 
2 ABWOR represented an extension to the Green Form scheme, under which solicitors could prepare a case and represent clients in 
civil proceedings in magistrates’ courts and in front of Mental Health Tribunals, subject to financial eligibility and the tests of legal merit 
and reasonableness specified in the LAA 1988, s. 125 (2). 
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regulatory goal of achieving Value for Money (VFM) and training models in both the 
FP and NFP sectors which are based on achieving the best result for the client? 
 
These questions have already been the focus of a good deal of attention on the part 
of researchers in the field of legal aid.  The current research does not attempt to 
replicate any of the specialised and expert work undertaken in the development of 
the schemes. It is rather concerned to use a case study approach to explore how the 
processes of training and regulation impact on comparability between the FP and 
NFP sectors. 
 
1.2 Access to Justice and the introduction of the NFP Sector 
 
As Christine Parker has noted, whilst the Access to Justice movement is over 40 
years old, and has both influenced research and come to constitute a major element 
of government rhetoric in the field of justice policy, the term has never been well 
defined (Parker, 1999).  It has been seen as covering issues as diverse as 
accessibility of court procedures for dispute resolution, ‘equality of arms’ in criminal 
justice proceedings, and the development of accessible alternative dispute resolution 
procedures (Parker, 1999, p 30). Indeed, it is worth noting that, when legal aid was 
initiated, the policy of delivering advice on a case-by-case delivery through private 
solicitors was regarded by many as a less desirable option than the adoption of a 
salaried service, or universalist delivery through advice centres (Goriely, 1996, p. 
224).  
 
The entry of advice providers from the NFP Sector can therefore be regarded as in 
many ways an overdue development, as was the initiative to explore alternative 
methods of advice provision other than face to face case work (Bull and Seargeant, 
1996)   The perception that the existing system of legal aid provision was failing to 
meet the needs of a substantial section of the population was given added force by 
Hazel Genn’s  ‘Paths to Justice’, published shortly after the AJA 1999, which 
revealed both a considerable amount of ‘unmet legal need’ and ignorance about the 
functioning of the legal system and courts (1999).   
 
Genn found that the likelihood of a matter being taken to solicitors in order to seek a 
resolution was related to the perceived seriousness of the issue, the awareness that 
it had a legal remedy, and the availability of legal aid (Genn, 1999, p 251).  This work 
has been succeeded by other systematic research in the same vein, such as the 
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Legal Services Research Centre (LSRC) survey of Justiciable Problems (Pleasence 
et al, 2004) and detailed accounts which have identified concentrations of civil justice 
problems in vulnerable groups (Buck et al, 2004; Buck et al, 2005).  The implication 
of this body of work, and of the joint papers by the Law Centres Federation (LCF) 
and the Lord Chancellor’s Department, and its successor the Department for 
Constitutional Affairs (DCA/LCF, 2001; DCA/LCF 2004), was that advice had a 
central role to play in meeting the government’s objective of combating social 
exclusion:  
• through the empowerment of excluded groups and individuals;  
• through increasing the material resources available to these communities;   
• by providing a counter balance to the discretionary decision making on the 
part of the State to which these groups above all others are subject. 
 
These developments form the backdrop to the shift of emphasis in legal aid provision 
heralded by the AJA 1999, as the numbers of contracts for areas of law like debt, 
housing and welfare rights were greatly increased, and contractors from the NFP 
sector were drawn into publicly funded provision in unprecedented numbers.  At the 
time the research was undertaken, around 400 NFP agencies (excluding Law 
Centres) had contracts with the LSC to provide legal advice and assistance to eligible 
clients. Of these, the largest provider was Citizen’s Advice, with approximately 200 
Bureaux participating (of which around 80 employed solicitors).  Shelter had around 
40 offices with contracts to provide housing advice, while the residue was spread 
between a number of different specialist advice agencies.  Overall the NFP sector 
contractors started around 115,000 cases annually, 22% of the total acts of 
assistance (House of Commons Select Committee for Constitutional Affairs (HoC 
SCCA), 2004, we 48, p. 6), and in 2004-5 the NFP sector was awarded 942 out of a 
total of 6242 contracts.  Between 2003-4 and 2004-5 this figure rose by 11.3%, while 
the number of contracts awarded to solicitors’ firms declined by 9.9% (HoC SCCA, 
2004, we49, p 10).   
 
This shift to the use of a wide range of providers, many of which employ non-legally 
qualified personnel, has inevitably resulted in a legal aid sector which is 
characterised by an equally varied range of occupational norms.  As we will note 
below, this was hailed at the onset of the ‘partnership’ between the State and the 
voluntary sector as a positive aspect of the arrangement: voluntary sector values 
would bring ‘added value’ to service delivery.  An unresolved issue, however, was 
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whether the approach designed to assure the quality of advice in the FP sector was 
appropriate for all providers.  A key element in the development and maintenance of 
externally-regulated standards has been the LAFQAS and the subsequent QM for 
the Criminal Defence Service (CDS), the CLS and the Bar (LSC, 2002a, b & c).   The 
design and development of these measures was accompanied by extensive 
research, which included comparisons of the FP and NFP sectors (Moorhead et al, 
2001), but there have as yet been few comparative studies of their medium term 
effect.  Alongside the research questions raised by the impact of QM are those raised 
by the impact of the contract itself.  Contractualism is increasingly accepted as a form 
of regulation on its own account, as a form of ‘extended accountability’ (Scott, 2000; 
Moorhead, 2001), and it has impacted on the NFP sector in ways few had 
anticipated3. 
 
In what way might contractualism represent a difficulty for the NFP sector and its 
social welfare law clients? Genn’s evidence suggests that the socially excluded are 
difficult to reach through case based work by solicitors (1999, p 101), and the 
evaluation of the Civil Non-Family Advice and Assistance Pilot indicated that the NFP 
sector was better at dealing with some of the problems associated with social welfare 
law (Moorhead et al, 2001).  Possible explanations for this include: 
• the sector’s value-base, such as a greater commitment to the cause of 
socially excluded clients;  
• the sector’s expertise, for instance its extensive experience in areas of law 
neglected by private practice, and allegedly superior interpersonal skills and 
empathy; and finally; 
• the way in which the sector’s values and skills combine to produce a greater 
expenditure of time per client problem.   
 
The issue of how to train the workforce for the publicly funded advice sector has also 
yet to be fully explored.  It is possible to overstate the extent of the distinction 
between the training for the two sectors:  the NFP sector employs qualified solicitors, 
albeit more commonly as experts providing ‘second tier advice’, developing test 
cases, and helping to produce training materials than as routine front-line advice 
workers, and the FP sector uses staff with varying degrees of training (not only 
qualified legal executives, but also unqualified paralegals) on elements of contracted 
                                                 
3 As Jochum et al point out, ‘less attention has been paid by the government to the (voluntary) sector’s wider contribution to civil 
renewal ...  this is reflected in attitudes towards voluntary and community organizations, seen primarily as “delivery agents”, promoting 
choice rather than voice’ (2004, p 34) 
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work4.  However, it is clear that while the FP sector is dominated by fully qualified 
solicitors, the NFP sector largely comprises workers who, where they have 
experienced systematic initial training, have not received nationally recognised 
qualifications for it. This latter fact lies at the root of the project to develop National 
Occupational Standards for the advice sector (NOS4Advice) within the National 
Vocational Qualifications (NVQ) framework.  
 
Given these differences in the training base for the FP and NFP sectors, the question 
arises whether solicitors are over-trained for publicly funded legal advice work, and 
NFP workers under-trained, or whether the ‘market’ or reservoir of legal need eligible 
for public funding falls into different sectors requiring differing levels of expertise and 
training.  If the latter, what kind of infrastructure should bind these sectors together?  
The Community Legal Service Partnerships (CLSPs), 5 envisaged as the vehicles for 
developing the AJA’s aim of creating a ‘seamless web’ of advice services, have 
achieved uneven results in this regard. CLSP membership at the time of the Matrix 
evaluation indicated significant under-representation of solicitors in the partnership 
process (Matrix, 2004, p. 38).  Instead the development of local partnerships as an 
infrastructure for networking advice provision tended to be correlated with the 
strength of previous arrangements and local authority commitment to the project.  
Difficulties in these partnerships at a local level, however, only reflect more 
widespread problems with the theory and mechanics of partnership at the national 
level. The LSC hopes to overcome these with the development of Community Legal 
Advice Centres (CLACs) and Community Legal Advice Networks (CLANs).   
 
1.3 Third Sector Partnerships 
 
NFP sector involvement in legal advice has been mirrored in other areas of civil 
society.  William Plowden has traced the development of voluntary sector 
involvement in service delivery in the 1990s, and the subsequent shift in emphasis 
towards ‘partnership’ and a ‘compact’ in the early period of the Labour Government 
(2003).  The enhanced consultation and cooperation heralded by the compact finds 
                                                 
4 Although the claim that firms tend to sustain the viability of legal aid work by a reliance on paralegals has been much debated.  
Sidaway et al (1997) found no evidence that the use of paralegals was associated with involvement in legal aid work, but Williams and 
Goriely suggested that immigration work in particular
 
appeared to be rely heavily on unqualified or inexperienced staff (2003, p. 15) 
5 CLSPs were piloted in six areas prior to the AJA, 1999, and formed a formal part of new Legal Aid arrangements from 2000: they 
were networks of local advice providers, intended to include the LSC, local authorities, local solicitors’ firms providing legally aided 
advice and assistance, CABx, law centres and other advice providers. Participation in CLSPs has been voluntary however, which has 
resulted in a variable degree of effectiveness (Matrix, 2004, pp 38-52). 
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echoes in the rhetoric of partnership characteristic of the early stages of NFP 
involvement in franchising, a rhetoric which is potentially in tension with the need to 
ensure VFM in the funding arrangements reached with the sector. 
 
It is now commonplace that the role of the state in service delivery has shifted from 
direct intervention towards ‘enablement’, or regulated devolution, producing the term 
‘New regulatory state’ (Hood, 1991; and see Rhodes, 1997). The impact of the 
resulting expansion in regulation has been felt most keenly in the NFP sector and 
small FP organisations involved in public service delivery as the techniques of ‘New 
Public Management’ (NPM) (Hood, 1991)  have been extended to cover their 
activities.  This has in turn generated a considerable literature about the appropriate 
governance of these organizations.  The main themes include:  
• the distinctive contribution that the NFP sector can make, and hence its 
perceived role in the delivery of legal services and advice;  
• the question of resources; 
• modern management techniques (Ashby, 1997) and the threat these may 
pose to the sector’s professionalism and values;  
• the purpose, optimal extent and impact of regulation; the role of support, 
advice and training and the inter-relationship between regulation and training.   
 
The extension of the full range of NPM techniques, including contractual regulation 
and market incentives, into the NFP sector has been supplemented by a ‘new’ 
approach  designed to engender trust and partnership under the CLS (Moorhead, 
2001). Moorhead argues that the CLS represents an example of Morison’s ‘extended 
accountability’, where synergy between the state and the voluntary sector 
(Moorhead, 2001, p 546) provides a means of moving beyond the provision of 
services to the development of a more participative form of citizenship. 
 
1.4 Developments in training and regulation 
 
The research reported on here is the product of, and has taken place during, a period 
of rapid change in the policy environment for legal advice.  We explore some of these 
changes in depth in subsequent chapters, but will identify here the principal reforms 
in order to give a sense of the pressures the sector was subjected during our 
research.  
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The DCA’s consultation ‘In the Public Interest?’ (2002) and the subsequent report on 
competition and regulation in the legal services market (2003) debated the merits of 
a range of regulatory frameworks for legal services6  in terms of improving 
competition, thereby reducing cost and enhancing quality.  This produced the 
Clementi Review of Legal Services, commissioned by the Government (Clementi, 
2004), and the subsequent White Paper on the Future of Legal Services (Cm 6679, 
DCA 2005). The resulting Legal Services Act (LSA 2007) has transformed the overall 
regulatory environment.  
 
Clementi signalled a move towards concern with the regulation of the economic unit 
of the legal business rather than individual solicitors (Para 12, p 7).  The focus of 
media and professional attention was the proposal  to  create  the Legal Services 
Board (LSB) as the meta-regulatory authority, and the loosening of the regulatory 
conditions in the market to allow Alternative Business Structures (ABSs).   The 
Review, White Paper, and the LSA have also however sought to embed in the 
regulatory framework policy principles for publicly funded legal advice, such as 
improving access to justice and increasing public understanding of the citizen’s legal 
rights alongside protecting consumer interest and promoting competition (Cmn 6679, 
p. 20).  In addition the LSA has brought the NFP sector within the regulatory scope of 
the LSB, through the ABS licensing scheme, where organizations offer reserved 
services, and the status of group licensing for umbrella organizations in the NFP 
sector has been affirmed (DCA, 2005, Cmn 6679, p. 50) to approximate to that of a 
Front Line Regulator (FLR): this closes one of the ‘regulatory gaps’ identified by 
Clementi. 
 
The work of Clementi was in part guided by the ‘better regulation’ movement, whose 
concern was to reduce the ‘drag’ on business created by excessive and cumbersome 
regulation.  The Better Regulation Commission (BRC) was the successor body to the 
Better Regulation Task Force (BRTF)7, which produced a number of reports in the 
first half of the decade influencing the move towards ‘lighter touch’ regulation, and a 
‘risk-based’ approach to regulation.  The latter approach has transformed the LSC’s 
                                                 
6 The framework consists of the statutes and non-statutory regulations governing conduct and eligibility to practise, the regulatory 
authorities with responsibility for oversight and enforcement, and the nature of the relationship between regulatory authorities and 
those they regulate 
7 The BRTF was set up in 1997 to advise the government on action to ensure that regulation and enforcement were proportionate, 
consistent, transparent and targeted. Members of this independent advisory body were appointed by the Cabinet Office Minister.  
Following the 2005 Budget, the BRC was set up with a similar brief, but with the added responsibility of vetting new legislation. 
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cost and contract compliance audit regime from that which obtained at the time of the 
research reported here. 
 
Alongside the concern with the regulatory framework for legal services in general has 
been the set of policy developments sparked by the equal concern to restrain the 
cost of legal aid, whilst maintaining and increasing access.  These have transformed 
the system of funding through the introduction of the block contract, and, most 
recently, the development of tailored fixed fees (TFFs).  These developments have 
occurred within the framework of a fundamental review of legal aid which has 
generated the New Focus proposals: 
• to simplify eligibility arrangements,  
• to restrict the Very High Cost Civil Cases budget in order to ensure improved 
access for low cost matters, 
• to improve cost recovery measures such as the statutory charge, and  
• to shift ancillary relief matters towards funding from assets or loans secured 
against assets (Cmn 6591, DCA, 2005).   
 
More recently, the procurement for Civil Legal Aid was subject to review by Lord 
Carter, who concluded that a market based system of legal aid would be more 
efficient to run than an administratively based one.  He recommended the gradual 
introduction of such a best value competition system, based on quality, capacity and 
price, with fixed and graduated fees leading to a TFF system (Carter, 2006). 
 
In addition, the LSC has developed more sophisticated information management 
systems which have enabled them to use data returns (quality profiles) from service 
providers to implement the risk-based approach to cost and quality control identified 
above.  All of these developments have had, or will have, a major impact on the 
agencies and firms involved in the sector. 
 
The changes in regulation and procurement have been accompanied by 
developments in the field of education and training for the providers of legal advice 
services, based on concerns both about the focus of solicitor training, and the 
absence of recognised formal qualifications in the NFP sector.  The first concern has 
resulted in the development a new, more flexible LPC which will be available from 
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September 2009 and mandatory from September 2011.8 The response to the second 
concern has been the NOS4Advice project, which, through a process of setting 
standards for the sector, is designed to enhance both individual opportunities for 
accreditation and sector mobility, and the skill levels for the sector as a whole. 
 
1.5 Policy Tensions in the Field 
 
The publicly funded field is characterised by several tensions which are exemplified 
by that between the added value the NFP sector was seen as bringing and the need 
to ensure that VFM is achieved.  This tension is paralleled in the need for the LSC to  
maximise the numbers of cases dealt with and the level / quality of service delivered.   
 
1.5.1 Added Value vs. Value For Money 
 
Much of the writing on ‘Third Sector’ involvement in the delivery of public services 
has stressed the following attractions for the State: 
• the ‘added value’ provided by its resources of social capital,  
• the more reciprocal relationship between VCOs and their user groups  
• the moral foundation of VCO ‘missions’, which form an alternative to the 
profit-oriented business ethic, and  
• the perception of public services as organized around the interest of 
producers (see for example Kendall and Knapp 2001).    
 
There was also a widely shared view that, particularly in the areas of welfare law in 
which NFP organizations specialize, relationships with clients and the quality of 
advice were better than those offered by private firms.  This was partially confirmed 
by Moorhead et al’s research, discussed above (2001).  
 
However, as also noted above, as VCO involvement in service delivery has 
increased, the emphasis on the sector’s capacity to add value has gradually given 
way to a greater emphasis on its need to deliver VFM.  This development appears 
likely to weaken the distinctive aspects of NFP/VCO provision such as its holistic 
                                                 
8 The Law Society’s
 
Training Framework Review (TFR) was launched in 2001, and the TFR Group concluded its work in 2007, 
following three public consultations.  Protracted negotiations over the Group’s more radical proposals  have been resolved with the 
announcement by the Solicitors Regulatory Authority (SRA) of
 
a new LPC) which is more flexible both in terms of courses and 
delivery mode (see www.sra.org.uk)  
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approach to the client, the well developed relationships with user groups and local 
communities, and a mission which is defined by a local sense of client need. 
 
1.5.2 Maximising Numerical Access vs. Maximising Quality 
 
A consistent theme of both ministerial announcements and policy-oriented research 
in the area of legal aid has been the limited nature of the Legal Aid budget.   Costs 
limitation necessitates some form of rationing of supply, either by restrictions on the 
amount of need which can be met, or by a limitation on the unit cost of meeting need.  
A major criticism of case-based, solicitor sourced legal aid is that instead of rationing 
decisions being the product of conscious public policy, covert rationing occurs at the 
supplier level, where discretionary trade offs between access and quality are made 
by individuals shielded from the public gaze (Moorhead, 1998, p 371). It has been 
argued that there should instead be a transparent balancing of competing demands 
within resources declared to be limited, with the goal of maximising access in the 
sense of ensuring both that the available funds produce the maximum number of acts 
of assistance and that individual clients receive a service at least as good as that 
which their adversary might receive. In l983, Garth explicitly advocated the departure 
from the ideal of universalism, arguing that this had to be traded against access to 
justice (l983, p 649; and see Cappelletti and Garth, l978). Claiming that the 
importance of a uniform standard of quality had been exaggerated by the profession 
in the interests of safeguarding its monopoly, Garth argued for the introduction of 
market forces and the development of differing levels of competence based on cost 
(1983, p 669).   Whilst a consensus around this view now appears to have been 
reached, namely that the level of quality should be set at ‘competence-plus’9, it is 
difficult for any system to specify explicitly what this constitutes.  Consequently, some 
element of discretion and subjectivity is retained, and the tension between access 
and quality will work its way through the process of decision making. 
 
1.5.3 Meeting Unmet Legal Need vs. Supplier Induced Demand 
 
The revival of interest in the idea of unmet legal need, discussed above, has become 
a central feature of government rhetoric and the vectors of policy implementation in 
the CLS.  This resulted in the use of detailed indicators of need to set the level of 
                                                 
9
 
Given that the poorest client might ‘choose’ to employ a barely competent representatives, the concept of ‘competence plus’, 
reflecting what is required in order to meet the minimum threshold of professional service, was introduced.  The concept is realised in 
the Transaction Criteria which form the framework for the audit of quality of advice under the SQM. 
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matter starts to be anticipated locally, even if this level was greater than the actual 
level of contracted matters in the area for the year before: if the aim of publicly 
funded legal services is to combat social exclusion then this is clearly a logical 
approach.  However, it is in conflict with the market driven approach exemplified by 
the Frontier Economics Report (2003; and see Carter, 2006),  and with a series of 
studies which argue that a feature of public services in general, and publicly funded 
legal services in particular, is supplier-induced demand. According to this model, 
legal service providers will seek to maximise their returns from public funds by 
pursuing matters of little merit, or by making decisions as to which matter to pursue 
based on its profitability (Bevan, 1996).  The tension between the objective of 
seeking out unmet need, and the suspicion that suppliers will exploit this objective for 
their own ends is, we would argue, realised in some of the local transactions between 
both FP and NFP suppliers, and the two arms of the LSC, the CLS development arm 
and the LSC contract management arm. 
  
1.5.4 Access to Justice vs. Access to Services 
 
The concept of providing legal advice services does not imply any necessary 
outcome beyond the provision of advice itself.  The modality of the advice service 
and the nature of the problem may combine to result in a just outcome, and in certain 
forms, this process will be easy to trace (the files recording face to face advice work 
and outcomes will be susceptible to peer review).  In others, it will be less so (as will 
be the case with telephone advice).  The expansion of legal services therefore has 
no necessary correlation with an increase in just outcomes. Certain forms of legal 
service provision (for example, web-based services, some forms of mediation) give 
the appearance of being cost-efficient and of empowering the stakeholder, and will 
therefore be attractive alternatives to face to face case work; it would, however, be 
unwise to assume that an increase in these services will inevitably directly translate 
into an increase in access to justice. 
 
1.5.5 Markets versus Networks 
 
Much of the thinking about regulation in the legal services sector has been 
dominated by the model of private firms competing in a market, and by a concern to 
avoid distortions (such as information asymmetry) which permit the uncompetitive 
pricing of services.  The thrust of many of the resulting policy documents has 
therefore been to increase competition between service providers.  To some degree, 
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the position of the CLS in these developments could be seen as anomalous.  Firstly, 
the LSC is able to use its position as a monopoly purchaser of legal aid services to 
set the price for these below the market rate for legal services, and to exclude some 
of those already in the market, as well as some others who might wish to enter.  
Secondly, the CLS’s model of weaving together the different specialisms and levels 
of expertise in publicly funded legal advice, to create the seamless web, is predicated 
on cooperation between firms and agencies.  However the introduction of increased 
competition, and therefore conflicts of interest, between providers, is likely to 
undermine networking, unless this can be incentivized. 
 
1.6 Structure of the Report 
 
In Chapter Two, we outline our methodological design of the project, and provide 
details of the areas in which we conducted our case studies and of the respondents 
who participated in the study.  
 
In Chapter Three, we delineate the way in which the issues of regulation and training 
are intertwined in the development of the solicitors’ profession, and develop a model 
for comparing the extent and impact of training and regulation in the FP and NFP 
sectors.   
 
In Chapter Four we concentrate our discussion on the literature associated with the 
regulation of legal advice, amongst other public services, and present the results of 
the research relevant to this topic.   
 
In Chapter Five, the report of our data on training in both sectors is contextualised by 
discussion of some of the literature concerned with work based learning. 
 
Chapter Six summarises the overall conclusions of the report. 
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Chapter Two Methodology 
 
2.1 Choice of Approach 
 
The current research fits within the parameters of two research traditions: 
programme evaluation, and case study research.  Each tradition has its strengths 
and limitations, and in the process of design it is necessary to take these into 
account.  Our approach in this project therefore was to ground our data collection in 
the interview procedure, but to supplement this with other procedures in order to 
achieve some data triangulation.   
 
Interviews were conducted with members of firms and NFP agencies at different 
levels of advice provision, in order to achieve a degree of respondent triangulation in 
one dimension.  Some client interviews were also conducted, though since the 
investigation of client perceptions of quality has been the subject of dedicated studies 
(eg Sommerlad & Wall, 1999) they were largely used to triangulate the accounts of 
advisers about their attitudes, values and practices. 
 
Choosing a method to establish the nature of the skills required to undertake good 
quality legal advice work was more problematic.  The intention was to explore in 
more detail the processes through which advisers attain standards. We addressed 
this by supplementing our interview data with observation of adviser/ client 
transactions, and extended discussion of case files.  The aim behind these 
techniques was to identify not only critical incidents but also key points of decision 
making in the process, and to interrogate the skills and knowledge underpinning the 
decision. Details of the procedure are provided below. 
 
2.2 Sampling procedure 
 
The sampling frame for the study was established by reviewing the LSC spreadsheet 
of contracts with suppliers in the geographical areas in the North of England that we 
were focusing on, and then discussing with CLS development workers the nature of 
the local ‘markets’ and issues relating to legal need.  Efforts were made to generate a 
purposive sample that would enable us to gather data that reflected the level not just 
of the organization, but also of advice activity in the area.  As we noted above, a 
significant element of the mission of the CLS has been the concept of the ‘seamless 
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web’ of advice, and this has been the springboard for the contemporary emphasis on 
the development CLACs and CLANs.  By sampling contrasting areas we hoped to be 
able to shed light on the regulation and training issues which would affect the 
functioning of advice networks.  Consequently, we included in our sample the 
following types of locality: 
• one major urban area with well developed networking strategies  
• one with less well developed  networks 
• one smaller urban centre with evidence of CLSP activity, and a reasonable 
supply of advice 
• one similar sized authority which was identified by several respondents as an 
‘advice desert’.   
 
Finally we also sampled providers in a neighbouring rural area. In the following 
section we will provide thumbnail sketches of these areas   
 
2.3 Area case studies 
 
Respondents were guaranteed complete anonymity and confidentiality, and to 
reduce the likelihood of providing inadvertent identifiers we have given all the areas a 
pseudonym.  The descriptions of the areas provide a context for the data, and we will 
comment directly on the way in which locality can both affect the impact of regulation, 
and represent widely differentiated environments for recruitment and training. 
 
‘Chapelvale’ is a small Metropolitan district with a population of 192,000 spread over 
quite a wide geographical area resulting a relatively low population density.  Almost 
half of the population lives in the main town in the authority, Linfield, and a feature of 
the authority is that some of the smaller outlying settlements have been thought to 
have stronger traditional links with other neighbouring towns and cities than they do 
with Linfield.  Unemployment rates in Linfield were only 0.9% above the national 
average in 2001, and the service sector, in particular banking, is a major source of 
employment. The area’s geodemographic profile is very diverse: Linfield contains 
wards with very high concentrations of residents of South Asian origin, while North 
Linfield is the site of several major post-war public housing developments with high 
concentrations of low income families.  The outlying settlements of Chapelvale 
include satellite settlements with high concentrations of middle class commuters but 
also pockets of deprivation. Public transport links between the settlements and 
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Linfield are patchy. The needs analysis for the area indicated that the supply of 
specialist CLS Quality Marked legal advice is based in the centre of Linfield, that 
there was almost no evidence that those in need of advice crossed authority 
boundaries from the outlying settlements in order to obtain it, but that equally, most 
outlying residents were reluctant to travel to Linfield to access advice.   There was a 
high level of need in the areas of housing and debt advice which was not fully met by 
suppliers in the area, and a dearth of provision in North Linfield. 
 
The CLS development worker and some of the providers in the area therefore 
characterised Chapelvale as an ‘advice desert’, and identified the absence of a 
culture of seeking advice as a consequence. This resulted in two further problems: 
when provision was commissioned from local firms and agencies, it was hard for 
them to achieve the desired take-up levels (in one year during the study, matter 
starts were increased from 1200 to 1600 on the basis of needs analysis, but only 
1100 matter starts were achieved), and as a result several providers had dropped out 
of the scheme, particularly in the FP sector. 
 
The major advice providers in Chapelvale are located in Linfield and are the CAB, a 
large women’s advice centre, and a few solicitors’ firms.  We carried out research in 
three solicitors’ firms, the CAB and the women’s centre, and, as this centre 
represented an umbrella for a wide variety of advice provision, we undertook a 
substantial in depth study of it.  . 
 
Castleton is a Metropolitan District adjoining Chapelvale, with a total population of 
373,000.  The principal town of Hillchester has a population of 154,000, and is 
surrounded by several other substantial settlements which form part of what is 
regarded as a major conurbation.  The town has a larger commercial centre than 
Chapelvale and is home to a post-1992 University as well as a college of Further 
Eucation.  In addition to a large CAB in Hillchester, there is another CAB in North 
Castleton, and the district is home to two offices of Shelter, as well as other smaller 
advice centres.   Hillchester and the neighbouring town of Carbridge also have a 
number of medium sized solicitors firms which specialize in specific areas of LSC 
funded work (Community Care, Education, certificated Personal Injury (PI) work with 
abuse victims for example).  In Castleton we carried out research in three solicitors’ 
firms, the Hilchester CAB and a housing advice centre. 
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Weaverton is a Metropolitan District which, with a district population of 467,600 in 
the 2001 census is the second largest population centre in the region.  It has a 
university and a college of Further Education.  Once a thriving textile centre, it was 
the focus for large scale immigration from the Asian sub-continent.  In 2001 it had a 
Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) population of 21%; the largest in the region. 
 
Weaverton also has a greater population density than either Castleton or Chapelvale 
(12.8 people per hectare) and consists of the principal city which gives the district its 
name (population approximately 290,000) and a series of main settlements along a 
river valley, linked by a rail line and major road.  The area has endured an extended 
period of economic decline as the textile industry has disappeared but not been 
replaced by other large scale economic activity.  In the 2001 census it had an 
unemployment rate of 4.4%, the third highest in the region. Fifteen of the wards in the 
area qualify for Objective 2 European funding. 
 
Partly as a result of the availability of European funding over many years, the area 
enjoys a greater supply of advice provision and has seen the development of 
effective network and structured partnership for commissioning services according to 
agreed criteria.  In Weaverton we carried out research in two solicitors’ firms, a 
housing advice centre and a resource centre for local voluntary organizations. 
 
Boomtown is a major regional population centre, and a hub for financial and legal 
services.  With a population of 720,000, it is one of the largest metropolitan districts 
in England, and the third most densely populated in the region.  It has a larger 
number of employees in the professional and managerial sectors than other areas in 
the region, largely as a result of rapid growth over the past decade in the financial 
service and business sector.  Between 2001-2004 it experienced a rapid growth in 
job creation, above the figure for the region, and the national average.  
Unemployment has fallen from 10% in the 1990s to 3.2% in 2004 based on the 
unemployed claimant rate, and 5.2% on the Labour Force Survey rate. 
 
However, the development of a prosperous core to the city has been based largely 
on an increase in inward commuting.  The city itself retains large areas of residual 
social housing, and overcrowded and unmodernised properties (it features in the top 
two areas in the region on both of these indicators).  It has a large BME population, 
and a large population of single parent households with dependent children. In 
Boomtown we undertook research in a Law Centre, and two solicitors firms. 
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North Daleshire (ND) is a large rural authority with a population of around 570,000 
spread across 3,103 square miles.  There are only two major population centres, and 
their combined population is around 114,000.  The rest of the population is spread 
over many small market towns and villages, and access to public services is an issue 
for many of the more remote areas.  The population has a greater than average 
number of the elderly, and a below average number of young people.  There is a very 
small BME population (of around 1%).  Like many rural areas, it contains some areas 
of considerable prosperity, with popular retirement destinations and dormitory 
suburbs, but also considerable poverty.  We carried out research in two of North 
Daleshire’s market towns, in a CAB and two solicitors’ firms. 
  
We also interviewed the director of a local authority funded advice centre in an 
authority neighbouring Chapelvale. 
 
Table 2.1 Comparison of research areas by key social indicators (2001 
census figures) 
 
Indicator 
 
Castleton Chapelvale Weaverton Boomtown ND 
Unemployment 3.4% 3.8% 4.4% 3.3% 2% 
BME population 14% 7% 21% 8% 1.5% 
Overcrowding 7.6% 7.0% 8.3% 7.8% 3.7% 
Households without bath or 
shower 
0.4% 0.4% 0.5% 1% 0.3% 
Lone parent households with 
dependent children 
6.8% 6.6% 7.4% 7% 4.2% 
 
 
2.4 Respondents 
 
The research design specified that we should, in each organization, interview:  
• the Director or Senior Partner;  
• the LSC contract manager where that position was not held by a senior 
partner;  
• persons in the training partner or manager role where that person was not 
also the contract manager; and  
• at least one supervisor and one supervisee.   
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In addition, we interviewed senior members of national organizations in the FP and 
NFP fields with special responsibility for training or regulation, managers and 
development workers for the regional LSC office and a commercial trainer.  A table 
indicating the number of respondents in each category is given below: although some 
participants had multiple roles, each respondent is entered only under the category 
which matches the subject of the interview most closely. 
 
Table 2: Respondents by sector and status 
 
Respondent Category FP Sector NFP Sector Other TOTAL 
Senior Partner/Director 10 7  17 
Non-partner Contract 
Manager &/orTraining 
Manager 
3 3  6 
Supervisor 2 4  6 
Supervisees 10 8  18 
Trainees/volunteers 2 2  4 
Training Organisations 2 6  8 
Committee members  1  1 
LSC personnel   4 4 
TOTAL 29 31 4 64 
 
2.5 Specialisms 
 
While we planned to obtain a balance of advice specialisms in both the FP and NFP 
sectors in our sample, this proved difficult.   Contracts for some specialisms were 
quite rare, and the organization with the contract was not always willing to cooperate.  
As a result some specialisms such as housing are represented by a greater number 
of respondents.  This had unanticipated benefits: because the area is so specialised, 
many of the respondents were known to each other, and as a result we were able to 
triangulate some accounts of organizational practices.  The table below provides a 
count of the specialisms of case workers: where they undertook more than one 
specialism they have been double counted. 
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Table 2.3 Case worker specialisms 
 
Specialism FP respondents NFP respondents 
Housing 3 8 
Welfare Benefits 0 3 
Community Care 1 0 
Immigration 3 0 
Domestic Violence 0 3 
Personal Injury 1 0 
Family 5 2 
Employment 2 1 
Civil Litigation 3 0 
Debt 0 1 
Children 1 0 
Women’s Advice & Guidance 
(A&G) 
0 3 
Asian Women’s A & G 0 2 
 
2.6 Access issues and response rates 
 
As explained above in the section on sampling, access to firms was initially 
negotiated with the regional office of the LSC. The contract managers for firms 
identified on the sampling frame provided by the LSC’s contract list as meeting our 
criteria were initially contacted by letter and provided with a synopsis explaining the 
aims of the project.  Follow-up telephone calls were then undertaken to establish 
willingness to consider participation.   
 
In the table below we provide an account of the organizations and individuals 
contacted for interview.  Some of the firms contacted responded immediately by 
indicating that they were too busy to take part in the research.  Some firms initially 
agreed to participate, but withdrew at a later stage.  These withdrawals were for a 
variety of reasons.  
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Table 2.4 Responses to the research contacts 
 
Type of Provider Number 
contacted 
Number 
initially 
agreeing 
Number 
withdrew 
before end 
Total 
completing 
Solicitors Firms 18 13 4 9 
Law Centres 1 1 0 1 
CABx 3 3 1 2 
Other advice agencies 5 3 0 3 
Local authority provider 1 1 1 0 
Total 28 21 6 15 
 
2.7 Data Collection Methods 
 
Each respondent in the main sample was interviewed at their place of work at least 
once, using an interview schedule which was designed to suit their role in the 
organization; however all schedules shared questions relating to the impact of 
regulation on their work, and the extent and value of the training they had 
undertaken.  In several instances, either where the respondent occupied more than 
one role, or where we wished to discuss issues in more depth, a follow-up interview 
was arranged.  These interviews formed the core of the research.  One of our aims 
was to elicit any unintended consequences of training and regulation, and so the 
interviews were designed to accommodate discussions on points which we as a 
research team had not anticipated. 
 
Methods used for the purposes of triangulation included: respondent triangulation, 
where for example accounts of different participants in a CLSP, LSC and agency 
staff, supervisee and supervisor, or adviser and client, were cross-checked; data 
triangulation, where for example interview accounts of approaches to advice were 
cross-checked against observations; and time series triangulation, where agency 
accounts were checked at more than one point in time. 
 
Three types of observation were undertaken: observation of adviser client 
transactions; observations of support and supervision meetings, and observations of 
training events.   
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Chapter Three Regulation and Training – Conceptual Links 
 
3.1 Regulated training and the licence to practise 
 
This chapter explores some of the conceptual and practical links between regulation 
and training as a background to the analysis of the separate findings reported in 
Chapters Four and Five.  Not only do systems of education and training obviously 
interlock with regulation; they also interact with the market for services and labour in 
complex and interesting ways.  We therefore explore these interactions and the 
differences between the formal regulatory requirements for training in the FP and 
NFP sectors.  We also identify the ways in which these differences affect debates 
about quality and the labour supply in the two sectors, before describing a model 
which delineates the differences in terms of the risk attached to the various 
approaches.  Finally we briefly discuss ways in which the traditional relationship 
between regulation and training might be combined with the newer forms of 
performance management to provide an environment which sponsors a culture of 
competence and quality. 
 
Julia Black’s ‘de-centred’ definition of regulation indicates that regulation and training 
are virtually indistinguishable in terms of their function: 
Regulation is the sustained and focused attempt to alter the behaviour 
of others according to defined standards or purposes with the 
intention of producing a broadly identified outcome or outcomes, 
which may involve mechanisms of standard setting, information 
gathering and behaviour modification (2002, p. 20). 
 
We identify below the ways in which this convergent definition of regulation and 
training is exemplified by daily practice in the delivery of legal services, as a result of 
formal regulatory structures becoming part of the tacit behavioural repertoire of 
advisers.  Education and training interactions, as well as even less formal structures 
and cultures, powerfully regulate everyday behaviour.  The fact that informal cultures 
can be a more powerful form of regulation than formal ones is a significant element in 
the discussion of our results. Initially however, we will explore how training and 
regulation relate as definably separate entities.   
 
The right and obligation to self-regulate has been seen by many commentators as 
the root of professional claims to moral authority.  This independent status is a key 
element in professionals’ role in civil governance overall (Evetts and Dingwall, 2002), 
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which, in the case of solicitors, entails being gatekeepers to the legal system and 
mediators of state power (Seneviratne, 1999, p 24).   Often described as the 
regulatory bargain, this justification could be referred to as the ‘legitimation’ argument 
for regulation: professionals gain a statutory ‘shelter’ for their exclusive rights to 
practise in certain areas, and retain the autonomy that avoids their absorption into 
the vested interests represented by the State, private capital or organized labour. In 
return they have a commitment to patrol the behaviour of their members.  The 
incapacity of the market to provide a perfect mechanism for the provision of legal 
services, as a result of the information asymmetry highlighted by the Scoping Study 
for the Clementi Review as of such significance, furnishes a further justification for 
the regulatory bargain.   
 
There is a tension between the ‘legitimation’ and ‘market failure’ justifications for 
regulation.  The moral basis of professions’ claims to authority has been challenged 
by a host of writers, largely drawn from the ‘market control’ critics of the professions 
(most significantly in the case of the legal profession, Abel, 1988; 2003), who argue 
that professionals are influenced predominantly by their own financial interests and 
not by an altruistic commitment to their clients’ interests.  The logical corollary of this 
view is that clients can only benefit by the removal of restrictions on the right to 
practise, and reductions in regulation to the point where it is easy for new actors to 
enter the market place. Evetts and Dingwall, on the other hand, argue that a 
redefinition of professionals as purely market actors may ‘severely compromise the 
ability of professions to supply legitimacy to nation states’ (2002, p 165): an 
independent legal profession can be seen as a guarantor of the Rule of Law.  Evetts, 
amongst others, has argued for a recognition of the significant moral and normative 
elements in professionalism which may impinge on the relationship between 
professional and consumer/client (2003, p 410).  In other words, whilst altruism 
cannot be assumed to be an attribute of all professionals to the exclusion of financial 
motives, it can nevertheless be seen as an essential element in the culture of lawyer 
client relationships. 
 
The assumed close link between controlling entry and standards of practice 
(Seneviratne, 1999, p 23) has been the underpinning rationale for what has come to 
be known as the ‘trait’ theory of the professions.  This argues that the provision of 
effective legal services to clients is based on expert knowledge of the intricacies of 
the law which, in turn, necessitates a lengthy period of training and demanding 
examinations.  The achievement of the qualification, and socialization into the 
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profession’s norms and values through the vocational stage should, by this 
argument, provide the potential consumer with the confidence that the practitioner 
will perform competently and ethically.  
 
There was no shortage of claims from solicitors in our sample of respondents that 
lesser training represented a handicap to providing quality legal advice; for instance: 
what I do have problems with and I’ve always had problems with is 
people who are brought in and I don’t know whether they’re meant to 
be paralegals or pretend legals, and they’re given jobs to do that they 
are neither qualified nor capable of doing. (Civil Litigation Partner, 
Hillchester firm)             
 
Another commentator made the more interesting point that professional status was a 
cultural prerequisite for participation in the courts: 
At Boomtown County Court we have just set up a possession scheme – 
Duty Reps representing people at possession hearings.  And now 
there’s a battle going on about who can be part of that scheme and I am 
strongly resisting the NFP sector being involved. The reason why is that 
in the court room it is important that you have people who are qualified 
.. .  I have as much right as the Judge and anyone else to be there.  It is 
my space and I take no nonsense from anyone because I am an officer 
of the court – so I have as much right as them to be there. (Housing 
Partner, Boomtown firm)                                                                      
 
However, if training, as opposed to status, is to fulfil the function of guaranteeing 
competence then the standards of pre-entry education and training need to be highly 
specified, ideally in terms of the competences deemed to be necessary for 
satisfactory performance, and the avoidance of risk.  There are two forms of critique 
of this model – one theoretical and one technical. 
 
3.2 Technical flaws in the licence to practise 
 
The competent performance guaranteed by the licence to practise will need to be 
maintained since, whilst some competences are consolidated and enhanced by 
experience, others are eroded or corrupted, and changing work practices require the 
practitioner to engage in constant updating.  It is difficult for post-entry training or 
CPD to provide the same guarantee as pre-entry training due to the problems of 
setting up a system in which qualified practitioners, in practice, ‘fail’. Post-entry 
performance therefore tends to be managed through a complaints and disciplinary 
system which is a ‘last resort’ or through labour market ‘shake-out’. 
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Solicitors’ firms are actually composed of partners and employees with widely 
differing levels of training, experience and skill.  Many publicly funded clients have 
their affairs handled for the most part by practice members who are untrained or 
trained to standards below those demanded for the licence to practise as a solicitor.  
For the guarantee of competence to be valid, the work of these staff needs to be 
closely supervised by those who do have the licence to practise. The significance of 
supervision is recognised in both the Law Society’s guidance on Training Contracts, 
and very explicitly in the LSC’s SQM, and its efficacy is discussed in Chapter Five. 
 
Similarly, although the licence to practise should guarantee competent performance it 
cannot guarantee ethical conduct, so it needs to work in tandem with some other 
regulator of performance (in the case of solicitors this is the disciplinary system).  
Again, this is normally only brought into play in instances where things have gone 
seriously wrong, so its effectiveness as a more general regulator of performance lies 
in its deterrent power.   
 
The licence to practise may therefore be thought of as a necessary but not a 
sufficient regulatory device to guarantee confidence or competence.  This explains 
the tendency of the State, as a monopoly purchaser of some services, to seek some 
alternative form of guarantee.  In this analysis, therefore, regulation is required both 
to set the standard required for a licence to practise, and to compensate for the 
weaknesses of the licence to practise model. 
 
3.3 Theoretical flaws in the licence to practise 
 
Critics of the professions point to the way in which the licence to practise may be said 
to benefit practitioners at the expense of clients since it artificially inflates the price of 
legal labour, and the lengthy training creates an information asymmetry  which 
renders it difficult for clients or consumers to make sensible market choices.  This 
difficulty was acknowledged by practitioners in our sample: 
Someone once compared us to dentists.  If somebody fills my tooth I 
have no idea whether they have done a good filling or not but if they 
are nice to me, they are polite to me and the injection doesn’t hurt and 
they are sympathetic I will go back.  Well it is not that much different 
with law, the average punter does not really know whether they are 
getting really the best legal advice but they will know how you looked 
after them as a human being so that is very important… as well as 
being a good lawyer. (Managing Partner, Hillchester firm) 
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Solutions to this problem could involve the removal of the market shelter which 
prevents others performing the work, or the introduction of some form of price 
regulation.  Regulation may fulfil the function, in this analysis, of removing the 
artificial barriers to competition produced by the excessive reliance on training and 
qualification periods created by professional interests. In response to the Bar 
Council’s argument that ensuring suitable qualifications for practitioners should be 
the basic purpose of regulation (Bar Council, 2004, p 18), Sir David Clementi echoed 
the view that there were other means of protecting consumers which had less impact 
on the price of services.  The theoretical case for the licence to practise is further 
challenged by the extent of the provision of legal advice and assistance in the NFP 
sector (as noted above) and we now explore some of the key differences between 
the FP and the NFP sector. 
 
3.4 Regulation, training and labour markets in the FP and NFP 
sectors. 
 
The two sectors of advice providers have radically different training regimes and 
labour markets.  In the FP world of the private firm, initial training costs have been 
shared.  The individual incurs costs in the form of fees and the opportunity costs of 
extended training; the taxpayer incurs costs in the form of support for exempted 
degrees; and solicitors’ firms incur costs in terms of administering the training 
contract, employing trainees who in most cases do not generate income rates 
sufficient to cover the costs of their salary, and fee-earner time for supervision.  The 
exchange for incurring these high costs is the prospect, for the trainee, of salaries 
maintained by the entry barriers (particularly as there is the potential for an over-
supply of solicitors to the labour market), and for the firms, of both maintaining 
general labour market supply, and of having access to an extended recruitment 
period during which trainee capability can be assessed and some degree of 
organizational socialization achieved.  Traditionally, the vocational training stage for 
solicitors has been general in character: this is designed not only to maintain the 
unitary character of the profession, but also to ensure a degree of labour market 
flexibility (though as we will note below, unitary approaches to training and 
employment in legal services are subject to increasing strain).   
 
Apparently more difficult to explain is the detachment of much of the initial education 
and training from the functional requirements of the work role.  Trait theorists would 
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justify this on the grounds of the requirement for underpinning knowledge and 
technical expertise, though critics of professional interests would argue that it is 
precisely the indeterminacy and remoteness of legal training from functional reality 
that supports the creation of information asymmetries. We will now briefly summarize 
the form of training required to become a solicitor. 
 
The Training Regulations 1990, made by the Council of the Law Society under 
Sections 2 and 80 of the Solicitors Act 1974, with the approval of the Lord Chancellor 
(Law Society, 2004) specify two stages to solicitors’ training.  The first stage is 
academic, which is satisfied by either graduating with an Exempting or a Qualifying 
law degree, or by passing the (post-graduate) Common Professional Examination 
(CPE), a Diploma in Law (PgDip) or an integrated course.  The second stage is 
vocational, comprising either a combination of the LPC followed by serving a two 
year Training Contract, or a Training Contract during which the Professional Skills 
Course (PSC) is undertaken.  Qualifying law degrees, which are recognised jointly by 
the Law Society and the Bar Council (Law Society 2002) are required to include the 
‘Foundations of Legal Knowledge’: Public Law, European Law, Criminal Law, 
Contract Restitution and Tort, Property Law and Equity and Trusts.  The highly 
specialized areas which together constitute the field of social welfare law, instantiated 
in often highly complex delegated legislation, do not form one of the foundational 
subjects. 
 
The LPC, which for the majority of intending solicitors represents the gateway to the 
training contract, is offered by 33 universities and some commercial providers.  
Unlike its predecessor the Law Society Finals (LSF), it is not externally examined by 
the Law Society, but assessed by the providers.  Quality assurance is undertaken by 
means of periodic three day Monitoring Visits by the Law Society and three day 
Grading.  The monitoring regime was reviewed during 2005 and broadly endorsed by 
a Law Society working party (Law Society 2006, p 4). 
 
At the time of the research, the LPC comprised three mandatory areas.  The 
compulsory subjects include Business Law and Practice, Civil and Criminal Litigation 
and Property Law and Practice; the Skills subjects include Advocacy, Practical Legal 
Research, Legal Writing and Drafting and Interviewing and Advising, and the 
Pervasive Areas are Accounts, Professional Conduct and the Financial and Markets 
Act, Probate and the Administration of Estates. The social welfare law areas of 
Employment, Family, Housing and PI feature in a list of electives from which three 
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can be chosen. Since work-based learning is one of the main areas of discussion in 
Chapter Five, the content of the training contract is described in greater detail there. 
 
The question raised by the length and detail of this training programme is whether it 
is necessary for the bulk of publicly funded work, or whether solicitors are over-
trained for this work.  It is argued that the resulting level of expertise generates a risk 
that solicitors may be tempted to use it when it is unnecessary (the supplier-induced 
demand thesis), and that where the market incentives make ‘lower level’ work 
unattractive, to ‘cherry pick’ cases so that they only undertake the certificated work 
which uses the full range of their skills, and which is therefore also more 
remunerative (Moorhead, 1998, pp 380-81).  Hence the ‘over-training’ of the 
profession can be seen as reinforcing the need for increasing regulatory control of 
the market in order to restrain firms’ tendencies to inflate costs.  As Moorhead 
argues: ‘A system with scarce resources has difficulty in operating on such a basis 
unless the discretion of those serving the clients can be significantly restrained.’ 
(Moorhead, 1998, p 381). 
 
Solicitors (and NFP suppliers) in our sample tended to see the issue differently.  
Some respondents spoke of the values which they believed should be at the core of 
the justice system: ‘The merits calculation is the one that - I think if something has 
merit then it should be supported, no matter what it is’. (Civil Litigation partner, 
Hillchester firm).   However, as we shall see in the discussion of the contracting 
arrangements, there was also some justification for the cherry-picking argument (this 
kind of economically rational decision making is of course to be expected in a 
business).   
 
Nevertheless, the case for the value of the more expensive skills in the struggle 
against social exclusion was also made powerfully by one respondent, a community 
care specialist in a firm committed to using the Law innovatively to address social 
issues.  The firm was a frequent user of judicial review (JR) and the Human Rights 
Act (HRA) 1998 in order to challenge the failure of local authorities to carry out their 
statutory duties, and, whilst recognising that these actions were expensive, the 
partner defended the procedure: 
I think that they’re wanting to clip the wings of people who go for JR and 
I think it’s entirely wrong..., our experience of local authorities is that 
they don’t readily change.  It’s very rare for them, when you send a first 
letter to say ‘you’re absolutely right, we’ve made a terrible mistake 
here’.  You know, you have to fight and fight and you find that they’re 
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devious. .. So judicial review is an effective means of holding them to 
account, and so it’s the usual tale, the Government want to do certain 
things, which is getting access to justice, to community care or 
education law, but they’re not prepared to will the means to make it 
happen.  (Senior Partner Hillchester Firm) 
 
However, the expertise required, for instance, to enforce a right, or to challenge 
discretionary decision-making on the part of a government agency or local authority  
is, some respondents argued, only available to lawyers specialising in the field.  The 
following case against a local authority was provided as an example: 
But you’ve also got to know what you’re looking for - because of 
Castleton changing their policy on foster payments, they have changed 
their policy on residence allowances.  Now residence allowances are 
paid by the residence order, and quite often where a local authority has 
identified a carer – a relative as being somebody who might care - that 
will encourage them to apply for a residence order rather than have the 
child perhaps become subject to care proceedings, or even be 
accommodated.  So you get, for example, instances (which I’ve had) of 
63-year-old grandfather being contacted at half past seven at night 
saying ‘if you don’t come and collect your little girl, a granddaughter, 
we’ll have to apply for a care order’.  So he goes over and collects.  So 
we argue that in that case the local authority have ‘accommodated’ 
because they’ve accepted that the parents can’t care.  Now to be 
‘accommodated’, to be a ‘looked after’ child, is a technicality under the 
Children Act, and it’s a phraseology that children’s lawyers will 
understand.  But Castleton have just changed their policy on payments 
for residence allowances and they are now only prepared to pay when 
the child is a ‘looked after’ child, or has been a ‘looked after’ child.  If the 
child has been a ‘looked after’ child people will get anywhere between 
£30 and £40 per week extra.  But if, in their definition, the child hasn’t 
been a ‘looked after’ child, then people will stay on the same residence 
allowance which will just be increased by inflation, so they’ll get a 
shortfall.  Two people contacted me who’ve had the letters and the 
letters said “this child you’ve got isn’t a ‘looked after’ child”.  We say 
that’s absolute rubbish.  But you’ve got to be a solicitor to know – and 
even as a solicitor you’ve got to be a child care solicitor and you’ve got 
to be tuned into the way local authorities work to be able to say ‘look 
don’t sign this piece of paper which says ‘I understand that the child I 
have is not a looked after child and therefore I’m only entitled to ….’.  
Write to Castleton and say ‘this isn’t right’. (Senior Partner and 
Community Care Specialist, Hillchester firm) 
 
The argument made by this solicitor, and by other specialists in Housing and PI, was 
that they were using their specialist expertise to transcend the individually based 
judicare model, in order to achieve public interest results.  This is clearly accepted as 
a legitimate goal by the LSC (as the increase in the number of certificates on public 
interest grounds demonstrates), but the transparency of the decision-making 
processes governing access to this expertise is an issue. 
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The solicitor quoted above argued that one of the difficulties with this sort of case 
was ensuring that clients could secure access to advice that might enable them to 
resolve it since many NFP advisers, particularly at the General Help level, would, 
because of their lack of technical expertise, tend to assume that the local authority 
was in the right (an interesting variation on the theme of information asymmetry).   
This concern was paralleled in an objection that many solicitor respondents  
articulated about the increasing participation of the NFP sector in legal aid.  There 
were three grounds for their objection.  The first, raised above, was that the level of 
training for General Help advisers was too low to enable them to do the kind of 
effective ‘triage’, or screening, work which would enable a seamless web of advice to 
work well; the second was that access to the advice ‘gateway’ in the NFP sector, 
particularly in terms of waiting times, queuing and unanswered telephones, was 
erratic and effectively involved a form of covert rationing; the third was that the NFP 
sector was inefficient in its use of time (thereby producing the conditions that required 
rationing).   
 
At the same time, solicitors involved in social welfare work expressed anxiety about 
finding new candidates for the work in their firms and in the sector as a whole, and 
about their chances of retaining the solicitors they already had, because of the 
competing pressures of more attractive labour markets: 
most young solicitors tend not to want to be doing legal aid.  They come 
out of a college of law with debts and they’re all wanting to work in the 
major cities, and do commercial work that’s going to pay them a high 
salary.  (Senior Partner, Hillchester firm) 
 
What we are finding now is that those people who have a degree of 
enthusiasm and who wanted to change things, and really don’t mind 
putting their heads above the parapet, they are taking the career 
decision, which is - at 2 years qualified - why on earth would I want to 
earn £25K with * when I could be earning £45K doing insolvency … so I 
think we have a double problem.  The first is people: we’re not getting 
the right calibre of people; [those] who would have come here 20 years 
ago now are in the commercial sector.  Secondly, those that are 
available prefer to work in a pleasanter environment [than] we can offer. 
(Senior Partner, Carbridge Firm) 
 
The relationship between the regulation of the legal services market, training for that 
market and labour supply, is therefore complex. The solution adopted by these firms 
was to offer a secure and friendly organizational home to those interested in the 
work, in an effort to compensate for the poor financial rewards available.  They did 
this either by providing ladders of opportunity for employees at secretarial and 
paralegal level, or through a strong and supportive occupational culture which 
 30 
generated loyalty, thereby counteracting the bias in favour of individual human capital 
inherent in the training of lawyers. This model of a ‘learning organization’ is one to 
which we will return to in the discussion of training in Chapter Five.  Where these 
relationships were not forged, retention of staff was more difficult (trainees in two of 
the firms where the relationships were less successful left, in one case before the 
end of the training contract). 
 
3.5 Expertise and Strategy 
 
Moorhead et al (2001) explored distinctions between the kind of contracted work 
taken on by FP and NFP agencies, testing the proposition that solicitors were more 
likely to provide quality by taking on ‘higher level’ work, whilst the NFP sector were 
more likely to innovate and provide a holistic service.  Their findings did not confirm 
this simplistic set of assumptions, but rather revealed a more confusing picture.  In 
some areas, such as welfare law, solicitors were likely to avoid pursuing more 
complex claims, while NFP agencies sought adversarial solutions through tribunals.  
Their discussion identifies the complex set of variables influencing these outcomes 
(for example issues related to rights of audience) and the fact that the levels of 
remuneration mean that few FP firms are likely to seek contracts in this area of work.  
This was confirmed by one of our partners: 
we have a brilliant guy doing welfare benefits, but we don’t have a 
welfare benefits franchise simply because we could not make it pay in 
any way shape or form, and quite often people have problems with 
benefits and we can’t make those things pay and we constantly have to 
be prepared to take flyers (Senior Partner Hillchester Firm) 
 
The principal concern raised by the work of Moorhead et al is the fitness for purpose 
of the training required by regulation: ‘there is a question mark over a process of 
legal education and professional qualification that does not raise the standard of 
even the poorer quality recruits to a standard as high as that of non-lawyer advisers’ 
(Moorhead et al, 2003, p. 707).  We discuss this concern in Chapter Five. 
  
3.6 Links between training and regulation in the NFP sector 
 
The situation in the NFP sector represents a contrast to that in the FP sector, 
emanating from the origins of some of the principal providers.  For instance the CABx 
resulted from a movement concerned to embed the principles of accessibility and 
universalism, as opposed to the exclusive model of professional expertise.  
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Correspondingly, training in the NFP sector attempts to avoid artificial entry barriers, 
has a functional bias grounded in a detailed specification of the occupational role, 
and also places a premium on absorption of organizational values, as well as 
knowledge and expertise very much focused on client need.   
 
There are very few opportunity costs for the trainee in this approach, but, 
correspondingly, it appears that there are also reduced benefits in the form of a lack 
of easily convertible human capital. Whilst the graduate of NFP training remains 
within a labour market where the main qualification for participation is relevant 
experience, this does not represent a problem, but it does inhibit movement outside 
this specialised market.  The NOS4Advice project represented the first attempt to 
introduce any form of nationally accredited qualification for the sector, and its 
premise is that the development of qualifications based on NOS will raise standards 
and hence the status of the occupation, as well as enhancing individual mobility.  The 
corresponding drawback is that as labour mobility in the sector is increased, 
investment in training will not only be a resource burden, but also become more risk 
laden and less attractive for the individual agency. 
 
The situation of legal advice workers is similar to that of other workers in the public 
sector, the quality of whose work is regarded as highly significant, but who have not 
been subject to compulsory training: for instance those involved in social care.    
Ensuring quality of provision through training in the social care sector is complicated 
by issues relating to the structure of the market for care (Balloch et al, 2004), and the 
reluctance, or inability, of employers to contribute to training costs (Scourfield, 2005), 
a characteristic which is a longer term feature of the training scene in the U.K. 
(Stevens, 1999). 
 
In view of this, and given the low entry barriers and the shorter period of training, how 
can we explain the relatively good performance in the NFP sector in terms of quality 
(Moorhead et al, 2001)? Is it the specialized nature of the training?  We found few 
advisers in the NFP sector who laid claim to more than one area of expertise:  
housing advisers tended to identify a problem cluster around housing, debt and 
welfare, and would deal with this through referral, but only one agency (the 
Chapelvale Women’s Centre in Linfield) had the infrastructure to deal with all 
elements of these clusters in-house, and then only at a low level.   
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Another possible explanation is that NFP advisers take more time over the work, and 
this is supported by some of Moorhead et al’s findings that, contrary to received 
wisdom, non-lawyers were more expensive and less accessible (Moorhead et al, p. 
798).  We found some evidence relating to inaccessibility in our field work, 
particularly in CABx: telephone calls to open access lines were often busy with 
messages turning away calls and the doors of one bureau in particular were often 
closed by 10 am.  However, our field observations provided no objective evidence of 
NFP agencies fulfilling the stereotype of indulging in ‘tea and sympathy’ interviews.  
Most of the matters dealt with were elicited swiftly, and clients dealt with efficiently. 
 
Nevertheless, as we discuss in greater detail in Chapter Five, NFP agencies were 
keen to identify their ability to interview sympathetically and elicit the real nature of 
the problem from their clients, and the Director of one agency contrasted this with the 
FP sector approach: 
I was fascinated with the way the solicitor dealt with the issue and I 
know that if someone had come in here who dealt with that type of 
issue, he did in half hour what would’ve taken 3 or 4 hours for an advice 
worker to go through and that’s about being very blunt, very direct, 
having no touchy feely nice interview, putting anyone at ease or 
anything like that.  (Director, Housing Advice Agency, Hillchester). 
 
The cost implications of the amount of time expended by advisers is clearly a major 
concern for commissioners of public services.  Control of time is not, however, likely 
to be achieved either by ‘input’ regulation (entry standards and pre-service 
competence guarantees) or ‘output’ regulation (complaints handling, taxation). It 
therefore demands a third form of regulation: the management of performance and in 
particular expenditure of time, through the contract. Quality Assurance (QA) 
performance measures or contract compliance audit regimes also provide an answer 
to one of the weaknesses of input measures, namely that initial competence 
(assuming it has been reliably assessed) is no guarantee of continuing competence. 
However, like competence based training,  audit regimes have been criticised for 
their reductionism (failing to capture what the activity is ‘really’ about), the possibility 
of producing goal displacement (the organization spends too much time on ensuring 
that they pass the audit, and not enough on front line activities) and the temptation to 
generate fraudulent evidence of compliance. 
 
As we note below, regulation is, in this ‘performance’ sense, a form of training, but 
one that can impact on the behaviour of an organization and a sector, rather than just 
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an individual.  The LSC clearly identifies the process of monitoring the contract as a 
way of ratcheting up standards and efficiency: 
everyone who is supplying publicly funded legal services now have to 
jump that hurdle but some can do it effortlessly, can jump far higher 
than others - we are moving away from saying ‘well you either clear the 
hurdle or you don’t’, to saying ‘well all firms now must clear this hurdle 
but actually can we now differentiate between our suppliers more subtly 
and one of the reasons we need to do that is because we may need to 
make better informed procurement choices’ (LSC Regional Manager). 
 
Specifically, the management of performance has been seen as a way to address the 
issue of costs in the NFP sector, and the interview data on this reveals the interplay 
between performance regulation and the state of the market.  Similar to the 
relationship between regulated entry standards and the individual labour market, it is 
necessary to set the entry standards at a level which enables the labour supply to be 
secured sufficient to avoid the price of labour becoming prohibitive.  The view was 
expressed in the FP sector that the NFP sector was treated more favourably both in 
the procurement process and in the process of compliance auditing, and to a degree 
this was confirmed by the LSC. 
the NFP agencies we brought into the scheme on a pilot basis where 
the LSC’s initial approach – or the LAB as it was then - was to bring in a 
relatively small number, – take probably their more confident, judicious  
auditors / account managers and bring them in .. not treat them with kid 
gloves, but… help them to meet the standards, get them there.  And for 
a long time there is a feeling in the Commission that the NFP agencies 
have probably been pretty indulged.   My instinct says that there will be 
a greater parity of expectation and it is the case still that in some NFP 
agencies I think the introduction of the NFP contracts has driven a 
degree of professionalisation of advice but it has not uniformly impacted 
in the agencies (LSC Regional Manager). 
 
One of the local CLS development workers confirmed the view that it had been 
necessary to balance procurement needs against compliance standards: 
In my experience in the NFP sector, the sector is most likely to do 
Benefit, Debt and Housing work and these are the core categories of 
welfare law which have got to be targeted if you’re seeking to address 
social exclusion, so the NFP sector is vital because most solicitors don’t 
do this work. So if you want that done and have pressure on it to be 
effective, efficient and deliver quality, well you can tinker with quality, 
getting it right, being accessible; what’s meant by effective depends on 
what you want to achieve, but if you think of it as dealing with social 
exclusion then we can agree on that, but how to make them more 
efficient, to deliver VFM? 
 
Achieving a balance between quality and efficiency was seen to be accentuated by 
the problem of the supply of labour, as serious in the NFP sector as in the FP sector: 
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One of the problems is recruitment of volunteer advisers.  Nowadays 
the labour market is very tight and there just aren’t that many people 
available and those that are, tend to have problems themselves – for 
instance they may be lone parents.  So the volunteer base is shrinking.   
I think this is made worse in some agencies – for instance NACAB set 
stringent training requirements which is good but is also a resource 
issue for agencies and volunteers because it takes too long to get onto 
a course and to complete it. 
 
This concern that imposing training entry standards on the NFP sector could restrict 
the workforce supply was echoed by a national representative of the advice sector.  
Whilst she expressed her support for the workforce development mission of 
NOS4Advice, she identified scarce resources as a problem.  She also argued that a 
cumbersome and expensive system of mandatory training could deter both the 
younger entrants that the sector hoped to attract, and the existing older workers with 
experience and unaccredited training, who might not be prepared to submit to 
extensive assessment. 
 
3.7 Conceptual Links between Training and Regulation – a model 
 
We are now in a position to clarify some of the conceptual links between training and 
regulation, which we have attempted in the table below. Further research would be 
required in order to test some of the propositions this model contains (such as those 
about the impact of mandatory training on workforce turnover), but it serves the 
purpose of identifying manifold links between systems of training and regulation. 
 
 
Table 3.1 Links between training and regulation – a model 
Regulated 
entry 
barriers 
Effects Risks Training model Performance 
regulation 
issues 
Regulated 
Training 
High Entry 
Barriers 
Filters 
available 
labour supply 
Provides 
proxy 
guarantee for 
starting 
quality 
Expertise may 
not be matched 
to occupational 
requirements. 
Information 
Asymmetry. 
Supplier induced 
demand 
Cherry-picking 
 
Funded by the State 
and the individual 
Pre-service 
Education 
partitioned between 
academic theoretical 
and vocational 
training 
CPD required for 
updating expertise 
Output regulation 
needs to be 
strong 
Performance 
regulation needs 
to keep output 
costs at 
competence plus 
level and covert 
rationing 
decisions & to 
maintain quality 
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Regulated 
Training 
Low Entry 
Barriers 
Less 
restricted 
access to 
available 
labour 
 
Problems 
maintaining 
competence 
Problems 
capturing 
knowledge and 
values base in 
competence 
model 
Qualification 
requirements 
may deter 
volunteer entry 
In-service 
Competence / 
standards based on 
role but with generic 
currency 
Functional 
orientation 
Individual funding 
unlikely, 
organizational 
support unreliable 
 
The skills base of 
the workforce may 
combine with 
workforce 
turnover issues 
may require 
enhanced 
monitoring of 
performance 
Unregulated 
No Formal 
Entry 
Barriers 
 
Unrestricted 
access to 
available 
labour 
Client focus may 
lead adviser to 
ignore needs of 
clients ‘outside 
the tent’ 
‘Holistic’ values 
may inflate costs 
‘ownership’ of 
clients leads to 
reluctance to 
refer 
Variable output 
regulation 
Either extended 
traineeship 
OR 
Recruitment of 
experienced labour 
with in-service 
training 
Functional 
orientation 
Strong emphasis on 
organizational 
culture and loyalty 
If turnover 
increases, 
recruitment and 
training costs 
become a 
problem for NFP 
agencies, and 
stronger 
performance 
management 
regimes may be 
required. 
 
3.8 Training as Regulation/ Regulation as Training 
  
We will conclude this section with a brief discussion of the functional overlap between 
training and regulation as a means of promoting particular behaviours.  The primary 
aim of professional training is precisely to regulate behaviour in an enduring form: 
ensuring a consistency of judgement; inculcating knowledge and skills to manage the 
transactional elements of the role; and providing an enduring set of values which will 
equip the recipients to adapt to changing practice environments.   
 
Conversely, regulation can be a powerful form of training, as we noted above.  Its 
power can derive either from the severity of the sanctions for breaching the 
regulation (removal from the Solicitors’ Roll or termination of a contract), or from 
ownership by the regulated party of the desired framework for behaviour.  At one end 
of the spectrum, the deterrent effect of extreme sanctions can, over time, generate a 
strong culture of conformity, without the need for direct hands-on inspection and 
surveillance (so disciplinary actions under Rule 15 are comparatively rare).  At the 
other end of the spectrum, the development of a consistent and regular relationship 
between an auditor and an organization can provide a supportive environment for 
quite considerable change, which our evidence suggested was the case with the 
SQM.  The Regional LSC Director described this approach in the following way: 
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What made franchising and contracting work was never the quality 
standard, was never the contract or the Law Society or the LSC; it 
was the people who went out and the people in the firms who said 
we want to achieve  
 
In some public sector areas, the link between the monitoring and the educational 
functions of audit has been made more explicit.  Evidence to the Bristol Royal 
Infirmary Inquiry identified the way in which, in the NHS, ‘audit could form an aspect 
of research and scientific development.  It was also a form of continuing professional 
education, in that it involved scrutiny of aspects of clinical practice and care’ 
(http://www.brstol-inquiry.org.uk/final_report/annex_a/chapter_18_4.htm).  However, 
the Inquiry also found that as audit developed, clinicians became concerned about 
issues of confidentiality and the link with disciplinary procedures.  There is clearly 
therefore a tension between the disciplinary and educational functions of regulatory 
audit.  The most supportive environment for the development of individuals and 
agencies is one based on mutual trust, which is difficult to encourage when the 
outcome of a procedure may be the termination of a contract. 
 
There are other conceptual links between regulation and training.  Both attempt to 
specify sets of behaviours and dispositions which they wish to encourage, but 
frequently have to be satisfied with specifying proxies for these behaviours and 
dispositions, thereby incurring the risk that they displace the intended outcome with 
conformity to the proxy demands.  The complex cultural systems that drive the 
behaviour that training and regulation seek to sponsor are sensitive but 
unpredictable, as some of our discussion of the impact of regulation, in Chapter Four, 
should demonstrate.  ‘Light touch’ systems of audit, or systems of training which are 
detached from functional roles, carry the risk of accommodating incompetent or cost-
inflating behaviour, while ‘heavy touch’ audit systems and highly functional training 
regimes risk obliterating the ‘value-added’ cultures of commitment and client-
centredness which appear to be the basis for much of the ‘quality’ in the sector.   
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Chapter Four   Issues in Regulating Legal Advice 
 
4.1  Regulation: sources, forms, functions and effects 
 
We will introduce this section with a brief exploration of four different aspects of 
regulation, and the interplay between them.  These are: 
• the sources of regulatory authority,  
• the forms of regulatory authority,  
• the functions of regulatory authority and  
• the kinds of intended and unintended effects that regulation can have. 
Throughout this chapter we will be referring for the most part to the regulatory regime 
which obtained at the time of the research, though we will refer in passing to some of 
the changes brought about by the LSA 2007. 
 
4.1.1  Sources of Regulatory Authority 
 
The sources of regulatory authority are statutory, self regulation, contractual 
regulation and elective and voluntary schemes. 
 
4.1.1.1 Statutory  
 
The primary and delegated legislation which governs solicitors includes: 
• regulations covering general rights to practise (such as the Solicitors Act 
1974, the Practising Certificate Regulations 1995, the Solicitors (Keeping of 
the Roll) Regulations 1999, the Master of the Rolls (Appeals and 
Applications) Regulations 1991, the Training Regulations), 
• regulations covering rights to practise in specific areas of law (such as the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 or the Immigration and Asylum Act, 
1999, Part V which created the Office of the Immigration Services 
Commission (OISC)) and 
• legislation affecting aspects of practice such as client confidentiality 
(Proceeds of Crime Act 2002). 
 
In addition, prior to the LSA 2007, there existed other forms of regulatory authority 
relevant to the legal services field, such as Licensing Bodies (e.g. the Council for 
Licensed Conveyancers established following the Administration of Justice Act 1985) 
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and the Financial Services Authority (FSA).  The work of Economic Regulators also 
applies to legal services, and has become more relevant with the passage of the LSA 
2007, since the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) has specific responsibilities in relation to 
fulfilling the competition objective of legal services regulation, and ongoing duties to 
consider regulating provisions once Front Line Regulators (FLRs) have been 
authorized (LSA 2007, ss 57-61).  Under the Enterprise Act 2002 the LSB has taken 
on the role of an economic regulator, with ‘stop now powers’, and powers to direct 
FLRs to behave in such a way as to promote consumer interest . 
 
4.1.1.2 Statutory - rights and protection 
 
Much of the primary and delegated legislation discussed above confers rights on 
consumers of legal services, such as those sections of the Solicitors Act 1974 
covering professional fees (ss 57, 59-61, 64, 66-71).  The sections of the LSA 2007 
which create the Office of Legal Complaints (OLC) provide rights of referral to it in the 
event of failure to resolve a complaint with legal service providers at a local level, and 
gives it powers of redress, while leaving existing disciplinary responsibilities with the 
FLRs, under LSB oversight (DCA 2005, p.134: LSA 2007 s. 114). 
 
4.1.1.3 Self-Regulation 
 
Self-regulation is generally governed by the statutory licence which also guarantees 
the sheltered market. In the case of the legal profession, the movement has been 
away from self-regulation towards independent regulation, confirmed in the LSA 2007 
with the creation of the OLC, and the development of arrangements for oversight of 
FLRs by the LSB .    As discussed above, the advantages of self-regulation are seen 
to lie in the professional autonomy to act in the best interests of the client, regardless 
of potentially conflicting interests of the State or of vested interests.  The 
disadvantages are seen to be the profession’s reluctance to discipline its own 
members, and the use of regulatory powers to develop restrictive practices. 
 
4.1.1.4 Contractual Regulation 
 
In Chapter Three we identified the significance of the contract in filling the regulatory 
gap between input measures like initial training and qualification, and output 
measures such as complaints handling and disciplinary procedures. Contractualism, 
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entailing supervision and audit, is becoming the dominant mode of operation in the 
public sector.  The Civil Contracts offered by the LSC are clearly ideal types of this 
regulatory form, but Service Delivery Agreements (SDAs) or Service Level 
Agreements (SLAs) also incorporate compliance regimes which are far more rigorous 
than the evaluation regimes characteristic of grant aid. One of the CLS development 
workers identified the problems which could accompany the transition to the contract 
compliance culture: 
I think there is quite a cultural problem and it just doesn’t work in the 
world as it is now.  There are people there whose values are great and 
who’d do everything for the client but who are still rooted in the politics 
of the 1980s so they think the organisation has got to be collective and 
everyone should be consulted on everything and funders are always 
wrong and the LSC in particular is the devil incarnate – and it’s a culture 
which is still quite powerful within agencies and tends to influence 
people who come into it and to some extent  I think it’s a problem with 
quite a few voluntary agencies which hate us, which is an impediment to 
establishing the partnership, the relationship of trust which the LSC and 
local authorities want.  I think the only way is just to be completely 
straight and say something like ‘look, buy into it, this is the way it is, it’s 
not a grant, it’s  a contract, and you have to think private sector because 
that’s the way the world is now’.  Mind you, most local authorities 
haven’t really changed either – most of them are still dishing out grants 
quite haphazardly, and are happy as long as they get good results 
which of course you tend to do when you’re dealing with generalist 
agencies.  (CLS development worker)   
 
Contractual regulation has a number of advantages not shared by other regulatory 
approaches.  It is flexible, offering the capacity to adapt the regulatory content to 
changing situations and priorities.  Correspondingly, it offers the opportunity to 
specify detailed performance in context, in a way that is impossible for statutory 
regulation to match.   Hence the LSC has been able to regulate performance in fine 
detail through the use of the Funding Code, SQM and the discretionary elements of 
compliance auditing whilst maintaining a degree of flexibility in terms of context.  A 
further advantage is that it allows the regulator to withdraw suppliers from the market 
without explicit or heavy handed intervention.  It also offers a form of arms-length 
‘ownership’ of services: as agencies become dependent on the contract to maintain 
their organization, they may be more willing to adapt to the demands of the 
purchaser rather than risk losing the reservoir of skill and experience which is funded 
by the contract. 
 
Suppliers also saw the contract as a means of exporting to them some of the risks 
and costs associated with providing services, and the justice of this view was in part 
recognised by the LSC: 
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at the moment it’s possible for NFP workers to do that extra stuff 
because of the cross subsidy from the local authority – but if CLACs 
and CLANs come in then each funder should have their own set of clear 
objectives so that you can’t have this sort of cross funding where the 
local authority is effectively subsidising the LSC – though equally you 
could say that in some senses the LSC cross subsidises the local 
authority as well because it builds the quality of workers and allows for 
the support of volunteers and actually the money the LSC puts in, it’s 
more generous than the local authorities – but what the LSC really 
wants is a straightforward contract where they pay for a number of 
cases and that’s what they get.  (CLS Development worker) 
 
LSC managers also argued that, compared to other forms of regulatory authority, 
they were able to achieve greater independence, since regulation was not their 
business, and because they were not constrained by a supply shortage: 
I’ve a friend who’s a GP – she said ‘I’ve got to have my accreditation, 
mind you they’re so short of GPs that if I was Harold Shipman they’d 
only make me re-train’. You know there are limitations on regulatory 
frameworks – we have the great benefit actually that we have a 
greater degree of independence than a lot of the other regulatory 
mechanisms or regulatory agencies (LSC Regional Manager) 
 
However, contractual regulation can only control the quality of work in the market 
place for publicly funded services: if there is a private market for advice which can be 
exploited by non-contracted agencies or individuals, then another form of regulation 
may need to be introduced (as was the case with immigration advice and the OISC). 
 
4.1.1.5 Elective or voluntary schemes 
 
Badged membership schemes were introduced into the voluntary sector in order to 
counteract the widely recognised local variations in operating standards.  The most 
established and well know of these is the Citizen’s Advice scheme, which runs its 
own audit, and which is passported for the SQM.  However, doubts about whether 
the process would ever be used to exclude a ‘member’ suggest it may be 
inefficacious in raising standards to a threshold level across the sector: 
Other than LSC regulation there is no overall scheme (in the VCO 
sector).  If an adviser were in a solicitor agency then they’d be subject 
to Law Society regulation and if they worked in immigration, to the 
OISC, but otherwise the NFP sector is very lightly regulated and it’s 
very variable – so, for instance there are different quality standards.  It’s 
partly a resource issue – apart from NACAB which has money to audit, 
most ‘regulation’ comprises self accreditation systems.  But even with 
the CAB, I would question how effective it is, whether you can term it 
regulation as they rarely chuck anyone out. (National officer of a major 
advice consortium). 
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Commercial certification marks like Investors in People (IiP) and ISO9002 have a 
dual function for participating organizations.  They aim to provide intrinsic benefits: in 
the case of IiP the aim is to develop the capacity of an organization to invest 
efficiently in workforce development and provide it with market advantage by 
guaranteeing certain features of organizations providing services.  These marks have 
a considerable reach, for example, IiP is held by 37,000 organizations in the UK.  
However, the Scoping Study on Quality in the Legal Services Industry (DCA 2005) is 
generally critical of them as a means of remedying information asymmetries, since 
research tends to demonstrate that few consumers notice them at all, and those who 
do, fail to register their significance.  The authors argue that quality marks need to 
meet the condition of objectivity, and to measure accurately the expertise of the 
adviser, and that moreover they should not be linked to artificial barriers to market 
entry, raising the question of whether there is a potential conflict with the move 
towards preferred suppliers in the publicly funded sector.  
 
4.2. Forms of Regulation 
 
This section excludes formal regulation in the form of licensing and controlling entry 
which are discussed in chapters Three and Five 
 
4.2.1 Informal Regulation versus Formal, ‘Command and Control’  
Regulation 
 
The significance of informal cultures on behaviour is recognised in Baldwin’s 1997 
review of the regulation of legal services in the form of the controls exercised on 
barristers by Chambers, Inns of Court, Circuits, Clerks and Specialist Bar 
Associations (Baldwin, 1997, p. 13).  Our data points to a wide range of informal 
influences on the actors in the publicly funded legal advice sector. These include: 
• training and other mentoring or supervision 
• specialist networks 
• clients 
• district judges 
• LSC contract managers 
• Other NFP advisers 
• Spatial organization of agency (e.g. separate offices or open plan) 
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• Critical mass of other specialists within organization 
• Recruitment procedures 
 
Some of these influences are compatible with Lave and Wenger’s model of 
‘communities of practice’ (1991), which represents a useful counterweight to the view 
that solicitors are individualist ‘hired guns’.  We will explore in both this Chapter and 
Chapter Five the powerful effects of organizational cultures. 
 
4.2.2 Formal – Discipline and Complaints handling 
 
Discipline and complaints handling have tended to be identified by consumer 
organizations as one of the weak areas of regulation of the FP sector.  The 
arguments delineated in the White Paper were that the current system failed to 
provide consumers with confidence about its independence, was too slow, lacked 
clarity about the gateway for complaints, and that because of the professional bodies’ 
capacity to set their own standards, these gateways varied across the sector. 
 
In the FP sector, Rule 15 of the Law Society’s practice rules covers the information 
given to clients about complaints handling procedures within the firm, but does not 
specify the form these should take or set standards for them.  One respondent 
identified the problems that might result for firms from the looseness of the 
framework: 
I think the difficulty a lot of solicitors find is that, when you don’t find yourself 
part of all that framework,  you see yourself paying for it, you see yourself 
shackled with all the rules and regulations and you see yourself competing 
with others that don’t  comply and it’s difficult.  In other words, if you are an 
ethical firm that is well regulated yourself - I’m talking now specifically about 
Rule 15 and things like that - and if you apply it rigorously and 
conscientiously and kill these things off, as I think we do, in all but the more 
meritorious of them, it begs the question of why you need anything beyond 
it, but that of course involves saying ‘what about the firms that don’t apply 
Rule 15 skilfully?’ I mean what I’ve learned over the years is this.  If a 
complaint comes in, you’ve failed in any event, haven’t you? Even if it’s 
unmeritorious – and so you’ve got to take Rule 15 seriously, and find a 
solution to it, even in those cases where you think the client is just pulling 
your leg and my strategy to avoid referrals to the OSS at all costs (Senior 
Partner & Family specialist, Chapelvale firm) 
 
Weaknesses in firms’ internal systems have been seen as mirrored in the Law 
Society’s complaints handling, which has been frequently criticised by the 
Consumers’ Association and the Legal Services Ombudsman (LSO) (Clementi, 2004, 
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p. 57), and as we noted above, the system has now been superseded by the OLC.  
The development of the Consumer Complaints Service (CCS) as a successor to the 
Office for the Supervision of Solicitors (OSS), and as a quasi-autonomous body, was 
intended to answer criticisms of its lack of independence and to remedy the slow rate 
at which it responded to complaints.  
 
Whilst complaints handling in the NFP sector has not attracted the sort of adverse 
publicity the solicitors’ complaints system has received, it nevertheless represents 
one of the ‘regulatory gaps’ with which Clementi was concerned.  One of the 
weaknesses identified in the existing system, with its mixture of multiple remote 
oversight (including the LSO), the Legal Services Complaints Commission (LSCC), 
the Secretary of State, the Master of the Rolls, the FSA and the OISC) and 
professional body front line responsibility, was its inability to accommodate new 
entrants to the market, which publicly funded NFP providers represent.  An audit of 
quality standards for advice work (Advice Services Alliance (ASA), 2000) found that 
complaints handling was unevenly dealt with by existing standards, despite the fact 
that many NFP agencies identify client focus and user involvement as key values. 
 
4.2.3 Formal – Quality Control and Management 
 
In this section we explore the concern with quality in legal services by identifying the 
origins of the concept in industrial production, its translation to the service sector and 
to legal services in particular, and the issues raised by current market driven 
perspectives, and the prevalence of competing quality ‘badges’. 
 
In l979 the British Standards Institute (BSI) developed the kite mark BS5750 in 
response to the growth of the quality accreditation movement which followed the 
Second World War.  This focused on quality control systems and was revised to 
comply with the international standard of quality assurance, ISO 9000 (Kirkpatrick 
and Martinez Lucio, l995, p 5). Its somewhat limited approach to quality was 
subsequently deepened in the development of the holistic concept, Total Quality 
Management (TQM), which focuses on the empowerment and involvement of 
employees and the elimination of the causes of defects, and which gave rise to the 
development of a number of certification programmes such as IiP.   
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In the public sector these developments may be seen as culminating in NPM, the 
shorthand term for the administrative reforms which, as discussed above and in 
Chapter 1, centre on  the contractualisation of relations between agencies and 
service providers and between clients and professionals (see Freedland, l994; 
Vincent-Jones, l994), thereby achieving strict cost control (Pollitt, l993), the 
generation of explicit performance indicators (see Hood, l991; Tritter, l994), 
delegated budgets and increased accountability through external audit (see Power, 
l997).  The Law Society has made clear its endorsement of the emphasis on quality 
control (l989, paras 99-129) as evidenced in the establishment of the Client Care 
Rule (Law Society, l991), the introduction in l993 of the Practice Management 
guidelines, which played an important part in shaping the first franchising 
specification (Legal Aid Board, l998, p 38) and the development of the Lexcel 
Practice Management Standard, which mirrors many of the features of the SQM.  
 
A combination of factors prepared the ground for the application of NPM to the 
publicly funded sector of the legal profession.  The development of a mass market for 
legal services, along with rising costs and overheads, made their provision an 
increasingly expensive item of public funding, whilst for non-legally aided, middle-
income clients, the cost of legal advice diminished access to justice (Bevan et al, 
l994, p 2) at a time when, arguably, law was colonising increasing areas of social life 
(Galanter, l992).  At the same time, the increasing sophistication of consumers made 
the obscurity which shielded professional services from public accountability 
unacceptable.   
 
Quality initiatives in the form of franchising were applied to the legal aid sector in 
England and Wales in 1993. As part of the implementation of exclusive contracting, it 
was proposed that the transaction criteria for civil advice and assistance would be 
supplemented by outcome indicators, with, ‘where appropriate’, in depth file review, 
leading, in exceptional cases, to more detailed inspection and external peer review; 
and that in addition there might be occasional use of client questionnaires (Legal Aid 
Board, l998, pp 39, 44). In essence, the same framework is deployed in LSC ‘risk-
based auditing’: the sophisticated analysis of outcome indicators allows the 
identification of ‘risky’ firms or agencies to whom the detailed audit and peer review 
procedures can be applied. 
 
The development of the transaction criteria into LAFQAS and the QM and SQM 
standards for both private FP and NFP sectors represented a watershed in the 
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application of quality techniques to legal service work, and formed the foundation for 
the QM levels which now obtain.  QMs reflected a commitment on the part of the CLS 
to the development of the advice network as a whole, and recognized the gateway to 
specialist advice, and therefore access to justice, represented by the ‘lower’ tiers of 
advice workers.  However, QM came to be seen as over-audited: the initial conduct 
of annual SQM audits was both a burden on the audited organization and absorbed a 
considerable amount of the LSC’s energies and funds.  The transition was described 
in the following terms by the LSC regional manager: 
it was an audit on everybody, every year, for the purposes of ticking a 
box and saying they had met the standard.  The difficulty for us is that 
it’s very resource intensive and it means that you’re not actually able to 
direct your audit resource to where it’s most likely to be efficiently, or 
effectively, used, so, for instance if we thought we had a particular 
problem  with a firm where we might  want to go and audit for a week 
rather than a day or 2 days, we’d find it difficult to find the resources to 
do that so the real shift is from a universal annual audit cycle towards 
the principle that you actually audit on risk – broadly defined as how 
serious is what might be wrong and is it actually wrong, and is there 
actually a risk or is there not? 
 
However, we will note below that the intensive auditing of the early stages may have 
had a radical effect on internal practices and procedures, and have given the QM a 
reach which justified the resources expended. 
 
4.2.4 Quality and procurement – extending the influence of the QM 
 
One obvious consequence of the extended role of the LSC in commissioning 
provision from the NFP sector has been the development of concordance between 
the quality and audit regimes of the NFP sector and the QM.  By 2000, this factor, in 
combination with the policy drive towards large scale inclusion of the NFP sector in 
the CLS, meant that LAFQAS had become major influence on the sector in terms of 
the redesign of their quality regimes (see for instance the Advice Services Alliance 
mapping exercises, 2000).  By February 2004, the following Quality Standards had 
been mapped onto the CLSQM: 
• Commission for Racial Equality Core Standards 
• The Association of Local Government Quality assurance Measures 
• Age Concern Quality Standard 
• Disability Information Advice Line (DIAL UK) Quality Standard 
• Federation of Information and Advice Centre (FIAC) Quality Standards 
• Quality Management in Mind Standards 
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• Practical Quality Assurance for Small Organisations 
• Telephone Helplines Association Quality Standard 
• Youth Access Quality Standard 
 
At the same time, however, the NFP sector’s perception of what represented a 
standard and how it should be maintained, a product of its distinct history, persisted.  
Consequently, a slightly different balance of influences pertains in the two sectors, 
with systematic but informal influences probably more evident in the NFP sector.  
 
4.3 Functions of Regulation 
 
This section is intended to help identify which forms of regulation are most effective 
in fulfilling which functions.  For example, in terms of defining the scope of an activity, 
or of the range of activities in which an actor may become involved, statutory 
regulation may provide the furthest reach; disciplinary and disbarring mechanisms 
may have the strongest effect in outlawing certain performances, whilst contractual 
regulation may be the most flexible and penetrative form of regulation in specifying 
both scope and performance on a daily basis. 
 
4.3.1 Specifying scope 
 
In the market for professional services, defining the scope of services has always 
been associated with the process of securing market control on the part of the 
professions.  In publicly funded legal advice work, however, the process of defining 
scope becomes more elaborate, and correspondingly, the specifications involved 
have become more and more detailed.  The Civil Contract and its accompanying 
Funding Code has to specify which: 
• clients are eligible on the basis of means;  
• matters are eligible on the basis of general criteria identified in the Guidance 
on Excluded Work (for example representation at social security tribunals);  
• matters are excluded on the basis of assessment of merit or sufficient benefit 
(for example, where prospects of success are poor or where the cost benefit 
calculation does not justify pursuing the matter);  
• supplier is applying for funding for the matter.   
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The Funding Code, which defines all these matters, consists of several documents 
with which regulated agencies need to be familiar, the Criteria (43 pages), the 
Procedures (55 pages) and the Guidance (352 pages). 
 
For our respondents in the NFP sector, these forms of specification of scope were 
sometimes seen as problematic and because of counter-cultural issues, caused 
compliance problems.  For example, the embedded culture of universalism in some 
areas of social welfare advice could mean that advisers found it distasteful to begin 
an interview with a question about means: 
One of the big problems we have is the capital rule, because… for 
eligible work, the actual clients have to meet the capital rule.  It’s 
currently something like £1200.  Anything above that and you’re only 
allowed to do 45 minutes worth of work with them.  Now that capital 
level is actually below the poverty line benefit level, because I think 
currently disregard on capital for income support is something like 
£3,000.  So it’s a poverty line which is even more stringent than the 
actual poverty benefits and we certainly find that increasingly to be quite 
a serious problem for us.  (Manager of a welfare rights service) 
 
Respondents from the LSC argued that since scope was an issue of policy rather 
than audit, it was not a legitimate topic of complaint for NFP agencies.  However two 
other aspects of scope raised by respondents may be viewed as legitimate matters 
for debate.  The first is the impact which limiting scope has on an NFP agency’s 
‘mission’, the essential reason for which they feel they are in business.  The second 
concerns areas which are perhaps not as clear cut as those responsible for audit 
would argue.  One example is the Disability Living Allowance (DLA) form.  This 
lengthy form contains questions designed to establish the degree of capacity a 
disabled person has to carry out the daily tasks necessary to live independently.  
Practitioners argued that many clients failed to understand both the need to be exact 
about their capacities, and that failure to establish dependence will mean refusal.  
Several of the cases observed or commented on involved DLA appeals, where the 
adviser was attempting to remedy the failure to establish dependence at the initial 
application.  Further examples are discussed below. 
 
4.3.2 Specifying price 
 
Economic regulators fulfil the function of setting the competitive boundaries for the 
provision of goods and services, of ensuring the functioning of a competitive market, 
and, increasingly as the service sector has accumulated a large number of privatized 
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utilities with different degrees of monopoly, setting prices so as to balance the 
interests of consumers and companies.  Where services are publicly funded, the 
market is a curious one, controlled by one monopoly purchaser without a direct 
interest in the outcome of the transaction between supplier and client.  In these 
circumstances a mechanism has to be found to counteract the natural tendency for 
those not paying for a service to make unreasonable demands on it. This function 
has to be fulfilled in certain instances by the ‘reasonable paying private client’ test 
(Funding Code Guidance 3C-035), but in other circumstances by using the contract 
to set the price.  
 
These mechanisms might be expected to produce complaints from suppliers, and we 
shall detail a number of these below in the section on the effects of the contract.  In 
general the respondents in the FP sector emphasised the differential between the 
returns for legally aided and private client work in order to highlight the economic 
impact of deciding to persist with a contract, whilst respondents in the NFP sector 
identified cost compliance auditing as placing unreasonable demands on advisers in 
terms of the ability to meet the contract.  There were however also respondents in 
each sector who found the specification of costs reasonable if not generous, though 
their calculations included elements of cross-subsidy from other funders and from 
private client work respectively.  The following comment from an adviser from a local 
authority welfare rights service demonstrates this: 
Well the money’s very good for us I have to say because it’s block 
funding.  So for every post that they fund we get about £50,000.  Now 
given that our overheads are already public funded through the 
funding that we get from other public funding, that money, we use it to 
employ an extra member of staff.  But that leaves us about 20 grand 
in profit and even after we’ve employed an additional member of staff.  
So we’ve put that to quite good use, it initially created quite a surplus 
for us because with three posts we’re funding three members of staff 
and we must have had about 30 to 40 grand spare.  
 
As a caveat, however, the manager of this service stated that as they had had to 
perform more exactly to contract specifications, this ‘surplus’ had disappeared, which 
suggests that initially they had not fully understood the terms of the contract. 
 
The following partner in a high street practice in Weaverton found the costs 
specification tough but identified what appeared to him to be penalties in the TFF 
system for efficient firms: 
now the beef at the moment is firms who are saying ‘well why am I 
being paid £150 to do the same job as my neighbour next door who is 
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getting £300 because he over-egged his pudding over the last 12 
months?’ So there is a beef at the moment between those two 
standpoints. I think in (Weaverton) we’ve been offered the lowest, so 
efficient solicitors could be penalized and I think they will be, because 
we’ve been offered –  it’s ranged from between £297 to £160 for the 
same piece of work – we’ve been offered £160 but I’m happy with that 
– it’s right, the figures are there; I’ve  got Excel spread sheets which 
show that that is what my average was, and I’m still making money out 
of that so I don’t understand what the other firms have been doing, to 
be honest (Senior Partner, Weaverton legal aid practice) 
 
4.3.3 Specifying performance: assuring quality? 
 
We will now briefly summarise some of the main issues which have been raised in 
the debate over quality initiatives in legal service work.  The issues most frequently 
identified as problematic include:  
• the ambiguous character of some of the key concepts of quality discourse 
(Sommerlad & Wall, 1999) 
• the complexity and intangibility of the core aspects of professional services  
• the consequent difficulty in the setting and assessment of standards  
• the resulting danger that too much reliance will be placed on proxy 
measurable indicators which may then displace the immeasurable aspects of 
quality (Raine & Wilson, l993, p 87; and see Gorz, 1989; Power, l997, p 13).   
 
Travers has argued that sole reliance on process measures is insufficient, and that 
they should be supplemented by outcome measures.  However he also points to the 
multiplicity of variables which may affect an outcome, such as, in addition to the 
lawyer’s skill and tactics, ‘the strength of the opponent’s case, the legal issues 
involved and the tactics of the other side’ (1994, p 184).  As a result he suggests that 
the variables of process and outcome should be isolated, and the causal relationship 
between them identified (Travers, 1994, p 181; and see Wood, l997)  
 
The architects of the Transaction Criteria acknowledged their limitations as quality 
indicators; for instance, conceding Travers’ argument, they noted that ‘strategy is 
inherently a matter for subjective discretion.  Indeed, it is in the very nature of legal 
work that there is rarely a correct answer to the handling and outcome of a case  ...’ 
(Sherr et al l994, p194).  As a result they proposed the use of a further mechanism to 
supplement existing quality measures. Amongst other approaches, they have trialled 
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and advocated a ‘mystery shopper’ and peer review methodology to measure the 
real quality of advice (Moorhead et al, 2001).10  
 
These concerns are related to the problem, identified above, that most quality 
measures rely on proxy measurements. For instance, the ‘soft skills’ are least easily 
measured by QA regimes, and since these are often regarded as the special 
expertise of the NFP sector, this may account for the wariness with which it 
approaches quality. Several of our informants argued that the LSC approach suffered 
from a general failure to recognise the added value they brought to their work, such 
as the social policy work which is a key aspect of the mission of Citizen’s Advice and 
Age Concern. 
 
However, in spite of reservations from both sectors about the capacity of the SQM or 
contract compliance audit to capture the quality of advice (of which more below), it 
was widely regarded as providing a reasonably reliable guide to the baseline that 
organizations should seek to reach. The regional manager of the LSC expressed 
confidence in the way in which, by use of proxy measures, genuine issues of quality 
could be identified: 
there are two things we audit against, fundamentally, there’s the 
requirements of the Quality Standard and the requirements of the contract – 
they come down effectively to clauses and rules so you may say ‘well we 
haven’t got any specific quality concerns but the information we have says 
that this firm is likely to be breaching the contract or this particular 
requirement of the contract’ ..  so you go and audit it and find out what the 
facts are because any kind of proxy information is only indicative it’s never 
definitive – because the information on the profile is just that, proxy.  The 
audit will say,’ let’s have a look at the facts’ –  you have information that a 
high percentage of  certificate applications are being refused on merit 
grounds - you want to go out and find out why  ..  
 
He then went on to describe a case which he claimed illustrated the way in which 
proxy indicators (for example, above average time per case or inactivity on file) threw 
up problems of quality of advice, and, crucially, of supervision: 
I went to an interesting case where someone came to a supplier and said 
‘the house next door to me burned down, and there’s a massive amount of 
damage to all the goods in my house and I want to sue’. So they said, ‘ok 
we’ll sue the landlord; how did it burn down?’. ‘It was set fire to actually, it 
was arson.’  So the adviser then – and this is over the course of 18 months - 
writes to the landlord and says ’tell us who your insurers are because you’re 
liable for all the damage to our client’s property.’  Landlord writes back and 
                                                 
10 Originally Sherr et al  rejected client and peer review on the basis of lack of knowledge and self-interest respectively, contending 
that case evaluation was probably not capable of sufficiently objective evaluation and proposing outcome measures as a solution 
(l994, p 195, & 197). 
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says ‘we’re not liable, it was arson’. So the adviser, leaving it weeks in 
between, talks to the client ‘no that’s not acceptable’; writes again, gets the 
landlord’s insurers, itemises all the stuff, writes to the insurers and they say 
‘we’re not liable, it was arson’. The adviser then goes to supervisor who 
says ’the landlord isn’t liable - it’s arson.’ 
  
As he noted, peer review wasn’t necessary to identify the flaws in the handling of this 
case.  He emphasised the importance of supervision, since many of the risk 
indicators, such as certificate refusals, and departure from the standards from 
completing cases, would be picked up by good internal supervision systems. 
 
4.4 Effects of regulation 
 
The increase in regulation of the publicly funded sector in recent years has produced 
the term ‘regulatory burden’.  The LSC contract has been seen as having a 
particularly significant impact, which could be described in terms of Power’s concept 
of ‘colonization’ (Power, 1997). 
 
4.4.1 Regulatory burden 
 
The BRTF/BRC has consistently identified administrative burdens imposed by 
regulation as hampering business, channelling resources away from more productive 
uses, and inhibiting innovation and growth (2005b, p 4). More recently it has reported 
on the burden that regulation imposes on the voluntary sector, including those 
organizations in our NFP sample (BRTF, 2005a). Consequently it recommended the 
adoption of the Standard Cost model for estimating regulatory burden, and a target of 
a 25% reduction in the burden over four years, overseen by an independent public 
body which would evaluate the costs implicit in all new regulation (BRTF, 2004).   
The theme of ‘less is more’ has been taken up in a number of other reports, 
commissioned by the government and by other stakeholders in the regulation 
process, such as VCOs and small businesses.   
 
The Hampton Report (Hampton, 2005) found that the systems of inspection and audit 
operated by government as a whole were uncoordinated and good practice was not 
uniform.  Hampton also identified overlaps in regulators’ responsibilities and 
enforcement activities, a proliferation of forms, and excessive duplication of requests 
for information.  Echoing other commentators in arguing that risk assessment - 
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‘though widely recognised as fundamental to effectiveness – is not implemented as 
thoroughly and comprehensively as it should be’ (2005, p1), he recommended that:  
• comprehensive risk assessment should be the foundation of all regulators’ 
enforcement programmes; 
• there should be no inspections without a reason; 
• resources released from unnecessary inspections should be redirected 
towards advice to improve compliance;  
• data requirements, including the design of forms, should be coordinated 
across regulators.   
 
His report emphasises the need to ‘streamline and modernise the regulatory system 
in order to deliver reduced administrative burdens’ (2005, p2) and also to release 
resources for advice: 
Overall the level of inspections in parts of the regulatory system seems     
higher than is necessary to achieve regulatory outcomes.  Inspection is 
a high cost activity and inflexible inspection programmes, in inspecting 
businesses unnecessarily, take resources away from advice services, 
where there are serious unmet needs  (2005, p. 26). 
 
Other independent commentators, including academics, tend to endorse the view 
that regulation has been burdensome, especially for small businesses and 
organisations (which most legal aid law practices and NFP offices are), and, with 
regard to the NFP sector, potentially destructive of the very characteristics which 
were cited as primary reasons for devolving service delivery to it in the first place. 
However, whilst the literature emanating from the LSC and Ministry of Justice (MoJ) 
stresses the objective of building a publicly funded legal service which is holistic, 
creative and based on relationships of trust, it also continues to emphasise the need 
for ‘tight management controls’.   
 
Arguably a major reason for the tensions which emerge from commentaries on 
regulation of VCOs and SMEs relates to the multiple functions which that regulation 
is now expected to fulfil, an issue which we have touched on in the Introduction and 
in Section 4.3 above.  On the one hand, at the micro-level, it is charged with ensuring 
that regulated services simultaneously deliver quality, VFM and responsiveness 
(each of which is not only a contested concept, but may require a different form of 
regulation). On the other hand, at the macro level, it connects with government 
concern with the ‘dependency culture’ exemplified by the targeting of social  
exclusion through non-state bodies and suggests that in the future ‘responsibility for 
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the social sector (will be) handed to voluntary organisations and business’ and that 
the ‘VCS  adopts more business practices’ ( BRTF, 2005a, p 15).  This evolving 
situation creates tensions because, as Bolton argues, ‘as the role of the state has 
changed from providing public services and utilities directly to ensuring that these are 
provided, so the focus of regulation has shifted from relatively simple questions of 
probity to more complex questions of performance’ (M. Bolton, 2002, p 2). 
 
4.4.2 Contractual burdens for the NFP sector  
 
Observers of VCOs and NFP organizations increasingly suggest that the construction 
of the contract between the state and VCOs acts as a powerful form of regulatory 
authority over agency behaviour.  For many organizations, contracted funding 
represents a departure from the practices associated with project-based funding, 
which is predicated on greater freedom to define goals and working practices. 
 
Research by Alcock and his colleagues identifies the difficulties VCOs face as a 
result of the contracting process.  These include the way in which funding timeframes 
may distort priorities, and, where the funding is uncertain, create difficulties in 
managing the skillset of the workforce: ‘for small organisations this could become the 
focus of their work for a time .. (and this is) exacerbated by annually renewable 
contracts’. (Alcock et al, 2004, p 26).  They go on to argue that: ‘ the result is often 
poor value for money, for both contractor and organisation, financial instability and 
uncertainty, difficulties in recruitment and retention of staff, a focus on shorter term 
outputs rather than longer term change and diversion from the business of delivering 
better services’ (2004, p. 27).  In our sample these criticisms were borne out in a 
number of ways in the NFP sector.  Advice organizations with limited access to 
alternative funds (for example from a local authority funding stream) or which were 
heavily dependent on uncertain recurring grants would find it difficult to maintain a 
critical mass of advice expertise in any one area, and would therefore rely on LSC 
funding to support specialist work.  Correspondingly, it would be more difficult for 
single advice specialists to manage the contract, particularly if demand was 
unpredictable.  They would therefore tend to work in isolation from other advice tiers, 
and this would have a number of ripple effects:  Their expertise would be less likely 
to ‘trickle down’ to General Help level advisers, which might in turn adversely affect 
the process.  A similar problem could result from the short term nature of some of the 
funding.  One of the CAB Managers identified the Specialist Support Service 
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Contract as an important element in her strategy both for upgrading the skill levels of 
her own specialist and general advice staff and for meeting diverse need in a rural 
area with access problems and insufficient volume of business to sustain a contract.  
The subsequent premature termination of this contract represented an unexpected 
blow,11 as it had been seen to generate expectations of levels of service which could 
not then be met.  A similar point was made by the Chapelvale Women’s Centre in 
Linfield, which had received LSC funding for advice to victims of domestic violence, 
had established that there was a need, stimulated demand, and then had the funding 
withdrawn. 
 
According to Alcock et al, the standardized and complex nature of contracts between 
government and VCOs reveals a ‘one sided and inflexible approach to contracting on 
the part of statutory agencies that show themselves unreceptive to ideas from VCOs 
about the specification of services ..’ (2004, pp 29-30), a point illustrated by the 
examples given above and echoed by several of our respondents. 
 
The contracting process rarely allows for full cost recovery: commissioning 
organizations are generally reluctant to pay their appropriate proportion of overheads 
and management costs, and, as we explore further in Chapter Five, very little 
attention is given to the costs of reproducing the labour force, either in terms of the 
direct and indirect costs of training, or the inevitable inefficiencies which result from 
slow start-up (the length of time it takes a new worker to take on a ‘normal’ case 
load). This built-in funding deficit, coupled with annually renewable contracts, creates 
considerable financial insecurity, transfers high levels of risk onto VCOs and is, some 
commentators argue, unsustainable, particularly in relation to the delivery of non-
profit making services to vulnerable groups.  Evidence suggests that highly unstable 
funding relationships also undermine trust between contractors and VCOs (Alcock et 
al, 2004, p. 32), and this was confirmed by the experiences of some of our NFP 
respondents 
 
4.4.3 Colonization 
 
Michael Power identifies two extremes of response to audit processes (1997).  One 
is ‘decoupling’ where the audited organization seeks to manage the process by 
delegating responsibility for dealing with the audit to a specialized section or sub-set:  
                                                 
11 Following representations, this service was restored and continues to be regarded as a valuable support to the NFP sector. 
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The other extreme to consider is that the values and practices which 
make auditing possible penetrate deep into the core of organizational 
operations, not just in terms of requiring energy and resources to 
conform to new reporting demands but in the creation over time of 
new mentalities, new incentives and perceptions of significance. 
(Power,1997, p 97) 
 
The impact of the LSC contract and associated auditing illustrates Power’s argument 
that this form of regulation can have a major cultural impact which extends beyond 
the relative weight of the funding and can amount to a form of colonization: 
They do hold a lot of clout - funders do anyway, but the LSC do hold a 
remarkable amount of influence - for what they actually put into 
organisations, phenomenal.  Out of proportion I would say, and   that’s 
quite clever, quite good from their point of view and I do support the 
Specialist Quality Mark and the impact it has had.  I think there are a 
lot of strengths to that. They need to be aware of that sometimes, 
because the audit regimes they run are very tough. The local authority 
put in a lot more money than the LSC but the LSC, in terms of actual 
advice and quality, are awful lot more influential than the local 
authority. (Director, specialist Housing NFP organization). 
 
One respondent complained about how auditing appeared to be spreading, but 
seemed uncertain about the impact it was having: 
In the last 3 years we’ve had a fantastic growth (in auditing) and in 
this sort of performance measurement/management that’s gone on 
at the County Council level.  As to how that actually impacts on the 
Service I’m not really sure.  Some of it seems its things that we’ve 
got to be seen to be doing.  We have these performance 
measurements some of which we’ve come up with ourselves... 
(Director, Local Authority Welfare Rights Advice Service). 
 
However other responses suggested that the intended and unintended 
consequences of auditing’s ‘colonizing effect’ on NFP organizations could in some 
areas be quite substantial; we explore these responses in greater detail below. 
 
4.5 Benefits of the contract and audit 
 
The contract and audit were viewed, especially by managers, as having some very 
positive effects especially in relation to management systems and procedures both of 
which were perceived as improving client care,  business planning and making 
practitioners sensitive to the costs and benefits of cases.  
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4.5.1 Improving management systems 
 
Respondents in management roles often took a positive view of aspects of the 
cultural transformation produced by QM and audits, and in particular the 
improvements in their organizations’ systems, even where they identified gaps, 
inadequacies or inconsistencies in the process.  In several cases they were also 
positive about the effect on staff who they found difficult to shift on their own.  For 
instance a CAB contract manager identified the process as facilitating supervision of 
recalcitrant staff: 
I’m very strict about my supervision of them because it’s prescribed in 
the manual what I do and the other staff I manage I like to make sure 
that they’re supervised as regularly as well….  Some people don’t like 
being supervised, as they have been doing the same job all the time 
and think ‘well I don’t need to be supervised’. (Contract Manager, 
Hillchester CAB) 
 
The following positive comment from the senior partner of a firm specializing in 
education and community care was typical of the views of the management stratum 
in the FP sector: 
I think it’s transformed our firm.  We were reasonably well managed 
but, in general terms, we think it’s been all to the good.  It’s made us 
have standard files; it’s meant that papers are in place, that proper 
notes are kept.  Generally speaking, although it was traumatic to 
begin with for us all just to simply make sure we were ready, it’s been 
a real benefit to the firm. 
 
This respondent then went on to point to the benefits this improvement in 
management systems had brought to clients: 
 and I think it’s been a real benefit to clients, and we strive to keep to 
the standards. (Senior Partner, Hillchester Firm) 
   
The overwhelming majority of respondents endorsed this view that the improvement 
the contract had made in management systems had led to the development of 
practices which resulted in a greater focus on the needs of the clients.  
 
4.5.2 Procedural benefits 
 
Several respondents emphasised the role played by the SQM and the transaction 
criteria in bringing about a major improvement in client care: 
On the delivery of service as a whole, yes, (the LSC has been) hugely 
significant in that if one is honest prior to LAFQAS you had no guarantee 
that a legal aid client would receive any letter of advice.  First of all, no 
guarantee of meeting with you confirmed in writing, no guarantee as to 
when he would get that letter, no guarantee as to whether you’d agree an 
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action plan with him, no set target dates and that’s just been an impossible 
regime to operate under LAFQAS, and that is the huge gain for the client 
under what’s happened in the last few years - in that we are accountable as 
we always should’ve been, and must be.  There will be people not able to 
make that transition. (Senior Partner, Carbridge firm) 
 
As we will note below, several (though not all) respondents from the FP sector 
contrasted the rigour of the practice management QA under the SQM with the 
inspection and audit regimes of other QMs.  In the NFP sector too, the SQM was 
widely recognised as providing a discipline to client care;  
I think that in more cases now, a client will go away with a clear idea of 
the experience they’ve had in our office, with a clearer contract of what 
they can expect from us, and what we should expect from them, so 
moving away from that very kind of woolly, ill defined experience that a 
person will often get when they go to a CAB and speak to an 
experienced volunteer who will not write up their notes very accurately; 
we’ve come a long way from there and we can now safely say that most 
of  the cases  we do for the LSC will be done to a fairly high standard, 
include client care letters; include a clear closure procedure on a case, 
that it won’t be arbitrarily closed because somebody in an administration 
function wants to get rid of all the open cases from last year or 
whatever.  It doesn’t happen like that any more, certainly not for the 
LSC cases.  So that has been a good thing – it’s driven us towards a 
better understanding of professional principles as they apply to 
providing advice and advocacy and I’m very pleased about that. 
(Specialist Housing Adviser, Castleton Housing Advice Charity). 
 
Other respondents’ evaluation of the benefits the QM produced was more qualified:   
rolling out the Quality Mark was a real difficult process with six area teams 
and the main anxiety was it would get in the way of achieving results, slow 
people down, make people do things that were unnecessary and be a 
bureaucratic approach… hopefully it’s not made a major difference.  
Opening letters is something we took on board as good practice a number 
of years ago anyway.  What it probably has meant is that some people 
who decided to not to bother with opening letters, they’ve been kind of 
brought into line….  So it has structured people’s casework, hopefully in a 
way that’s not impacted on what’s kind of motivating them which is 
actually getting results. (Manager, Welfare Rights Advice Service). 
 
Some respondents stated that they wished to move beyond the threshold or 
benchmark represented by the QM to an even greater focus on clients.  No one 
referred favourably to the regime of client care which pertained in pre-LAFQAS 
legally aided work. Several respondents stated that because of the procedural 
benefits the QM produced, it had subsequently been rolled out across their 
organization, and Lexcel adopted for those areas of firms which undertook solely 
private client work.  This development was seen to be particularly important in areas 
where complex procedural rules or time limits entailed risk: 
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I think if you do public funded work, you automatically have organised 
files and you accept that you should do confirmation letters, properly 
communicate with your client, be able to find everything on a file, and 
that’s the contrast between people who do public funded work and 
expect to have to do that and people who have not been trained in 
that way,….  I don’t think that’s true of some of the new people and 
bigger firms because I think they’ll see that it’s good risk management 
(Family Ancillary Relief specialist, Carbridge) 
 
 
4.5.3 Continuity of care within the organisation 
 
The mandatory nature of file recording and review was also identified as a particular 
strength of the QM regime by several respondents (and this issue will be discussed 
more fully in the section on training).  Weaknesses in recording practices were 
highlighted by one housing solicitor as a key failing in the NFP sector: 
We’ve had instances – people coming to us where they’ve been ill 
advised.  We’ve then appealed their case and unpicked what’s happened 
and frequently found that where a voluntary sector person has been 
involved no note has been made of the judgment – we had an instance 
where we succeeded on appeal purely because no one had any idea of 
what the judge had said – because no one had taken a note… (Housing 
specialist, Boomtown) 
 
It was not surprising, therefore, to find that NPM managers in particular emphasised 
this aspect of the cultural change brought about by the contract, noting that 
improvements in file management made it easier to transfer responsibility for a case:   
Caseworkers in general I think tend to be fairly slap dash (the ones 
I’ve met) and keep details about their client in their head.  The LSC 
makes you put it all down on paper.  Then if you are run over by a bus 
somebody can carry on … it makes you put it down , and when I do 
file reviews I can see what they’ve done, when they’ve done it and 
how much time it’s taken, and, yes, I think it makes them look at their 
work in a different way. (Contract Manager, Urban CAB) 
 
However, as we discuss below, many respondents in the NFP sector considered that 
the contract and compliance system could adversely affect continuity of care by 
severing relationships between the tiers of advice. 
 
4.5.4 Business planning  
 
Some respondents in the FP sector identified the stable cash flows and secure 
business planning which resulted from contracting as significant benefits and several 
considered that the (TFF) regime would improve this situation further. One partner 
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with a mixed crime and family practice described how, with the support of a 
consultant, he had developed a system which enabled him to give the same kind of 
detailed scrutiny to his costs and charges that the LSC could give, enabling him to 
continue to operate as a 70% legal aid practice, even though, as he put it, ‘the pay’s 
rubbish’: 
Everybody was up in arms, including myself:  ‘why should we accept £173 
for each case when we may be doing far more?’ And the LSC said ‘it’s 
swings and roundabouts, some you’re going to gain on and some you’re 
going to lose on’ and no one believed them including myself.  We then get 
to a position where I now have this spreadsheet and I’ve now got 5 years 
worth of data on there – every single bill I do, and at the moment the 
average is that I’m beating fixed fees by 14 ½ %, so we are doing better 
under fixed fees than we would if we claimed under the old rules by 14 
½% (Senior Partner, Weaverton firm) 
 
4.5.5 A sense of the costs and merits of cases 
 
One of the aims of the regulatory system for publicly funded legal services might be 
to encourage advisers to internalize a sense of the cost benefit calculations which 
inform decision making at the national level about the disposition of resources.  
Regulatory control over the pricing of services is an alternative approach to 
managing behaviour, but may have the undesired effect of encouraging firms and 
agencies to turn away work which is meritorious but unremunerative.  This danger 
was exemplified by a firm specialising in immigration work which, as a result of their 
experience of changes to its funding, withdrew from the contract in the initial stages 
of the research: 
it’s not been working very well because we had to get this extension (on 
the prescribed 5 hour limit) from London and they’re obviously trying to 
get their heads round it as well  … when you think that in the past we 
have probably spent 20 or 30 hours doing this work, 5 hours is not a lot 
of time with a person who does not speak any English and who doesn’t 
understand what is going on, it can take you 5 hours just to explain it to 
him really.  Basically you know we just have to send them away 
(Contract Manager, Hillchester firm) 
 
There was however evidence that firms and NFP agencies were assimilating the role 
of custodians of public disbursements, and thinking of ways in which the cost benefit 
calculation could work practically. This welfare adviser had attended training on the 
sufficient benefit test: 
I think something along the lines of the sufficient benefit test is a good 
idea because I don’t want to waste my time taking appeals that haven’t 
got a cat in hell’s chance,  I want to know that they’ve got a case that’s 
worth taking. (Welfare Adviser, Linfield CAB) 
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One housing solicitor however argued that the policy drive towards encouraging 
mediation and early settlement was not only having an adverse effect on the social 
justice side of his work, but also preventing him from obtaining costs from the other 
side and thus saving public money: 
if the other side makes an offer and it’s a walk away settlement then there’s 
no order for costs and instead we send our bill to the LSC.  And if we don’t 
accept an offer, they report it to the LSC who then gets onto us and asks 
why we’re not accepting the settlement because they don’t want us to take 
cases unnecessarily to court. I’m undermined by the LSC in this approach 
because the LSC is all about compromise / settlement which undermines 
the culture I’m trying to create (Housing Partner, Boomtown Firm). 
 
4.6 Multiple Regulation  
 
One of the concerns raised at the time of the Clementi Review was the issue of the 
burden imposed by multiple regulation.  We discussed with respondents the number 
of other regulators that affected their practice, and how they experienced the 
regulatory process.  The greater formal regulation of the FP sector through statutory 
bodies and professional organizations was regarded by respondents as an unfair 
handicap in a commercial environment: 
I think as a profession we are probably over-regulated; over the 20 odd 
years I have been in practice we’ve evolved from being a profession into 
a business but we’re a business that’s competing at a professional 
disadvantage because we are hamstrung with all the old regulatory stuff 
that applies to the professions, but competing with businesses that don’t 
have those handicaps – so I think we are probably over-regulated  
(Senior Partner, Chapelvale firm) 
 
On the other hand several respondents expressed the view that the influence of the 
Law Society on day to day practice was negligible, including the site inspections, and 
the following respondent expressed a desire for more directive monitoring: 
The Law Society is, in my view, wholly ineffective.  Unless you are 
dipping into your client account, they’re really not bothered.  We had a 
monitoring visit 2 weeks ago from the Law Society and the lady who 
came said ‘if I’m honest, the reason I’m here is we’ve got to justify our 
existence’ and she spent all day trawling through files, client ledger 
balances, and whatever they do with every firm, and it was a clean bill of 
health but you know, I didn’t understand the purpose ..  I can pick up a file 
– any file - and find fault with it – a technical fault or a client care fault, 
complaints procedures not being adhered to.  I think you could find faults 
like that in any practice. Yet her assessment was that our client care was 
excellent…  Now of course I’m happy with that finding and I think it 
probably was correct, yet there probably are areas we could tighten up on 
and it would have perhaps been helpful to be guided … (Senior Partner, 
Weaverton firm) 
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Some NFP respondents similarly identified as a weakness the relatively light 
evaluation entailed in some alternative funding sources as a result of the lack of 
systematic quality measurement.  For instance one respondent, a manager of a rural 
CAB in North Daleshire which had lost its LSC contract for General Help and was 
mainly funded by the local authority and the Primary Care Trust (PCT), noted the 
absence of performance auditing on the part of these other funders: the PCT audited 
the number of recorded cases and enquiries, but not processes or outcomes, and the 
local authority undertook no auditing at all. 
 
On the other hand, other respondents from the NFP sector felt that because the 
regulation to which they were subjected was associated with several funding 
streams, they were probably subject to more intrusive demands: 
It’s difficult on several levels: firstly we are subject to financial reporting 
requirements which across the eight funders are different for everyone, so 
a timetable exists which shows when the financial reports and the project 
reports are due - actually we’re still developing this. That’s a very practical 
juggling act that we have to do. Secondly, all funders require these 
reports at different times; so some want quarterly reports - some even 
want them monthly / twice monthly – and of course all the different 
projects have different start dates and therefore times of reporting; so 
juggling that lot is another stress. Thirdly, the actual output and outcomes 
monitoring and evaluation / information keeping - what is required as 
information - all differs from project to project. Some funders are very light 
touch; for instance Lloyds TSB – you apply to them to get money and 
they require you to report 12 months later. They don’t monitor in between 
(Director, Women’s Centre, Chapelvale) 
 
4.6.1 Benefits of other regulators and certification bodies 
 
In both sectors, organizations had sought other forms of elective regulation, through 
generic or specialized QA or quality marks.  Some of these compared the QM 
unfavourably to these marks, arguing that there were aspects of practice 
management which they covered more effectively.  Thus those (several) 
organisations which had IiP, ISO 9002, and, in particular, ISO 9000, had found the 
development of the LAFQAS and QM less burdensome.  
 
The Director of the Women’s Centre in Chapelvale had applied for IiP for strategic 
reasons, but also identified contingent benefits for the organization: 
We have Investors in People; we went for that because we were aware that 
it is increasingly important to have evidence that we are a quality 
organisation and as voluntary sector organisation applying for funding it 
gives us the edge because few small and medium sized voluntary sector 
agencies have it.  And it has given us the edge – it has helped us get 
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funding. … We got it in 2000 and since then our income has risen by 600% 
- we have grown hugely.  Our income is now about half a million pounds 
whereas it was £30,000 per annum. 
 
The impact of these other regulators was unclear since it could be evaluated on two 
dimensions.  Firstly, it was difficult to assess their immediate impact.  Thus, it was 
unclear whether they were able to influence the fine details of the way that people 
went about their business by virtue of regular inspection, the possession of sanctions 
that could be applied administratively, or the sense of ownership that organizations 
felt over the procedures and processes that they were promoting.  The second 
dimension was the authority of the alternative regulator.  This dimension accounts for 
the degree to which the regulator can have a profound impact on the whole of an 
organization’s business, even though it may be remote from the day to day 
transactions. This would normally be associated with some form of catastrophic 
sanction, involving the withdrawal of the organization from the market for its services 
(so the Charity Commission could redefine an organization’s status, and loss of 
specialist panel accreditation could mean temporary or permanent withdrawal from 
the publicly funded market).  The dimensions of the impact of these alternative 
regulators is summarised in the below typology based on our respondents’ 
comments:  
 
Table 4.1 Alternative regulators and their impact 
Sector Regulators Impact Authority 
FP Law Society 
Law Soc Accreditation            
Panels 
Lexcel 
Lawnet 
OISC 
ISO9002 
Low 
Medium 
 
Medium 
Medium 
Medium 
Medium 
High 
Medium 
 
Medium 
Low 
High 
Low 
NFP Charity Commission 
IiP 
Citizen’s Advice 
Low 
Medium 
Medium 
High 
Low 
Medium 
 
4.7 Regulation: negative effects and unintended consequences 
 
As noted in the earlier discussion, much of the recent literature on regulation has 
been concerned with the concept of regulatory burden, or, more precisely, the cost of 
compliance with regulatory demands.  In their literature review, Chittenden and his 
colleagues (2004) identified a number of different dimensions to the concept of cost 
(see pp11-12). These dimensions (which include direct and indirect costs, operating 
and administrative, internal and external costs, fixed and variable costs, and 
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recurring and one-off costs) do not constitute a mutually exclusive or exhaustive set 
of categories, but provide different ways of understanding cost, and also help to 
illuminate costs which may often be overlooked. 
 
One Senior Partner gave the following description of the cost of compliance: 
one of our partners went from being a fee earner firstly to starting doing 
2 days a week managing the contract and then became a full time 
managing partner while – alright we had other parts of the firm to 
manage – but the LSC contract becomes a very high part of it. So you 
could be arguing that in partner time it’s £30 to 40,000 and we’ve now 
got to fulfil everything over at legal aid… we have two people doing the 
legal aid bills, we’re going to have a new practice manager costing us 
approximately £40,000 a year, and an assistant at £23,000 a year.  Now 
admittedly again, that’s for the whole firm, but disproportionately a lot of 
it is because of what’s required by the LSC.  (Hillchester firm) 
 
We asked some of our sample to attempt to give us an estimate of the cost to them 
of maintaining their LSC contract, and provided a prompt sheet with a simplified 
version of the Chittenden definitions.  The responding CAB identified the cost as 
5.7% of a contract worth £86,500, a solicitor’s firm in Castleton estimated it as 3% of 
a contract worth £1.5 million, while the local authority welfare rights service in the 
study identified it as 1% of a £100,000 contract, arguing that most of the costs 
involved procedures that would have been applied anyway.  Two agencies were 
unable even to attempt to estimate a figure.  Some of the divergence here may be 
explained by actual differences in investment (some firms engaged an external 
consultant to support the contract, while none of the NFP agencies did), and some by 
a simple failure to identify costs.  However, this failure probably means that the costs 
were being absorbed by the organization, either through a cross-subsidy from other 
work or funding sources, or through individual workers absorbing some of the costs 
themselves.  This cannot be in the long term interests of the organization or, 
ultimately, the LSC, as was pointed out by the Scoping Study for the Clementi 
Review (Baldwin et al, 2003, p.96). 
 
4.7.1 Adverse effects of colonization 
 
Whilst the cultural impact of the contract was perceived as producing the benefits 
discussed above, it was also perceived as producing adverse effects. We have tried 
briefly to summarize the data on these in the below table  
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Table 4.2 Perceived adverse effects of contract compliance 
 
Displacement of effort 
 
Time spent on preparing for and undergoing the 
audit, which some respondents felt would be better 
spent delivering front line advice 
A typical comment concerned the attention which 
ticking boxes required, reducing time available to 
concentrate on the quality of advice or client care. 
Displacement of mission Restrictions on scope, engineering a fundamental 
shift in the way the NFP organization worked with 
clients.  Restrictions most commonly mentioned 
were those on tribunal representation, on time so 
that a diminished service or no service was offered 
to clients previously served, or means testing, 
undermining a universalist principle which was held 
to characterise a service. 
Several FP firms identified those cases as ones 
that they would service in any event pro bono, for a 
mixture of social and commercial reasons. 
Distortion in internal 
organisation of workforce 
In the FP sector this might involve the partitioning 
of the firm so that the commercial arm and the 
legal aid arm were managed differently, leading to 
some internal pressures on publicly funded work. 
In the NFP sector the most common complaint was 
about the effect of ring-fencing workers, negating 
the model of the ‘learning organization’ which the 
sector aspired to, and depriving lower tier workers 
of scarce and valuable expertise. 
The ‘ring-fenced worker’ also experienced stress in 
relation to the pressure to meet the hours. 
Specialist multiple or dual funded organizations 
advocated the alternative approach of allowing 
more than one worker to contribute to a contract. 
Displacement of trust-based 
relationships and feelings of 
intrinsic worth 
A third of respondents spoke of a corrosive effect 
of procedures on the sense of partnership and trust 
which the LSC have stated they wish to build with 
the NFP sector.  They claimed that the work that 
they did out of goodwill was never recognized, 
whilst their time claims were minutely scrutinised. 
 
Respondents also specifically identified the way in which the QM audit failed 
sufficiently to differentiate between the quality of lower level legal help work and 
certificated work, noting that this could be a particular problem in areas with tight 
labour markets, and where staff turnover was therefore likely to be high: 
when we were doing legal aid work in some volume, when we were 
recruiting someone it would take a long time, using an agency, for someone 
to be found, and then there would be a shortlist of one .. I think it’s just hard 
to recruit in rural areas … then quite often, when the LSC did their audit 
they would find a problem with them and it was just a nightmare really in the 
sense that I was not making money out of doing legal aid work, supervising 
assistant solicitors etc was taking up my valuable fee earning time in 
respect of my private clients .. and every time the LSC came in the auditors 
would find great fault with somebody and in some cases that led to them 
being dismissed and us having to spend more money on trying to recruit 
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someone new - I mean it’s not an inexpensive exercise going through a 
recruitment agency.  (Partner, North Daleshire firm) 
 
This office has a legal help contract and that’s £80,000 a year and that work 
is low level divorce and injunction work done by low level fee earners.  And 
so to do the high quality public law complex children stuff that we do in the 
firm, which is probably a quarter of a million pounds worth of turnover, we 
have be audited on the work that’s at the bottom.  Like an inverted triangle - 
I’ve got all my high quality work which is dependent on what’s going on at 
the bottom.  Now I don’t mind it being judged on what’s going up here, 
anyone can come and look at my files.  I don’t have a problem with anyone 
looking at the lower end either.  But what I do have a problem with is if 
there’s an unacceptable level of compliance down here at that bottom level, 
which will be through work done by my cheaper people, then the whole 
thing goes because you lose your contract, lose your ability to do the 
certified work without anybody looking at what you’re actually doing. 
(Senior Partner, Carbridge Firm)  
 
For the NFP sector, probably the most serious distortion was that produced by the 
exclusion of tribunal representation from scope.  For welfare advice services in 
general, and CABx in particular, tribunal representation was identified as their major 
role in combating social exclusion, and several respondents expressed 
incomprehension at its exclusion: 
I mean my biggest thing is about the whole ‘access to justice’ thing and 
not being able to claim time for going to tribunals.  That is the biggest 
thing - I think it just makes access to justice a laugh really because when 
you ask the question, well ‘who’s going to go to tribunal?’ and in our case 
we are talking about social security tribunals, which are quite formal 
occasions and are quite terrifying for clients who are questioned by three 
people in suits, usually, and they find it difficult to speak for themselves  
and that’s why they come to the bureau in the first place, because they 
are unable to speak for themselves and so therefore being expected to go 
with a ‘friend’ in inverted commas to the tribunal, and not need the help of 
their representative seems ridiculous.  And it’s the same in the 
employment tribunal.  So that to me is a huge hole in access to justice 
because it prevents people getting the justice they deserve.  We cover it 
by going to tribunal and covering the hours by whatever way we can so 
we have a large lot of none-claimable hours because our Caseworker 
goes to a lot of tribunals with clients. 
 
4.7.2 Managing the audit process 
 
The LSC has had, as we noted above, a complex task in attempting to move the 
advice sector in the direction of greater appreciation of the demands of quality, and 
the need to manage publicly funded advice and representation work efficiently and 
responsibly.  Audit has fulfilled a dual role in this process.  It has been used explicitly 
as an educational tool, monitoring the use of the Commission’s procedures, 
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processes and instruments in practice, and supporting agencies in adjusting their 
practices where they fell outside the acceptable range.  It has also, however, been 
used as a disciplinary tool, to rein in and retrieve costs from the recalcitrant.  The 
balancing act between education and discipline is a difficult one: the emphasis in the 
first process is on partnership, whereas in the second process, the seniority of the 
Commission in the partnership can be in no doubt. 
 
4.7.3 Issues in Contracting and Auditing – Ambiguity and Consistency 
 
As we have noted earlier in the report, a key issue in relation to regulatory burden is 
the clarity and consistency of regulatory frameworks.  The Mandelkern Group (1995) 
identified simplicity as one of seven ‘common principles’ of regulatory quality, and the 
OECD, in producing a ten point checklist for regulatory decision making, asked (at 
No. 8) ‘Is the regulation clear, consistent comprehensive and accessible to users?’ 
(OECD, 1995).  The Hampton Report identified knowledge and understanding of 
regulation as a significant factor in the likelihood of self-regulated compliance 
(Hampton, 2005, p. 56).  The BRTF’s Report on regulation of the VCS reiterated the 
five principles of good regulation, which included the following: 
• regulators should clearly explain how and why final decisions have been 
reached; 
• regulation should be predictable in order to give stability and certainty to 
those being regulated; 
• regulations should be clear and simple.  
(BRTF, 2005, pp. 64-5) 
 
It has been argued that the failure to observe some of these principles accounts for 
the demoralizing impact of regulation and inspection reported by some VCOs.  The 
respondents in Margaret Bolton’s study identified the problems raised by 
inconsistencies in inspection teams’ interpretations of audit frameworks and criteria 
(Bolton, 2003, p. 15).  Similarly, the Matrix research into the CLS found that ‘the 
differing levels of flexibility the regional offices are willing to offer, particularly around 
managing contracts, have been problematic for national provider organizations’ 
(Matrix, 2004, p 21).  This finding was difficult for us to evaluate, since our research 
covered only two regional offices, but respondents did comment on issues of 
consistency within offices: changes in the regional directorate, or even the contract 
manager, could result in shifts over time in interpretation of what was acceptable 
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practice.  Among the examples supplied was the fact that in one region, what was 
perceived as an ideological opposition to contracting with local authority services 
ceased with a change of Regional Director, and then reverted back to the original 
position after a disagreement over some peer review judgements.  Another example 
given was the question of whether contracted staff needed to be ring-fenced 
(discussed above), or whether contributions to a contract could be made by a 
number of different staff in dual or multiple funded organizations.  Instances were 
given of cases where the LSC view appeared to change with the contract manager: 
we like to give the same standard of service to all clients so we’ve not had 
people ring fenced, we’ve not had people just doing generalist work, or just 
specialist work or just contract work or just non contract work. But when you 
look at the contract, my interpretation is that you identify people who 
contribute to it and let the Commission know. But this new Account 
Manager is under the impression that the Commission’s expectations 
through the contract are that people will be ring fenced.  But when I read 
the contract there’s no term ‘ring fenced’ so I don’t know where it comes 
from - apparently it’s a Commission term.  But this is something that needs 
to be further discussed with our new Account Manager because it can quite 
drastically change the culture of our work, the way we operate which would 
have knock on  effects with regard to service delivery and contract delivery 
and all sorts.  (Manager, Weaverton Housing Advice Agency) 
 
Issues of consistency are exacerbated where the inspecting team fails to adopt the 
consultative and developmental approach to regulation recommended by a number 
of commentators (see for example Bolton, 2003, p 23).  Conflict between 
organizational mission and the imperatives of inspection can lead to confusion and 
loss of morale in the organization being audited or inspected: according to the 
‘Chittenden’ model this is in itself a major regulatory cost, since it interferes with the 
productivity of individual workers and teams. 
 
However, achieving consistency and clarity can be difficult since the objectives of 
regulation contain a tension between two polar imperatives.  On the one hand the 
imperative to achieve clarity requires that the process of judgement is standardized 
and reliable through ever more minute specification of standards and criteria, and 
that these criteria are applied rigorously no matter what the context.  On the other 
hand it is necessary to avoid a framework for audit judgements which is so rigid as to 
stifle the capacity for innovation and flexibility which is regarded as one of the 
strengths of VCOs (see BRTF, 2005, p. 17). 
 
There are therefore a number of features of the LSC’s contracting and auditing 
regime which suggest that it may not always be either clear or consistent.  The 
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features which have been most widely discussed are those relating to the costs 
arising from contract compliance auditing.  Some firms and agencies reported few 
instances of disagreement with auditors, and where this was the case, tended to 
attribute this to their own skills in managing the contract and evidencing their claims. 
By contrast, where there were difficulties and the LSC had disagreed with claims or 
had initiated cost recovery, respondents tended to attribute this to unreasonableness, 
either in the construction of the criteria, or in auditors’ application of them.  Whilst 
both the criteria for assessing cost and performance are intended to be objective, a 
detailed case study which we report below indicates the existence of a considerable 
discretionary element in the process.   
 
4.7.4 ‘Keephome’ Case Study 
 
This case study follows the introduction of the risk-based approach to audit, where 
the LSC identified ‘problem’ agencies by using risk indicators (such as under- or 
over-performance on a contract or substantial deviation from average time per case 
or from their own previous profile) and designated ‘Quality Profiles’.  It demonstrates 
firstly that not all suppliers were familiar with the significance of the new approach, 
and what it might mean for their office procedures and for the training of their junior 
staff; and secondly that the process suggested to the supplier the existence of  
considerable differences in interpretation between the regional office and the 
specialist audit team who were sent in from Nottingham. 
 
Keephome is a housing and welfare rights advice service with offices at three sites in 
the Weaverton Metropolitan District Area.  It has been in existence since the 1980s, 
when it was established with local authority funding. It first became involved with the 
LSC in 1997 with a pilot franchise.  It had chosen to operate its contract with the LSC 
so as to allow all four of its supervised advisers to contribute to the hours: 
 
This arrangement was only possible because of the dual funding streams: local 
authority and LSC.  The manager took the view that if the LSC funding were to be 
withdrawn, it would be difficult if not impossible to maintain the advice service, 
because the LSC only supported eligible work, and the organization needed to 
maintain a profile of non-eligible work in order to obtain access to that work. At the 
initial interview, the manager of the K office expressed considerable satisfaction with 
the contract, the auditing process and the constructive relationship with the LSC 
which he felt had helped to enhance the agency’s work on a range of fronts.  These 
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included improving file management and the information base which in turn helped 
Keephome develop its social policy and strategic planning role within the local 
authority by identifying trends and issues emerging from the case data.  He also 
supported the view that organizations’ procedures and processes were good proxies 
for quality. 
 
Keephome was working in such a way as to pre-figure the model of CLACs and 
CLANs; its innovative approach to providing social welfare law exemplified one of the 
principal rationales for the involvement of the NFP sector in publicly funded work: 
We work quite closely with what I would call our partners, the CAB, in 
delivering the umbrella of social welfare law.  If it’s something we can’t deal 
with we would pass it on, and likewise the expectation would be that they 
would pass on housing, certainly complex housing and complex welfare, to 
us.  Which they do and it works quite well.  Now perhaps it works well 
because the two agencies are located quite closely.  If we had to make a 
referral to S the client might never get to S because they don’t want to go to 
S, which is a worry. There’s nobody who undertakes immigration advice up 
to specialist level in B, or there wasn’t until the Immigration Advice Service 
tried to do a surgery and advice office there.  So we liaised with the * 
(Weaverton) Law Centre recognising that people who wanted immigration 
advice had to travel to * (Weaverton), which was a bit unfair, so could we 
try and encourage them to do a surgery in B and if premises were a 
problem we would make our accommodation available here free of charge, 
which is what we did and we’ve got a surgery running from this office.   
 
Furthermore, the agency appeared enthusiastic about embracing change and 
accepting the new environment for their work.  Experiences of audit with their local 
LSC office had been positive, and their educational audit had resulted in a verdict 
that they were highly compliant.  The manager was particularly pleased with two 
aspects of their performance, believing, firstly, that they only claimed for eligible work 
with clients, allowing the other work to be supported by the local authority funding 
stream, and, secondly, that they had consistently out-performed their contract whilst 
many other NFP agencies were under-performing. 
 
In November 2005 the agency was singled out for an audit by the specialist 
compliance team at Nottingham LSC: 
We did have an audit in November which didn’t go as planned, but as a 
consequence we were issued with a number of non compliances, so 
there was a recommendation from the Audit Team which came down 
from the Nottingham Office to actually re-audit in July 06 which was fine, 
we accepted that and we had to just satisfy that we were no longer non-
compliant in these areas.  But what’s happened is that because it was the 
office in Nottingham as opposed to previously the office in * (Boomtown), 
where we’ve got caught up is the inconsistencies in the interpretation of 
the contract specification and the SQM.  Whereas we’ve been doing quite 
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well with previous audits conducted by the team in * (Boomtown), we’ve 
not done near as well with the audit conducted by Nottingham. 
 
The manager was prepared to accept that staff might have been non-compliant, but 
felt that the fault lay at least in part in a system that had failed to provide clarity.  One 
example given was a non-compliance covering proof of income, a requirement for 
demonstrating the client’s financial eligibility: 
we were quite categorically told at the audit that you cannot have a 
‘satisfactory’  if you ring up the DWP (Department of Work and Pensions) 
and get confirmation that a person is on a benefit and get details of the 
amount and the type of benefit - that is not acceptable as proof of income. 
But when you read the contract it states that you can accept a telephone 
call to the DWP in lieu of a hard copy, which threw us a bit.  Previously 
we’ve been actually told by the office in * (Boomtown) that if you want to 
speed things up or you’re having problems getting a hard copy from your 
client that you can, in lieu of that, actually get confirmation on the phone. 
 
There were several other instances where the agency felt that ambiguity and poor 
guidance from the Boomtown regional office had given rise to non-compliances for 
which they were being punished.  Another example was that of Concluding Matter 
Codes for cases with more than one problem. The manager argued that it was ironic 
that they had been picked up as suppliers out of profile because of two of the factors 
which they were proud of: namely, restricting the amount of LSC time claimed on a 
dual funded matter, and out-performing their contract.  One aspect of the experience 
which had caused confusion was the refusal of the Boomtown office to accept that 
any of their advice was in conflict with the Nottingham judgement.  The manager 
described the process as leading to a destruction of the relationship of trust that had 
been built up: 
I thought it was always a partnership, but you now learn that when 
there’s a slight problem or disagreement it’s not really a partnership, 
you know – ‘this is what you have to do and if you don’t do it we’ll 
terminate your contract’, or ‘we’ll vary your contract’.  You’d have 
expected a bit more of a partnership exercise to overcome or help us 
over some of the problems that they’ve actually identified.  It’s quite 
difficult actually, I’d never have believed, you know last year, that they 
could act in this manner because from my point of view the relationship 
has been there for 8/9 years, ever since we took up the franchise 
contract, so you’d have expected better communication, which I 
perceived we always had until they’ve identified a slight problem and it’s 
as if they’ve washed their hands of you to an extent.     
 
Follow up interviews with other NFP agencies revealed a similar erosion of trust and 
sense of partnership. It became apparent that the details of Keephome’s experience 
had been recounted throughout the sector in the region, with negative consequences 
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for the image of the LSC, and also that other agencies were beginning to lose trust 
as a result of their own experiences. 
 
4.7.5 Ambivalence in the LSC’s relationships with the NFP sector 
 
There was some evidence from our interviews with LSC staff that shifts in policy, and 
perceptions of the advice field, might indeed, however indirectly, be affecting the 
degree of severity with which organizations were audited.  The tension between the 
view of the NFP sector as providing added value, and the imperative to achieve VFM, 
is reflected in this LSC Regional Manager’s comments: 
I’ve come across what I regard as adviser dependency syndrome,; where 
the adviser does everything they can for the client and says ‘do come 
back next week if there’s anything else’ – where I think the adviser is 
almost cleaving to the client rather than being driven by the client’s needs 
or god forbid the 50 other people in the waiting room desperately trying to 
get in.  Then there’s the issue of volunteers – how assertively can you 
supervise a volunteer?  there are all sorts of cultural tensions there.  
 
These comments tend to support the view expressed by some NFP respondents that 
there had been a change in approach to the sector from the LSC in the two years 
prior to the research, but that it had not been signalled: 
We performed at the same level for the last five years roughly and only 
for the last two did they begin to talk about quantity of hours - and I can 
understand from a use of public money point of view why they want us 
pay us an amount of money to perform to their contract requirement, but 
if that were the case I think that could have been made clearer from 
earlier on, rather than a sudden bit of a culture shock when suddenly 
they’re emphasizing quantity..  They are emphasizing quantity and 
number of hours output and the same time that they are introducing 
time standards, so it’s like a big squeeze from both sides - those things 
happened right at the same time, last year  (Director, Linfield CAB) 
 
4.8 Impact of Audit – Cost compliance and time standards auditing 
 
Opinions concerning the LSC audit regime varied across the sector.  In spite of the 
examples of ambiguity identified by some of the respondents and commented on 
above, it is not easy to evaluate whether this variation is the result of the way in 
which different organizational cultures react to change, or whether it derives from a 
fundamental inconsistency in the audit process itself.  Some agencies felt that the 
regime could be sensitive to the context in which legal advice was delivered, whilst 
others felt that the approach could be pedantic and insensitive.  The Director of a 
local authority Welfare Rights Advice Service felt that their audit 
 72 
was friendly, it was an educational one…. the things they came up with 
was stuff that our advisers would have gone to the barricades over.  It 
was things like ‘you haven’t justified - you’ve filled in a DLA form for this 
customer, you know it’s a simple form it doesn’t require help’.  Well, I 
mean, as far as our adviser is concerned that’s bread and butter welfare 
rights advice work, helping people with forms.   Most people need help 
with forms, most people struggle with forms.  It’s not something you 
actually need to justify as being an exception, that’s the norm.  But they 
took a different view of that and it would have got very messy if they’d 
tried to do something, like use the audit findings to actually take some 
money off us.  We wouldn’t have been happy with that at all.  But they 
seem to have backed off from that anyway. 
 
However, few others had this positive view of time standards auditing.  Generally the 
standards were regarded as unrealistic, neglecting many of the time consuming 
activities which might accompany a task, particularly in organizations which were not 
resourced with support staff to the same degree as the FP sector.  The main 
criticisms were that: 
• the nature of the audit expressed a lack of trust in NFP agencies and a sense 
that advisers were likely to inflate their claims; 
• auditors were inexperienced in many instances, and unfamiliar with the reality 
of delivering front line advice and as a result could be unrealistic about what 
could be achieved within a given timescale; 
• auditors were searching for non-compliance and hence pedantic and critical; 
as a result the process of undergoing audit could be demoralising and 
oppressive; 
• audit standards were applied inconsistently: over time (audit during the 2003-
4 period was seen as having been more harsh); between regions (some 
teams were seen as more critical than others, or to be applying specific rules 
in different ways), and between organizations (some organizations were seen 
as achieving a privileged status, because they undertook a specialism in short 
supply). 
• the rigid and (perceived) inappropriate application of time standards produced 
distortions within the sector. 
  
This last criticism exemplifies Power’s argument that audit can ‘colonise’ an 
organization: some respondents claimed that the LSC cost rules had led them to 
undertake some tasks simply because they could be claimed for and, 
correspondingly, to cease doing others because they could not be claimed for.  As a 
result, it was argued, what constituted advice work had changed.   Some advisers 
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also doubted that the LSC appreciated the extent to which quite ordinary clients 
might be difficult to manage.  These doubts sometimes appeared to stem from a 
failure to understand what could be achieved with careful evidencing of reasons for 
exceeding time norms.  However there were also occasions where advisers’ 
concerns that it would be impossible reasonably to support a claim for the time 
actually spent appeared well founded.  We will briefly explore the reasons for this in 
the next section. 
 
4.8.1 Departing from the script – ‘difficult’ clients 
 
One argument consistently made by both the FP and the NFP sector was that much 
of the performance and cost compliance auditing was based on a standardized 
model of transaction with the client, where the ‘script’ was predictable, and where the 
client would respond rationally and informatively to the questions that the adviser 
needed answering in order to progress the matter.  Respondents reported however 
that many of the clients eligible for assisted advice did not or could not conform to 
this model. This was due to factors ranging from communication difficulties 
associated with mental health or language problems, through to problems resulting 
from ‘clusters’ of social exclusion issues, to the difficulties clients have in reconciling 
their own case ‘story’ with the technical shape of the case as it appears to a legal 
adviser.  Many of these factors were identified by Moorhead et al (2001). 
 
We observed one example of a case which was taking far longer to conclude than an 
outside auditor would have believed possible, as a result of the characteristics of the 
clients (a very elderly woman and her son who was himself in his 70s).  The solicitor 
provided the following account of the case prior to our observation: 
I have no issue with the fact that the client has been wronged but their 
instructions are conflicting in that they each give different versions of 
events and one of the things we are going to be talking about today is the 
fact that they’ve already given instructions for a defence which was 
approved before Christmas but they’ve now changed their mind as to the 
content and I saw them a few weeks ago because  we received a request 
through from the other side which was quite extensive. I spent 2 hours 
with the clients and only got half way through because they were still 
arguing, so I sent them away to have another look at it, having already 
given it them in advance of the last interview and it’s taken them the best 
part of 3 weeks to get back to me but they phone me every day with a 
query, they sort of need their hands held and it’s very frustrating because 
I’ve given them the papers because I can’t tell them the answers. 
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The subsequent  observation of the interview not only revealed the clients to be even 
more difficult than the solicitor had suggested, but also established that evidencing 
the problem would be extremely difficult since it stemmed in part from the way in 
which they interacted with each other as well as with their solicitor.  They constantly 
interrupted and spoke over each other, were unable to keep to the subject no matter 
how skilfully steered by their solicitor, and arrived with a carrier bag of both relevant 
and irrelevant supporting documents which they then ‘sorted’ in front of her.  These 
were two clients without any of the recognized factors such as learning difficulties, 
but who exhibited many of the characteristics common to other socially excluded 
clients: namely, extreme anxiety, poor understanding of the processes of law and 
administrative justice, and inarticulacy. 
 
4.8.2 Externalizing Risk? 
 
Some respondents expressed the view that the LSC appeared to be externalizing the 
risks and costs (and see Section 4.1.1.4) resulting from cyclical funding through rigid 
and unduly strict application of time standards.  Consequently, organizations were 
undertaking some work pro bono.  An example was offered by an NFP adviser: 
I personally can touch type and I can probably do a 4 page letter, working from 
a draft, in less than 30 minute - we rarely get away with claiming 6 minutes per 
page of that letter.  So I’m under claiming by something like 20/30 minutes on a 
complex letter, but other colleagues with poor typing skills may be under 
claiming by as much as an hour and a half.  Over a period of time, given that 
our work relies a lot on letter writing, that’s an enormous loss 
 
However it was the failure of the LSC and most other funding agencies to contribute 
to the cost of reproducing the workforce which most respondents felt was most 
significant.  This issue is discussed in the chapter on training. 
 
4.9 Summary 
 
In this chapter, we have analysed those elements of the data primarily concerned 
with the impact of regulation on the delivery of front line services.  The findings are 
complex, and it must be borne in mind that they are shaped by the extent of the 
changes which the sector was undergoing at the time. This is particularly relevant 
when considering the impact of innovations such as Quality Profiles: while agencies 
are accustoming themselves to the demands of meeting these performance targets, 
they will appear more burdensome than when they have adapted their structures and 
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practices.  However this fact underscores the desirability of enhancing training 
related to regulatory requirements, an issue to which we return in the subsequent 
chapter.  The converse of this point is that the apparent low profile for some 
practitioners enjoyed by some regulatory influences (such as the front line regulatory 
role of the Law Society) may be a function of long familiarity: the standards 
demanded are so firmly embedded in the cultural life of organizations that their day to 
day impact becomes almost invisible. 
 
The key aspect of our data appears to be the way in which the apparently weak 
impact of regulatory devices such as discipline and complaints procedures contrasts 
with the strong impact of contractualism, and its accompanying mechanisms of audit 
and inspection.  As a means of influencing the behaviour of firms, agencies and the 
people who work in them, contractualism has a powerful effect and a detailed reach, 
and has been recognized by actors in both FP and NFP sectors, particularly those in 
management positions, as beneficial, not simply to the provision which is covered by 
the terms of the Civil Contract, but also in terms of ratcheting up the general 
performance of the firm or agency. 
 
However, as is to be expected of such an effective, and intrusive, mechanism, 
respondents also perceive it as entailing some considerable disbenefits.  Some of 
these are associated with the fact that, although auditing is to a degree considered 
by the LSC and its contractors to be an educational process, it also has a punitive 
side, which involves organizations in financial loss (and a sense of humiliation). The 
conflict between the educational and financial control aspects of audit can lead firms 
and NFP agencies to feel on the receiving end of conflicting messages about the 
nature of the partnership in which they are involved.  In addition, although the LSC 
naturally would argue that judgements, both about the awarding of contracts and 
audit, are objective and consistent, the element of discretion which is necessarily 
present in many of the processes means that they can therefore be experienced by 
agencies and firms as erratic and unreliable.  Even more damaging was the sense 
that some of the time standards decisions were pedantic and failed to take into 
account the nature of complex work with difficult clients in under-resourced agencies. 
 
Many of these points have been acknowledged and acted upon by the LSC and its 
staff at regional level, with promising initiatives such as the programmes introduced 
to train contractors in the application of the Civil Contract, discussed further in 
Chapter Five.  Initiatives which build on the educative function of audit and reduce 
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the sense of its punitive dimension would raise levels of trust and partnership 
between the LSC and its contractors.  As we note consistently throughout this report, 
there is an inextricable link between processes of training and regulation, and an 
emphasis on the ameliorative, as opposed to retributive, aspects of regulation is a 
positive aspect to any system. 
 
Two further findings deserve mention at this point.  Firstly, contractual processes 
have the capacity to affect the internal organization of NFP agencies in unanticipated 
ways, which may reduce the benefits which the public derive from the contract.  If, in 
the interest of cost control, the activities of advisers supported by the contract are too 
heavily restricted to purely contracted, face to face work, then the valuable resource 
that their expertise represents for the agencies and the sector as a whole may be 
prevented from fulfilling its potential.  For instance, ring fencing prevents them from 
training colleagues and volunteers, and advisers’ skills base may erode due to a 
decline in the opportunities to learn from colleagues or undertake formal training.  In 
the rapidly changing social and policy environment confronting advice agencies, their 
capacity to function as ‘learning organizations’ is a crucial aspect of their 
effectiveness.  For this reason, we recommend that Regulatory Impact Assessments 
(RIAs) are undertaken to evaluate the impact of the LSC contractual terms on 
contracted organizations with a view to encouraging positive uses of contractualism, 
and reducing negative impacts. 
 
Secondly, many of our respondents were concerned about the cost of contractual 
conditions (such as supervision requirements) and audit, and who should bear these.  
In both sectors, managers argued that LSC work was subsidised: by private client 
work in the FP sector, and by other funding streams in the NFP sector.  Respondents 
argued that necessary overheads, particularly those associated with staff turnover, 
training and supervision were not met by the LSC’s funding model.  We were not able 
to gather useful evidence to substantiate this point, and suggest that it should form 
the basis of further research. 
 
In the following chapter we look at the processes which are more generally 
recognized as constituting training, whilst also continuing to take account of the 
impact of the contract and informal process on adviser behaviour. 
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Chapter Five Issues In The Training Of Legal Advice  
Workers  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
LSC contracting has resulted in an overlap of roles between the FP and NFP sectors.  
As discussed above, it also seeks to produce similar levels of VFM and quality by 
requiring NFP agencies (that is, those parts involved in the contract) to adopt some 
of the cultural and structural changes effected in publicly funded law firms.  The 
transformation of public sector professional roles, through centralized specification of 
their primary features and functions, is seen as key to realising these cultural and 
structural changes.  This transformation is, in turn, linked to and supported by radical 
changes which have taken place in education and training in recent years. 
 
Policy statements on education and training over the past two decades have 
increasingly linked the maintenance of economic competitiveness with the creation of 
a ‘learning society’  (Ball, 1992; Edwards, 1997). This has resulted in the 
development of National Occupational Standards (NOS) and partnership with 
employers, shifting the focus of training towards (specialised) outcomes. NOS are 
designed to assist employers in fulfilling a range of workforce development functions, 
including the formulation of appropriate recruitment practices and appraisal systems 
and analysis of training needs. This approach to training uses accredited work based 
learning12 deploying a structured reflective practice model (Kolb, 1984; Schon, 1983; 
Boud & Walker, 1998); student focused and flexible learning strategies aimed at 
increasing workforce diversity; and an emphasis on pervasive skills and 
competences.13 In this climate, the structuring of professional training around an 
academic, ‘fixed menu’ (Chalmers et al, 2001) appeared anachronistic14 and the 
training literature began to question ‘the accepted boundaries of professional roles’ 
(Richardson & Maynard, 1995).   
 
                                                 
12
 
Described as the linkage of learning to a work role: Cox, 2005, 460; and see Seagraves and Boyd, 1996  
13  Following criticism, the concept of competence was modified to recognise  both that consistent performance required underpinning 
theoretical knowledge, and that it is specific to the context in which it takes place.  
14 Shifting the focus of training for the professions towards outcomes and pervasive skills was a specific recommendation of the 
Dearing Report, resulting in the development of National Standards in a range of professions e.g. FENTO standards.
 
The ‘Fitness for 
Practice’ curriculum for nurses is illustrative of this model of training (UKCC, 1999); see too Swanwick, 2005 on the links between 
managerialism and competency frameworks in GP education, and Ayers & Smith,1998.   
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Before examining our respondents’ views on training, we outline the current systems 
which pertain in the FP and NFP sectors. 
 
5.2  Current Training for Solicitors and Advice Workers 
 
As we noted in Chapter Three, in many cases the NFP training model is congruent 
with the shift in educational thinking described above, in that it is structured around 
occupational role, with accreditation sought by mapping the occupationally 
determined requirements against National Qualification Framework (NQF) level 
descriptors, and with low or non-existent educational entry barriers (some Citizens’ 
Advice training is offered at NQF Level 2).  
 
However, since solicitors’ claim to exclusive rights is based on the ‘knowledge 
mandate’ which postulates expertise as the property of individuals rather than 
systems, their training has traditionally been concerned with the accreditation of 
individuals who are given a general licence to practise. Consequently, legal 
education has primarily comprised individualised, ‘formal learning’ 15 of the broad 
sweep of doctrinal law rather than occupationally determined competencies and, 
from entry level onwards, represents a barrier to entry and progression  (Abel, 2003, 
pp 108-11). 
 
On the other hand, a frequent charge has been that law is taught as a vocational 
subject rather than a liberal art  (Twining, 1967), its curriculum shaped by the needs 
of the profession. As a result, the late 1970s onwards has seen not only various 
attempts to reform vocational training16 but also the emergence of a ‘skills 
movement’, linked originally to the ‘clinical’ law movement, stimulated by the Marre 
Report17 and welcomed by employers.  The emphasis on the need to develop applied 
legal skills such as drafting and research therefore informed the re-design of 
                                                 
15 That is, it takes place in an institution through instruction aimed at producing mental activity
 
(Resnick 1987) 
16 Arguably modernisation of legal education began in 1963 when the Law Society reduced articles to 2 years and streamlined the 
examination system, followed in 1967 by the Ormerod Committee’s investigation of legal education and the access barrier posed by 
the premium payable for articles. The 1979 Benson Commission resulted in further modernisation: supervised practice replaced 
articles;  the LSF was introduced to relate the vocational stage to work based learning using core materials, case studies and standard 
forms, and, in 1985, a minimum salary was instituted for articled clerks who, in 1989,  became known as trainee solicitors   
17 The Marre Report advocated modernisation of vocational teaching and examining methods and a reduction in substantive law in 
favour of practical skills, resulting in new Training Regulations in 1990 and the replacement of the LSF by the LPC.  This aimed to 
develop professional skills through work based learning.  In 1993 Articles were replaced by a formal training contract and the firms 
had to be authorised as Training Establishments. Continuing dissatisfaction with legal education led to further and 2 reports (ACLEC, 
1996, and ACLEC 1997). Continuing debates about curriculum and access led  in 2001 to the Training Framework Review (TFR) 
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vocational training in HE, from the LSF into the LPC, and the Training Framework 
Review (TFR) proposals centred on work based learning through, inter alia, personal 
development plans and portfolio compilation.18 
 
The rejection of the TFR’s modernising proposals19 left intact a training regime which 
was in many ways formal, individualised, doctrinal and inflexible: virtually all solicitors 
must have completed a qualifying Law degree and an LPC - whose core is the same 
regardless which sector and specialism the trainee solicitor may wish to practise in - 
and served a two year training contract (see Chapter 3). The current LPC is therefore 
largely geared towards general practice, business and property law and the private or 
corporate client rather than the specialist practices of the legal aid lawyer. 20 Whilst 
the College of Law has designed the legal aid orientated Public Legal Services 
Pathway, this is an adaptation of the standard LPC, with new modules, and the TFR 
proposals may be distinguished from those adopted in other professions in that they 
did not encompass niche training for the specialist sectors which now characterise 
the profession. 21  However, since the research for this report was conducted, 
agreement has been reached on the shape of the reforms to legal training.  What will 
be termed LPC 3 will be characterised by far greater flexibility which appears likely to 
give scope for more training in areas relevant to legal aid practice. 
 
Our data suggests not only that the original rationale for reviewing legal training 
remains, but also that the professional role of publicly funded solicitors is now so 
distinct from that of their corporate colleagues, there is a strong case for aligning their 
                                                 
18  In its second consultation paper on a new training framework for solicitors (2003), the Law Society suggested that there was no 
‘evidence that the current scheme was failing in any significant way to achieve its objectives of preparing solicitors for practice
’
 (p 5).  
Nevertheless, it proposed to move to an outcomes based model, specifying an end-point standard and allowing for different access 
points and routes through to the qualifying standard, including different patterns and combinations of initial degree, work-based 
experience and vocational training, and thereby sought to address issues of quality and standards and the balance and flexibility of 
the current combinations of qualifications and access to a training contract (identified by Abel as the key mechanism for controlling the 
‘production of producers’, thereby restricting the diversification of the profession
 
(2003)).  
19 These proposals included the launch of a Diversity Access Scheme in 2003, and the TFR (The Law Society 2005) which, at the 
time the research was being undertaken,
 
represented the Law Society’s latest response to the modernising developments in training 
described above; its rejection left legal training out of step with other professional approaches.  One interviewee suggested that the 
Law Society had abandoned the attempt to modernise and render more flexible professional training in favour of demonstrating an 
overriding concern with standards.  However
 
the issue has been resolved with the development of LPC3. 
20 Dissatisfaction with the generalist provision caused large commercial firms to call for a ‘City LPC’ 
21 It appears clear that the reluctance to abandon common provision is linked to the commitment to an undivided profession;  in 
practice the ongoing  polarisation of the profession means that in the words a Law Society Moderator ‘legal aid firms now exist in a 
parallel universe, they are on the fringe, of no concern’       
 80 
training more closely to the demands of that role.22  Today’s legal aid lawyer serves a 
clientele that is generally distinctive both in its nature and problems; moreover, as 
discussed above, it does this within a strict regulatory framework, subject to tight 
financial constraints, and generally without the support infrastructure available in the 
corporate sector.  
 
On the other hand, as an LSC spokesperson pointed out, the main publicly funded 
specialisms -  matrimonial and children law - also make up the bulk of mainstream 
private client work in High Street firms and many of the skills practitioners need for 
this sort of work are ones most practitioners should be trained in.  He commented 
that: ‘anything that raises the profile of legal aid in a positive sense has to be good, 
so we welcome courses (like the Public Legal Services Pathway) which make legal 
aid seem like a good career’, but said that the LSC would not welcome an LPC 
specifically designed to train publicly funded practitioners since this would specialise 
trainees too early in their careers, therefore foreclosing trainees’ career options23 and 
potentially deterring people from choosing legal aid work24: ‘we’ve always been 
concerned that we didn’t want to create a situation where legal aid is different 
because in fact the main difference is how it’s funded’.  
 
Given the overlap between supervision and training, the following discussion of the 
data will deal with these topics together.  We will report first on the views and 
experiences of trainee and solicitor respondents, before reporting on the NFP sector.  
We will conclude the chapter with a discussion of the indications which the data 
provides for the skills required in publicly funded work, leading into recommendations 
for the training for publicly funded practitioners.  
 
5.3 Solicitors’ Training: the LPC 
 
Most respondents made favourable comments about their LPC; nevertheless there 
was a consensus that in its current form it did not adequately equip people for 
publicly funded practice.  Respondents gave several (inter-related and reinforcing) 
reasons for this view, including the absence of training on LSC requirements, poor 
                                                 
22 The need to develop a sector-specific training pathway for solicitors and legal executives , grounded in occupational standards 
which are common to all publicly funded practitioners (including those in the NFP sector) is currently being addressed by the 
NOS4Advice and Foundation Degree projects; see www.nos4advice.org.uk 
23 LSC Press Release 13 May 2004: The Pathway to become a legal aid solicitor – new LPC and Training Grants 
24
 
That this is a real danger is supported by evidence in Williams & Goriely, 2003, pp 7-8;  see too Sommerlad, 2001
.
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coverage of publicly funded subject areas and skills, and the deployment of teaching 
methods which were not always sufficiently interactive or practical.   
 
Whilst negative evaluations may in part result from the ‘performance’ aspect of 
interviews and the tendency to critique rather than praise, we nevertheless 
concentrate on this data given its importance for suggesting ways of adapting the 
LPC to the needs of legal aid practice25 and since the positive comments were 
particular rather than general. 
 
5.3.1  The theory – practice gap 26 
 
All trainees stated that the LPC was too theoretical or academic.  Some 
recognised that this was to a degree inevitable without a clinical law element:  
To a certain extent it’s always going to be contrived; they’re never going 
to give you a complete nutter, but here we get completely random and 
awful people in because that’s what happens in real life so, regardless 
of what you do on the LPC, we didn’t get in drunk, aggressive or 
abusive people.  (Civil Litigation specialist, Hillchester firm) 
 
But, as another newly qualified solicitor commented, the result was that ‘on the LPC 
you don’t know why you’re being told all these things, none of it makes sense’. 
Similar criticisms were levelled at the post-LPC PSC.  
 
The comments of a recently qualified lawyer homed in on the disjuncture between 
the ‘ideal type’ approach which governs both LPC training and the LSC construction 
of legal practice, in which both lawyer and client follow a script and problems are 
neatly compartmentalised:  
It feels as if there are boxes they have to tick so they’ll say ‘we’ll do a 
client care matter and you can do an interview where you tell the client 
all about costs’ but in practice you deal with all sorts of queries as they 
get thrown up, so you can compartmentalise the training but it doesn’t 
happen like that in real life..  (Civil litigation specialist, Hillchester firm) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 Much of the criticism we  report has surfaced elsewhere, including ‘the relevance and sequencing of the core subjects and the 
volume and focus of doctrinal coverage’ (Boon & Webb, 2002), the need for more innovative pedagogy and the weak skills training.   
26 Williams & Goriely found that employers made similar complaints (2003, p 32); the  theory- practice gap has provoked concern 
across a range of vocational training courses, reinforcing the need to shift emphasis to work-based learning (Hughes, 2004, 273) 
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5.3.2 Alternative approaches to developing competence 
 
It was suggested that placements or a clinical law module would solve the weakness 
identified in the quotations above.27  Failing this, trainees advocated greater use of 
case studies; for instance, one suggested that substantive and procedural law should 
be taught together, through realistic case studies which progressed throughout a 
module, and which involved more work on skills:   
We did do some things like witness statements and filling in forms, 
letters to clients and so on .. but it was always very theoretical .. it was 
‘you’ve got this form, you do this form’.  If we had had a case running 
throughout a module so it was a vehicle for learning the law as you go 
along, then the first lecture could introduce the facts and procedure and 
law relevant to the case study and then it could be like ‘someone comes 
to see you and tells you this, we’re going to build it up through the 
course’.  (Trainee Solicitor, Boomtown North Law Centre). 
 
 A commercial trainer endorsed these views:  ‘the PSC is dry and academic and 
boring and it needs to be practically situated in experiences drawn from real life’;  
he went on to suggest that it should also be moulded by the work based 
competency approach: ‘it should limit itself to maybe the  6 key functions 
people actually use ..’   
 
Another recently qualified solicitor argued that both the PSC and LPC should have 
included more practical advice and exercises which encouraged the sort of ‘thinking 
on the spot’ commonly involved in advocacy.  The comments of a trainee on the PSC 
supports the view that a well designed advocacy course could help with this problem: 
‘there was a mock judge .. he would ask questions, they had no answers for him ..’ 
(Assistant Solicitor, Weaverton firm).   
 
A second complaint concerned the extensive coverage of business and private client 
law:28 for instance: ‘the largest part was business and company law so if you don’t 
want to go into that, a lot of the course is useless..’; (Solicitor, Boomtown North Law 
Centre) and:  ‘there was too much business law, I really resented all the time we had 
to spend on that’ (Housing Specialist, Boomtown firm). 
                                                 
27 The College of Law’s Public Legal Services Pathway LPC offers the opportunity to participate in the College’s legal advice clinic 
and pro bono activities, and also includes ‘legal aid ‘master classes’ by experienced practitioners’
 
( LSC 2005) 
28 The concern that the compulsory core of the LPC is over-prescribed is noted by Boon & Webb (2002); it comprises the following 
compulsory subjects and skills: Business Law & Practice; Civil & Criminal Litigation; Property Law & Practice; Advocacy, Practical 
Legal Research, Legal Writing and Drafting; Interviewing & Advising; the pervasive areas are: Accounts; Professional Conduct and 
Financial
 
Services and Markets  and Probate & Administration of Estates.  The Business Law and Practice component has been 
increased to twice the weighting it was initially given. 
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The comments of others suggested that this focus could be interpreted as a 
devaluation by the profession of legal aid law;29 the remarks of one respondent points 
to the disjuncture in ethos between the two sectors, and irritation at what she 
perceived as an attempt to persuade students of the superiority of the commercial 
sector: ‘they got someone in to talk us round – some practitioner from a commercial 
firm and he said things like ‘I do contract work with a big firm and make loads of 
money and have a nice wife’ – I think he was implying he had a sexy life ..’ . (Housing 
Specialist, Boomtown firm).  For others, their resentment was accentuated by the 
high fees (and hence the large debts they were accumulating) for a course which 
was in part irrelevant to the work they would be doing in an increasingly poorly 
remunerated sector. 
 
Unsurprisingly, students expressed equal concern about the corresponding neglect 
of both the substantive and procedural elements of certain publicly funded law 
specialisms.  A trainee with a Law Centre argued for the vital importance of specialist 
knowledge (and of course this has long been the view of the LSC too) but claimed 
that he had: ‘had to learn a lot of the law myself, on my own’. (Trainee Solicitor, 
Boomtown Law Centre). He went on to link this problem to the current structure of 
the post graduate route into law (either PgDip  or CPE) which, as short courses, are 
unable to offer subjects beyond the core; as a result, he could not fully benefit from 
those legal aid specialisms which the LPC does offer:  
I hadn’t studied the modules that we did on the LPC before, like 
Family, Employment and Housing because I’d done the PgDip, and if 
you haven’t studied employment law for example, there’s no point in 
telling you the practice of it if you don’t know the theory behind it.  
(Trainee Solicitor, Boomtown Law Centre). 
 
Insufficient training in the procedural law of legal aid specialisms was repeatedly 
identified as a particular weakness.  The need for some training in time management 
was also mentioned and the trainee just quoted linked this with legal knowledge,  
because it’s about knowing within the first 15 minutes of an interview 
whether you can help the person in front of you. Knowing which form to 
fill in, if, for instance, you want to make an application to court to 
suspend a warrant. I’d never even heard of that in the Housing Law 
module – there was lots of theory but in practice there’s never an 
argument in court over whether an order for possession can be granted 
.. in practice you’re negotiating beforehand. (Trainee Solicitor, 
Boomtown Law Centre). 
 
                                                 
29 Respondents to Williams & Goriely study also expressed this view (2003, p p4-5)  
 84 
Employers/ partners were divided over the LPC content, and in particular the focus 
on skills.  One Managing Partner argued that the profession was ‘dumbing down - we 
seem to get applications for jobs from people with the most extraordinarily low 
qualifications’ (Senior Partner and Head of Family Department, Chapelvale firm). In 
his subsequent argument he reflects on the paradigm shift that has occurred 
throughout the profession (making a competency training model increasingly logical), 
so that the current norm is solicitor as specialist employee rather than independent 
generalist:  
The profession probably is becoming more skills than knowledge based - 
I think that is reflected in the changes we’ve already seen on the LPC 
..I’ve certainly noticed with new trainees that their levels of knowledge are 
not as broad as they might have been at the time I qualified30 and maybe 
the answer is they honestly don’t need to be ..but I think (the breadth of 
knowledge) does make me a better solicitor because you have a much 
wider perspective on legal problems than someone who is just a 
specialist in one area. 
 
To a great extent people’s views on this issue appeared to turn on whether they were 
continuing to try to offer a generalist service;31 the comments of some echoed the 
perspective of the respondent just cited and argued further that training which 
provided breadth of knowledge was a pre-requisite of the LSC objective of providing 
a seamless web and holistic service. 32   Another senior partner said ‘we don’t want to 
specialise trainees in narrow areas because we’re not that sort of firm and so, in 
effect, we’re funding somebody else’s future fee-earner’ (Carbridge firm). 
 
However the (female) Training Principal in another High Street general practice had a 
completely different perspective on the benefits of skills versus knowledge, which 
questioned the traditional approach both to training and quality:  
What makes a good solicitor? Some intelligence, down to earth, good social 
skills, able to talk to clients, organised. It wouldn’t be a bad thing if legal 
training was more about skills, but whilst the profession’s still riddled with 
the old boy network, Oxbridge sort of attitude that’s not likely; here we’ve 
got a really good paralegal and then we’ve had a really bad solicitor who’s 
also a Deputy District Judge - I mean I went to LSE but does that make me 
a better lawyer? we need to look at our legal training .. (Employment 
specialist and training partner, Chapelvale firm) 
 
                                                 
30 Boon & Webb noted that this concern has commonly been expressed (2002)  
31 Whether a firm was continuing to try to function as a generalist practice tended to relate to its location; thus in our sample
 
it was 
those firms located in smaller provincial towns that were
 
generally able to do this. 
32 Specialisation has of course been central to the reform of legal aid; on the other hand, it is arguable that the emphasis on holistic 
service introduces some ambivalence into the policy. 
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Trainees and junior solicitors also thought there had been too little training in skills, 
especially in those associated with legal aid specialisms.  The relative neglect of 
advocacy was a particular complaint (and was reiterated by some advisers in the 
NFP sector); the following comments were typical: ‘we only did one practical in 
advocacy and in a High Street firm that’s the main part of your work; in practice the 
job’s probably 85% advocacy’; (trainee in Family seat, Chapelvale firm) and, ‘the 
advocacy on the LPC was rubbish’; (Trainee, Weaverton general practice). 
   
One trainee was doing a Mental Health seat which had involved him in representing 
patients in tribunals within three weeks of starting his training contract, he said: ‘top 
of the priority would be advocacy .. it can be intimidating .. there are questions .. 
which in the initial stages I wouldn’t have asked (of the doctors)’. (Mental health 
trainee, Boomtown firm).  
 
The need for confidence was emphasised by many. Others also realised that: 
‘showing you’re confident is an essential skill’, and it was suggested that this in turn 
entailed some knowledge of ‘the right body language’. Another spoke of needing to 
learn: ‘the official language of the court .. I spent a lot of time preparing my language’ 
(Civil litigation, Castleton firm).  These dimensions to learning to be a successful 
advocate are brought together in the observations of a one recently qualified (female) 
Housing solicitor:  
I needed to become more authoritative ..you have to convey that at 
court hearings, so you sort of march down there, you know - very 
brisk, busy important person walk .. it’s all about body language, tone 
of voice and conveying confidence.33  (Assistant housing solicitor, 
housing, Boomtown firm. 
 
Respondents also tended to complain about the quality of training in interviewing 
skills. One respondent who had worked as an adviser in the NFP sector for years, 
commended the training she had received there and said:  
I know that some people feel very daunted when they start here as 
trainee solicitors about seeing clients – so the LPC should have far 
more training in that and in client skills generally – on talking to them 
and taking instructions.  (Housing Partner and supervisor, Boomtown 
firm) 
 
                                                 
33 A medical educator has expressed  this  point thus: ‘the task of the newcomer is not to learn from talk, but to learn to talk  .. and 
walk the walk – taking up the professional behaviours .. are important staging posts on the road to full participation’.  (Swanwick, 2005, 
p 863) 
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Others argued that they needed preparation tailored to interviewing legal aid clients, 
who might have learning difficulties or for whom English might not be their first 
language, or who could be experiencing extreme stress. 
  
5.3.3 Specialist Training 
 
The above observations suggest a need for specialist training in the sensitive and 
distressing issues, such as domestic violence, child abuse, drug and alcohol 
problems, associated with social welfare and family law, of which trainees may have 
little knowledge and/ or personal experience.34 One trainee said:  
The one thing we did have at S* that was really useful was, I did 
Family Law as an elective and we had the representative from S* 
Police who came in to talk us about domestic violence and her talking 
to us about how she dealt with victims and liaising with victim support 
was really useful because it’s a different aspect and different people.  
 
At the same time, there was general agreement that the understanding that such 
knowledge would develop needed to be balanced by training in how to maintain 
some detachment.  For instance all junior fee-earners working in Family Law spoke 
of their lack of preparedness for the emotional and often disturbing nature of some of 
their work: ‘it would be useful  .. because I get upset when someone else is upset ..’  
and ‘you need to be warned about the need to disassociate’; and: ‘when I first started 
I used to take a lot of stuff home with me because I was shadowing partners who did 
a lot of child abuse [cases]’. (Family solicitor, Castleton firm). 
 
This point is further illustrated by the comments of a newly qualified solicitor who 
specialised in domestic violence: ‘you’ve got to be careful that you’re not too cold, too 
clinical .. it’s a balance‘, and an experienced Family paralegal stressed the need to 
learn ‘to be able to cope with pressure, get on with your clients and strike a balance 
between being sympathetic but not being rail-roaded and letting them run the case’ 35   
(Family paralegal, Chapelvale firm). 
 
                                                 
34 The importance of some specific training in the problems associated with social deprivation is supported by the following research 
studies: Sommerlad & Wall (1995), and Stein (2004). A Consumers’ Association survey of  4 groups found that private practice  
solicitors were viewed as ‘. having little in common with most disadvantaged clients’, and as ‘just going through the motions’.  By 
contrast,  NFP advisers were viewed ‘extremely positively’, as ‘street-wise’, empathetic and having a ‘clear knowledge and 
understanding of the respondents’ communities and specific needs’  (McAteer 2000) 
35 The complexity of this aspect of the role is acknowledged in the College of Law Public Legal Services Route: ‘a sense of balance – 
many publicly funded clients are undergoing acutely stressful experiences.  You must guide them effectively but without taking their 
anguish upon yourself’  http://www.colleg-of-law.co.uk Legal Aid Firms – Publicly Funded Work, p 2  
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5.3.4  Communication in plain English   
 
Some respondents advocated training in expressing complex ideas in plain English.36  
This longstanding concern with legal training  (for instance NCC 1989) is addressed 
in current LPC teaching, however, there is no focus on the specific needs which 
many publicly funded clients may have,37 as described by a commercial trainer and 
consultant:  
 I’ve only seen one firm with excellent files ..the best client care I’ve 
ever seen is work he does communicating complex legal issues to 11, 
12 year old kids – and that’s fundamental to good communication. I’d 
say a basic peer review training point is that you should write most of 
your letters to clients as if you were writing them to a 12 year old child 
– that’s probably the average reading age of the population – 
especially the average legal aid client and especially when you are 
trying to convey something complex like a legal point .. when you start 
talking about decree absolute and decree nisi you’ve lost them – they 
may well act as if they understand ..  but it’s gone. 
 
5.3.5 Administrative skills  
 
Several respondents argued for training in 
case management – simple things like sorting your correspondence 
and keeping correspondence between you and the client separate 
from correspondence with, say, the landlord.  Cases tend to balloon 
so it’s getting a sense of the different boxes so you can maintain 
some order under pressure. 38  (Trainee solicitor, Boomtown North 
Law Centre). 
 
A complaint that ‘there was nothing to help you with, say, file management or 
anything to do with any of the things you have to do when doing publicly funded work’ 
(Housing Solicitor, Boomtown firm) suggests that it would be useful to train in a 
methodology of file and case management that corresponds to the audit of LSC 
forms. 
 
5.3.6 Training in Legal Aid codes and procedures   
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the need to be able to work under pressure is 
accentuated by the inclusion in legal aid practice of a great deal of (unremunerated) 
                                                 
36 Boon & Webb’s responses included a concern with the need for ‘plain English’ drafting (2002) 
37 See Webb et al (2005) pp 28-57; however this text does not address the needs of poorly educated clients.  
38 Again, the especial importance of this is acknowledged in the Public Legal Services Pathway developed by the College of Law; for 
example skills required include ‘Personal Organisation – you will be constantly required to work on several issues at any one time’   
http://www.colleg-of-law.co.uk Legal Aid Firms – Publicly Funded Work, p 2  
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administrative work which must be done both accurately and yet as quickly as 
possible.  The comments of a recently qualified solicitor points up the vital 
importance of knowing how to do this work:  
As a trainee, an assistant, you end up doing the legal aid because the 
solicitor fee earner wouldn’t be bothered filling in all the forms – you 
would just take the file and fill in the forms and do the statement out of the 
fee earner’s notes justifying the application for funding. I found it very 
difficult when I started and didn’t appreciate that if you get a legal aid 
application rejected you get a black mark against the franchisee; when I 
was at * I used to get quite a few rejected because I hadn’t dealt with 
something - for instance in an ancillary relief case if you don’t say an 
asset is the subject matter of a dispute then it’s treated as an asset .. it 
was the LSC that picked it up. (Assistant solicitor, civil litigation, 
Hillchester). 
 
Others echoed this complaint: ‘there’s nothing on the LPC to prepare you for legal aid 
work and in my training contract it was very much ‘you learn on the job’; and, ‘we 
should have done much more on the Legal Aid forms, your application to incur 
disbursements and things like that – your application for legal aid – we didn’t do any 
of that’.  The commercial consultant and trainer cited above argued that this 
preparation could take the form of training for file review, starting off with  
basic understanding of SQM – because you can’t go through a file and 
say you’ve met all the client care requirements if you don’t understand for 
instance precisely what’s required with regard to cost advice e.g. when 
you have to give it and how often you need to update that advice; you’ve 
also got to understand the general civil contract under which you work .. 
for instance about assessment of means .. and then you’ve got to be 
conversant with  file management procedures .as per LSC requirements .. 
 
The difficulties this training deficit caused for individual trainees and newly qualified 
solicitors, their firms and the efficient operation of the contract have been recognised 
and as a result, towards the end of the research, regional LSCs had begun to run 
short courses designed to familiarize contractors with standard procedures.   
However the LSC opposition to a dedicated legal aid LPC on the grounds that it 
would make legal aid too unattractive a career option, apparently extends to training 
in legal aid procedures on the LPC.  It was argued that this should instead be done 
by firms, during the Training Contract; however, our data (see below) suggests that 
many employers are too stretched to give adequate training and supervision. 
 
Finally, a common complaint was the intensity of the LPC. The following views are 
typical: ‘Everything in one year - you’re doing it under too much pressure.’ The work 
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overload39 was linked back to the fact that the course focused on subjects which 
were not part of the legal aid practice. 
 
5.4 Training Contract and Supervision 
 
Since the training contract and supervision are both forms of work based learning, 
and their governance overlaps, we will discuss them together.   
 
5.4.1 The Law Society Regulation of the Training Contract   
 
The Law Society (Education and Training Unit, 2005) stipulates that firms can only 
take trainees if they are authorised as training establishments.  This requires them to 
have a Training Principal who ‘agrees to take overall responsibility for training’ (Law 
Society, 2005, p. 3). It further requires that the trainee be given specific induction, 
close supervision with experienced staff and assessment procedures that include 
regular feedback and formal appraisal.   
 
The regulations require the trainee to be ‘guided and tutored in professional conduct, 
ethics and client care’; ‘the level and complexity of their work to be increased 
gradually; and supervised properly and their performance reviewed and appraised 
regularly’ (Law Society, 2005, p. 9).  The components of the various skills in which 
trainees should be trained and the activities which will enable them to acquire these 
are then broken down and the regulations stipulate that ‘to develop these skills, 
trainees should work on larger cases or transactions as members of a team, or be 
given smaller transactions to run themselves, under close supervision’ (Law Society, 
2005, p 10).  Similar breakdowns are set out for client care and practice support, 
communication skills, dispute resolution, drafting, interviewing and advising, legal 
research, and negotiation, again with an explicit emphasis on the need for gradual 
introductions to each area and skill and close supervision.   
 
Many of the training requirements are reiterated in the section on supervising 
trainees; for instance, supervisors’ responsibilities include allocating ‘work and tasks 
of an appropriate level, gradually increasing the level and the complexity of the work 
over time’; monitoring ‘the trainee’s workload to ensure they have a sufficient but not 
                                                 
39 Providers have expressed dissatisfaction with the ‘overloaded curriculum’ and concern that it inhibits ‘deep learning’ (Boon and 
Webb, 2002); ‘the LPC struggles to meet in 9 months the divergent practical concerns that the modern solicitors’ profession 
encompasses’ (UKCLE: 2005, p 1)  
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excessive amount of work’ , ‘review(ing) the training contract record regularly to 
ensure that an appropriate balance of work and skills is struck’ and giving ‘regular 
feedback to trainees regarding their performance’ (Law Society, 2005, p.16).   
 
The regulation carries weak enforcement mechanisms, however.  Echoing the 
account quoted in the previous chapter of the extremely light touch inspections 
conducted by the Law Society generally, monitoring of the training contract consists 
of questionnaires to be completed by training principals and trainees, following which 
the ‘Society might ..select the organisation for a monitoring visit’ (p. 19; our 
emphasis).  The evidence from our respondents, both trainees, newly qualified 
solicitors and more senior fee earners, suggests that in some firms there is a wide 
gulf between these requirements and actual practice.  According to one respondent, 
a Law Society Quality Monitoring Assessor,  
There does need to be regulation to ensure there is proper training and 
supervision and that’s a problem for High Street and Legal Aid firms 
because they are very stretched.  In fact you wonder how some of them 
can really train / supervise people properly at all because that obviously 
takes fee earning money and at the same time the trainee has got to do 
enough to earn their wage.  When you think that the big firms say that it 
costs them around £100,000 to train a trainee then how can these smaller 
firms do it properly? 
 
In Chapters 3 and 4, we identified the way in which regulation – in particular audit - 
represent a form of training which is effectively competence based.  In terms of 
requirements to supervise less experienced staff, the SQM Guidance specifies, inter 
alia, that cases be allocated to ensure that both in volume and complexity they 
correspond to practitioners’ competence.  The provision of ‘effective’ systems of 
supervision including ‘induction, training, testing, file review and appraisal records’, 
and ‘regular supervisory sessions to discuss new cases taken, progress in existing 
cases, tactics, options, use of undertakings, and content of complex case plans 
where necessary, outcomes of cases completed since the last session and training 
needs and professional development’ (LSC, 2002). This therefore provides some 
indirect control.  Firms are also required to conduct regular appraisals at which 
training needs must be identified.  
 
Despite this regulation, workplace legal education is not governed by rigorous QA 
processes.  As is revealed by the data discussed below, this lack means there is 
currently no mechanism for ensuring comparability of the trainee experience.   
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5.4.2  Compliant or ‘sink or swim’ training? 
 
The accounts of their training contract and subsequent work experience provided by 
trainees and newly qualified solicitors revealed two broad approaches to training and 
supervision. Sometimes both approaches were to be found within the same firm, in 
different departments, but generally one was relied upon at the expense of the other, 
corresponding to the culture and resources of the firm.  Respondents described 
these two approaches as, on the one hand, the ‘sink or swim’ / ‘in the deep end’ 
approach and, on the other, an approach which largely corresponded to the Law 
Society and LSC requirements in that it involved matching competence and 
experience to the volume and complexity of casework, and a structured, gradualist 
introduction to practice, generally through shadowing and delegation of (initially) 
small tasks on a file, building up to a caseload.  These polar approaches represent 
the extremes of a spectrum of processes which have been identified as together 
comprising the deep learning of a professional role.  That is to say, at one end, 
repeated exposure to a range of practice settings which can involve formal, informal 
and ‘incidental’ learning,40 and, at the other, a structured approach offering support, 
feedback and formal training.41 In theory, both approaches continue to incorporate 
the traditional apprenticeship model whereby learning is achieved through modelling, 
as the trainee observes the behaviours of her Principal or supervisor and other 
experienced practitioners, and reproduces these behaviours  (Bandura, 1977). 
 
Low remuneration levels clearly provide a strong economic incentive to use trainees 
in order to obtain a return on investment.42 Many firms said that trainees were an 
absolute cost to the firm, even in the latter stages of training, because of the 
opportunity costs incurred by fee earners involved in their training.  As a result, as 
one Training Principal admitted, ‘the needs of the firm (can) override (trainees’ needs 
and preferences)’ and ‘trainees could get ‘stuck in a department which needed them 
for far longer than originally planned’. (Employment specialist and supervisor, 
Chapelvale firm). However, although much of our data recounts this form of training, 
                                                 
40Formal learning is that which results from instruction, generally as an individual, cognitive process; informal learning is 
‘characteristically collaborative .. leading to context specific forms of knowledge and skills .. incidental learning  .. or implicit learning  
(is) a descriptor for the acquisition of knowledge independently of  any conscious strategy on the part of either the trainer or trainee’ 
(Swanwick, 2005, p 860, and  see Marsick & Watkins 1990) 
41 See for example Dreyfus & Dreyfus 1986; Ericsson et al 1993; Argyris, 1982. 
42 Rolfe & Anderson’s (2002) study found that some recruiters thought ‘trainees were a cost-effective staffing solution because they 
could often do the work of a newly qualified solicitor while being paid a lower salary
’ 
 (p 11) and expected them ‘to cover their costs 
soon after starting the training contract’ (p 93) 
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respondents’ accounts indicated a variety of experiences, in the sense of the extent 
to which the sink or swim method was used and the stage at which it was introduced; 
some trainees in firms which strictly observed LSC rules tended to enjoy closer 
supervision in the publicly funded departments than in, for instance, conveyancing: 
‘Family was better because that was a lot of publicly funded work so they had audits, 
so by the nature of the department they were generally more compliant anyway’.  
(Civil Litigation and Family Assistant Solicitor, Hillchester). 
 
It must be stressed that many employers attempted to combine the ‘sink or swim’ 
approach with some system and structure and that two firms in particular were 
rigorous about adopting a gradualist, well supervised form of training, and were 
commended by the trainees and junior fee earners for their training and supervision. 
 
5.4.3  Sink or Swim: the employers’ view   
 
It appeared that to some extent the sink or swim approach correlated with the 
resources of the firm or organization, and within firms, the specific department. 
Clearly the more stretched the organization, the greater the incentive to set the 
trainee to work on fee-earning business.  However this approach may also be a 
product of ‘cultural lag’.  The idea that ‘articles’ should follow a planned, formal 
training structure is relatively recent, and the bureaucracy which has resulted from  
the Law Society Requirements appears to be resented by some older senior 
partners. By contrast, the traditional apprenticeship method entails the trainee 
learning by direct or remote observation in combination with ‘doing’: as one senior 
partner put it: ‘the actual practical training then was deficient because it was quite 
autocratic - very little monitoring; nobody taught me’. (Senior Partner, mental health 
specialist and supervisor, Boomtown firm). 
 
Nevertheless, asked to describe his training regime, this partner (a Mental Health 
specialist from a Category 1 firm) said the ideal was to ‘just ease people in, but the 
practice is totally different’. Asked to elaborate, he said: ‘well I’m terrible really -  I 
mean in some respects I’m a bit of the sink or swim school -  I’m afraid  the theory is 
fabulous, but ..’. 
 
He went on to justify his traditional approach by reference to the low level of legal aid 
fees:  ‘it’s £57.25 an hour, it’s ridiculous, an insult’. 
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Other solicitors with some years’ PQE saw positive advantages in the sink or swim 
method; for instance:  
My personal experience was that I arrived at the firm and within days had 
my own caseload and off I went and I just thought that was the way it was 
and I’m grateful for it in some ways because I was in court doing trials 
within a couple of weeks of joining the firm .. that’s what got me into 
advocacy – being thrown into the deep end ..if you do (the training) in a 
formal way you’re going to get the sort of lawyer who’s different to the sort 
of lawyer who is produced if they don’t have a great deal of back up and 
support.  (Children Act specialist, rural sole practice, North Daleshire). 
 
His subsequent comments indicate that he was unhappy about the dependency 
which, in common with several of the other older solicitors, he considered greater 
support tended to produce. His account indicates how the disjuncture between the 
expectations of his generation and those of today’s lawyers, revealed in trainees’ and 
junior solicitors’ accounts, may cause tension:   
I did find that if they ran into the slightest bit of difficulty their response was, 
‘will you do it?’ So I got myself into the position where I had all the difficult 
clients, all the difficult cases and all the hassle of supervision. I expected 
that assistant solicitors would have been trained already and so they would 
need someone to talk through cases with that were difficult and I was happy 
to do that, and I’ve always been very keen on books, so I always had a very 
good library, access to Lexis through the internet. But his attitude was so 
different to the attitude that I’d expected of a trainee that it was very difficult 
– for example going to court on a first occasion - I mean you can never 
predict what’s going to happen in even the simplest of court hearings, but I 
will take a very simple application for someone to go along to as their first 
occasion, such as an adjournment or something of that nature .. and that 
would be weeks in advance, after they’d been a couple of months with me. 
So when even the simplest of applications goes wrong - the judge had 
asked them a question and they hadn’t felt able to answer it and so the 
response was ‘it’s not my file I don’t know anything about it’ – and of course 
that’s no good - and there was no attempt made to telephone me from the 
court.  But when we discussed it afterwards, the attitude was ‘well I wasn’t 
trained to do this – you didn’t tell me that that might happen’!  (Senior 
Partner, North Daleshire firm). 
 
The consequences of the difficulty in achieving the right balance between 
experiential learning and support were accentuated for this partner by the regulation 
associated with legal aid and resource issues:  
I was therefore reluctant to give them any work that was part of the legal 
aid contract for fear that they wouldn’t have their files kept in a way the 
LSC expected. So I could only give them a couple of files; it took too 
much supervision because I couldn’t rely on them to correctly copy the 
date of a marriage from a marriage certificate and put it in a divorce 
petition – it was that kind of lack of care – because the attitude was ‘well 
I’m only earning £15000 p/a and I’m here to get a training contract’.  
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5.4.4  Reluctance to give training contracts   
 
As a result of the factors discussed above, and because of the generally tight 
finances of legal aid firms or of the publicly funded departments within firms, we 
found that some practitioners, like the partner last cited, were increasingly disinclined 
to take trainees, or at least trainees to do publicly funded work, 43 especially in view 
of the potentially disastrous consequences which could flow from mistakes in this 
work. The following comments by another Family lawyer on the difficulties in 
recruiting in rural areas also points up the interconnections between the need to 
supervise closely (and consequent cost) and other disincentives:  
It’s a huge hassle to try and take someone on; for example when we 
were doing legal aid in some volume, recruiting someone would take a 
long time using an agency, for someone to be found; then there would 
be a shortlist of one; then often when the LSC did their audit, they’d find 
a problem with them and it was just a nightmare really… supervising 
assistant solicitors was taking up my valuable fee earning time in 
respect of my private clients, and every time the LSC came in the 
auditors would find great fault with somebody and in some cases that 
led to them being dismissed. (High Street Firm, North Daleshire) 
 
Other employers also complained about the cost of trainees, both direct and indirect, 
for instance:  
You’ve got to pay them ridiculous sums, and their attitude, they all think 
they’re worth every penny (they cost us) a fortune; we pay them £12-15 
grand then there’s national insurance and so on, and course fees and 
things like that, and then there’s our time, even if they only come in for 
15 minutes a day .. (Mental Health specialist, Boomtown firm) 
 
Another reason commonly put forward for not giving training contracts, which 
connected to the cost of training trainees, was that trainees tended to leave once 
they were qualified. and as a result of this, one partner said: ‘I have a subconscious 
preference for local people .. because they’re committed to the local community’. 
This (commonly expressed) attitude was grounded in experience of the effects of the 
increasingly sharp segmentation of the profession:  ‘they’re here just for the ride for 2 
years, to suck out their trainee payments for and then go and get a job at  * 
Commercial Lawyers in * (Boomtown)’ (Criminal Specialist, Chapelvale). 
 
 
                                                 
43 See Williams & Goriely, 2003. It  appears however  that the LSC Training Contract Grants 2004 Scheme is, to some extent, 
countering firms’ reluctance;  it was noticeable that several of the firms / agencies in our sample that had trainees under this scheme.  
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5.4.5  Sink or swim: the trainees’ perspective 
 
The ambivalence in the evaluations by trainees and recently qualified solicitors of  
the sink or swim approach to training illustrates the vital importance of experiential 
learning. Most of those who were qualified or nearing the end of their training, 
considered the approach to be of some value.  A common comment was that it had 
been a steep (and effective) learning curve.  The following account suggests the 
value of incidental learning:  
The most useful thing I found in the training - and I was scared at the time 
- was when you had to cover people coming into reception with queries 
and no one else wants to deal with them so they send the trainee and you 
don’t know what to expect and you have to deal with people there and 
obviously you don’t always know the answer and when you’re a trainee 
you’re not confident enough to say you know the answer even if you 
suspect you’re right, so it’s good skill development in being able to deal 
with people and say ‘well look I don’t know the answer straightaway‘ and 
just in dealing with more people. (Civil litigation specialist, Hillchester firm) 
 
However it was generally the survivors of this approach who gave it a qualified 
endorsement; as one newly qualified solicitor commented: ‘you’ve got to be careful 
with this sink or swim idea that people have with training – it’s not always the best 
way. It depends on your nature; a lot of people won’t be able to deal with the stress’.   
 
On the other hand some junior fee earners found that a lack of hands on work 
undermined their confidence.  Most Family departments appeared to be especially 
reluctant to give trainees responsibility, partly because of the extreme pressure they 
were under and also because of the potential damage errors could cause.  The 
following account depicts a department which appears to be the antithesis of a 
learning organisation: 44  
It was an absolute nightmare in Family, where I started. They don’t want 
to give you a caseload until they think you can do something but then 
when I asked the Training Principal if I could sit in, she said ‘well I think 
that’s for a bit further down the line’ and I thought ‘well what on earth am I 
supposed to do at the bottom – do I carry on making tea because I’ve got 
nothing else to do?’  and I wasn’t even downstairs in the Department, I 
was upstairs sharing a room with a  legal exec, miles away from them and 
I had to keep going upstairs and downstairs, so they put me in a room 
with the Managing Partner who for years has been incredibly stressed ..  
and they were too busy to train me .. if you tried to talk to the Training 
Partner about a case it was very hard to get her to go through it with you, 
and that’s what you need and it sort of led to a complete loss of 
                                                 
44 A learning organization has a culture which encourages staff to feel secure in their role and status and space and time for 
continuing support and education; see for instance Billett, 1999  
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confidence where I was absolutely crap at doing anything..  (Housing 
specialist, Boomtown firm) 
 
This trainee was then moved to Housing where, although an equally busy 
department, she was given both more responsibility and more supervision.   
 
Other respondents also recognised that some skills and forms of knowledge can only 
be acquired by repeated ‘doing’; another trainee said that in some ways he liked the 
huge amount of responsibility he’d been given from the word go ‘because I feel I’ve 
achieved something when I do it’.  He went on, however, to qualify this endorsement, 
saying that in other ways it was too much because ‘if I can’t do something the 
consequences of it are so very serious’.  This support for the need to balance 
experiential learning with formal guidance, by, for instance, ensuring that there is the 
incremental and synchronised approach to training across the firm required by the 
Law Society is also illustrated in the following account by a Training Principal:  
We got to a point in the year when (name trainee) hadn’t done any 
negotiation or advocacy skills so I had to go and talk to the person (in 
the Family department) and they went ‘ooh he’s not ready for that’ and I 
said ‘well last time he was in employment he did that. In fact he ran a 
whole case and settled it’.  Because you’ve got to encourage people, 
make sure they do things; they weren’t sure about letting him out of 
their sight, let alone out of the building to go and represent people.   
 
The importance of local or contextual knowledge also surfaced repeatedly in people’s 
accounts; for instance ‘you need to know the Judges and their idiosyncrasies’.   
 
On the other hand the sink or swim experience of a trainee in one NFP organisation 
was clearly not calibrated to his level of expertise; he thought that if he had not had 
some previous experience of interviewing from working in a Job Centre, he would 
have found it very difficult to cope. Interviewed in his fourth week into the training 
contract, he gave the following account:  
The whole thing’s been a bit hectic to be honest; what I expected to be a 
few days of not  so much settling in as being told what my role was going 
to be and also sitting in with * seeing how cases are dealt with in practice 
.. it was pretty much straight in the deep end. There was a case which 
hadn’t been dealt with, an employment case. So there was the case file to 
be managed .. there was a lot of it .. all the documents had to be sorted .. 
it was a real mess and it needed the witnesses to come forward, so * said 
to do that and we also had to prepare a brief for Counsel and negotiate a 
settlement; I don’t think I’d really learned anything about case 
management on the LPC .. dealing with the witnesses and the client to 
make the statement was tricky .. they asked lots of questions .. it was 
quite nerve wracking .. it was just ‘such and such is coming in, find out 
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what he knows’. I’d seen the file on the afternoon of the first day and this 
was the next morning.. . (Trainee Solicitor, Boomtown North Law Centre)  
 
The account by a Housing paralegal of her supervision (in a Category 1 Boomtown 
firm) was similarly troubled; her motivation for coming to the firm was rooted in ‘the 
master as role model’ form of learning: ‘I came here (from a CAB) to work with * 
(name solicitor) as he’s one of the best solicitors dealing with housing in *.‘  But this 
traditional apprenticeship form of learning failed because: ‘he had no time to 
supervise me .. I got a whole bunch of cases . .and I’d inch them along not having 
that overview of what was going on .. I got an incredible case load – about 200‘. The 
situation ended in a crisis when it was found that she was ‘missing legal issues’ as a 
result of which all her cases were taken from her and she was just delegated work on 
her supervisor’s cases.  Despite these problems, she received no formal training: 
‘I’ve only done 3 training courses in the whole time (7 years) I’ve been here’, and, 
unsurprisingly, she continued to  
feel scared .. because the work has huge consequences and the 
system that’s supposed to be in place isn’t really .. the reality is that if 
someone comes in and it’s a question of an imminent eviction then I 
have to draw up the application for an injunction.   
 
Her subsequent difficulties highlight the weakness of NFP training in the law and its 
application, and underlines the importance of both ensuring the match between 
competence and complexity of work, and tailoring supervision to individual needs:  
The thing is, without legal training you can’t always look things up easily.  I 
need help interpreting it and putting that interpretation onto the client’s 
situation, applying it; I mean ‘I know what it says on the page, but what do I 
do? My worst ever nightmare was * (name supervisor) being on holiday and 
just before he went we got this couple facing possession proceedings with 
anti-social behaviour and there being an injunction against the partner and 
he was in prison and * (supervisor) says ‘go to prison, get him to sign the 
legal aid forms for possession proceedings and to purge his contempt; get 
her in and get her instructions too’.  So I did all that and then it became 
apparent that the guy had incredibly severe mental health problems and 
shouldn’t have been in prison and his health was deteriorating and I waited 
for * to come back from his holiday, and while I waited this guy, when I next 
went to see him, he’s got a bandage over his eye, the guards were 
‘poisoning’ his food .. it’s all getting totally out of control, I don’t know what 
I’m doing .. I didn’t know how to set about doing an application for 
somebody to purge their contempt – the sheer practicalities. I went to see 
my client and then asked to see the Governor to get him to sign his bit and 
he actually came down and said ‘what are you doing? Why are you doing 
this if you don’t know?’  That was awful for me.  It was 2 years ago but I’ve 
never forgotten; knowing that if he’d been in the hands of a competent 
solicitor he would have been out of there in 2 days.   
 
She subsequently left this firm and returned to the NFP sector. 
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5.4.6  ‘Open Door’   
 
This form of training which, in combination with checks on incoming and outgoing 
mail, underpins the traditional apprenticeship system, depends on the accessibility of 
the ‘master’; 45 for instance: ‘yes his door is always open – whether he’s there or not 
is a different matter’.  And a solicitor said of her Principal at the previous firm where 
she had undertaken her traineeship: 
He just didn’t physically have the time to sit down and go through things 
with you so it’s a case of you’re left to get on with it and unless you had a 
question, you did get on with it ..so though they have an open door policy 
so that you can pop in and ask anything any time, in practice actually 
tracking down people was very difficult.  (Civil litigation, assistant solicitor, 
Hillchester firm) 
 
Research into work place learning demonstrates that in addition to accessibility there 
must be an equitable organizational ethos where staff feel valued and secure 
(Barnett, 1999).  However the data indicated that this might be relatively rare, in 
which case the efficacy of the open door model could be diminished; for instance: ‘I 
don’t know if it’s a personality thing but I find it quite difficult to ask him a question 
without feeling I’m pestering him or am really stupid’, and an experienced paralegal 
said: ‘the trainee will ask questions, but she tries to go round people in here so she’s 
not bugging one person too much and she always apologises for asking.  She’s not 
comfortable’.  (Family paralegal, Chapelvale firm) 
 
On the other hand, the open door policy clearly can play an invaluable role in training 
and supervision if the context is a culture which genuinely does encourage 
communication and if there is a structured training / supervisory scheme:  ‘it’s a small 
outfit this, and it’s daily supervision, hourly supervision; by the minute the shout 
comes from next door ‘what shall I do with this?’ (Civil Litigation Partner, Hillchester) 
Subsequent interviews with newly qualified solicitors at the firm not only endorsed his 
claims but pointed to an interactive and supportive form of supervision, based on 
collaborative problem-solving, suggesting that his firm fitted the description of a 
learning organisation:  
We are directly next door to each other and we’re passing each other all 
day every day .. it’s ongoing .. so here it’s a reality (unlike where she 
had trained), because though he’s very busy .. I know that if I go in and 
                                                 
45 LSC spokespeople tended to be very cynical about claims that supervision was being conducted through open door, and Williams 
& Goriely found that whilst Partners often said their firms were open and informal, this view was not shared by other staff (2003, p23)   
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say ‘I need to speak to you about this’ then he will drop everything and 
talk to me .. and I’ll say ‘this is what’s happening’ and he’ll say ‘right so 
what do you think?’ and then I’ll come out with ‘well I thought about this 
.. but ‘ and he’ll say ‘right, let’s get the book’ he says ‘well I don’t know 
the answer myself’ but I think it’s more that he wants to give me the 
chance and confidence to think it through.  
 
The other trainee at this firm said ‘they never make you feel stupid if you go 
and ask something; everyone just sort of wanders in and out of each other’s 
rooms’. 
 
Another firm illustrated the way in which a genuine culture of accessibility could 
become a durable feature of firms’ working and training practices. The importance 
assigned to training by this Carbridge firm was signified by the fact that the Training 
Partner was the Senior Partner.  ‘L’, a qualified ancillary relief specialist, argued that 
his open door approach, which continued in his supervision of her, was more 
effective than their formally arranged supervision sessions, partly because it was 
easier to keep in touch with someone’s performance if virtually continual but informal 
contact was maintained, as opposed to scheduled meetings.  The formal supervision 
and appraisal occasions L regarded as a consolidation of the ongoing learning and 
monitoring processes, rather than the substance of the processes.  For similar 
reasons, she believed in maintaining continuous supervision over her own trainee: 
He’s with me most of the time. I expect to know where he is and what he’s 
doing at any time, and he’s growing resigned to it. …it’s not the model that 
every fee earner here would use but that’s why I end up with them because I 
think that’s the right way to train. If you’re going to train you should train, so that 
means that you check all the letters, tell them what they’re doing wrong, give 
them work to do and check it all, and it’s definitely more trouble, but...                                                              
 
Her trainee identified the importance of this close supervision in bridging the gap 
between substantive knowledge of the Law on the one hand and its application to 
real life cases on the other, and further, the importance of absorbing the 
interrelationship between the Law and procedural detail: 
It has been three years since I did the LPC, so it’s extremely important that 
you have this reassurance over and over again, from someone who’s 
experienced the law for five or six years about how the law operates 
substantively, and also she gives me insight into the procedural side of it.                          
 
An ancillary relief matter provided him with an example of this process: 
We thought it was just going to be a general divorce ancillary relief matter, 
basic assets involved may be a house, but it turned out that in this particular 
instance there was an issue with dissipating the assets from the other side 
so it transpired that we had no option but to make an application under 
Section 37 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 to prevent the other side 
from disposing of assets and I’d absolutely no idea of the procedure 
involved to go about that and L took me through the stages, and through the 
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public funded side of it and I went to court and got the initial order.. that’s 
what a traineeship is all about really, you’re going to come across these 
scenarios which you wouldn’t ordinarily come across before, but then once 
you come across it once then you can do it twice and it’s only a matter of 
practice isn’t it; just get better at it all the time.                                                                 
 
This view of the effectiveness of open door training was echoed by a specialist in 
child abuse in the same firm who had qualified four years previously:   
Personally I think it’s better because I can’t think of anything worse than – 
especially when you’re training – thinking you’ve got a problem, and you 
don’t know the answer, and that for somebody else it’s probably not a 
problem at all.   
 
We will return to this issue of the creation of an organizational learning culture 
and learning environment below. 
                                    
5.4.7 Discrepancies between accounts of supervisees and supervisors   
 
There was some discrepancy between the respective accounts of some supervisees 
and supervisors of the training and supervision regime in their organization, and it 
appeared that supervisors might be recounting ideal practice rather than describing 
reality. This was most marked in the account by the supervisor of the trainee solicitor 
in an NFP agency who had been given casework on his second day and who had 
said he would have liked to have begun by shadowing and being given small tasks 
on files.  His supervisor’s account of his first week diverged significantly: ‘he spent a 
couple of weeks shadowing me, looking at my files, talking to me about cases, going 
to court, one to one training about legal aid and stuff’, (Solicitor and supervisor, 
Boomtown North Law Centre). 
 
Comments from other respondents suggest that the discrepancy in accounts may be 
due to supervisors’ desire to give more time than is possible.46  With the exception of 
two firms where the legal aid work appeared to be supported by more profitable work, 
this depiction of legal aid firms or departments being simply too stretched to enable 
supervisors to comply with LSC supervision and Law Society Training Contract 
requirements surfaced repeatedly in supervisees’ accounts.    
 
                                                 
46 The pressure on time was clearly related to the low level of fees for publicly funded work which was leading some partners in some 
firms to argue that their firm should give up publicly funded work altogether; for instance a Housing Partner in what was once one of 
the most reputable legal aid practices in Boomtown said: ‘’one of the Partners has been saying why didn’t Housing make any money 
and he actually came up one afternoon and ended up spending an hour talking about how we did things ..looking at axing my job – 
that’s the gist of it’  
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It was also striking how, in the course of the interview, many supervisors shifted to an 
acknowledgement that too much exposure to practice, and at too early a stage, was 
not always ideal; following this admission, one proceeded to describe how he would 
prefer to train / supervise:  
I would have formal supervisions and more often than at the end of the 
month .. you need to spend – even when they can partly do their own 
cases – at least an hour a day with them, going through problem files, 
talking through things – but there’s no time. (Solicitor and supervisor, 
North Boomtown Law Centre) 
 
5.4.8 The low status of the Training Principal   
 
Our research found that the job of Training Principal was generally viewed as 
undesirable; in the words of one solicitor: ‘I’m the general dogsbody or rather 
Training Principal’ (Training Partner and employment specialist, Chapelvale firm). 
Another solicitor said she did the job ‘because no one else would’ (Training Partner, 
Hillchester Firm); yet another recently qualified solicitor describing training at her 
previous firm said of the Principal: ‘he got given the job because nobody else wanted 
it .. he didn’t really do anything’.   
 
There was general agreement that the Training Principal should have more status 
and time and also receive some form of training. In practice we found none who had 
had a reduction in targets to reflect their training work, and none had been trained for 
the position. It was also noticeable that,  with only two exceptions, all the Training 
Principals were women, suggesting a possible relationship between women’s 
frequently lower status in firms and the low status of the position.   
 
5.4.9 Views on ideal training and supervision   
 
The view that shadowing should be a regular, compulsory and frequent component of 
training was widely articulated.  One trainee’s reflections on how his training could 
have been improved support  the assertion that learning is produced by a 
synchronised and balanced mix of theory and practice,47 tracked and supported 
through a record / learning log and regular supervisions (for instance Argyris 1982; 
Schon 1984):  
                                                 
47 This is a crude simplification of a complex and heterogeneous concept: various forms of learning have been identified, and are 
discussed more fully below 
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I was interviewing at the end of the first week .. I would have liked to have 
sat in more, to have seen a variety of cases. .. a training plan with set 
cases, a selection so I would have got a spread and so I could have seen 
exactly what had happened where and why and diagnose what was going 
to happen ..it’s all been a bit haphazard . I would have liked to have been 
given specified tasks on files ..what outcome we would want .. what sort 
of procedure we’d use ..I mean (name Principal) says things like ‘phone 
this person and speak to them’, but I don’t always know why ...  (trainee, 
Boomtown North Law Centre) 
 
We observed this trainee, in his fourth week into his contract, conduct one of these 
appointments which had been booked into his diary without any prior warning or 
indication of what the matter involved. Some way through the process of completing 
the legal help form, it transpired that the client was neither new to the Centre and nor 
was the matter a new one, and that he had therefore already completed a legal help 
form and had a file. The embarrassing position this placed the trainee in made it 
difficult for him to give a convincing impression of control and expertise and to 
establish a relationship of trust with the client and clearly dented his confidence.  
 
There was also a consensus that training should have more structure.  Similarly, 
virtually all trainees and supervisees said they would have liked to have had regular 
supervisions in which they could discuss cases.  These preferences, which the Law 
Society and LSC requirements enshrine, were being followed by one Training 
Principal:  
We’re watching the practice skills in each area in which he receives 
training.  There’s a loose thing about skills from the Law Society and 
you need a record of what they’ve done and what skills they’ve attained 
– so I thought ‘let’s start off with this .. I do find it useful because I can 
cross check that we are doing things. (Employment specialist, and 
training partner, Chapelvale firm) 
 
5.4.10 LSC Supervision and File reviews  
 
All firms and agencies tended to rely on traditional supervisory checks on incoming 
(and sometimes outgoing) post and open door policy, together with file reviews, and 
the efficacy of these appeared to mirror that of the rest of their training regimes.  For 
instance, those firms with an effective open door policy (such as the one described 
above) also had well developed systems for cross checking and supporting 
practitioners’ work.  What was most striking, however, was the approach to file 
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review undertaken by one of these firms, which generated constructive feedback 
thereby facilitating reflection48 on the part of the supervisee:  
My supervisor in Family reviews my files every month for both 
compliance and content; they read the file from start to finish – they do 
6 at random every month, and it’s a total cross section, could be 3 
private, 2 legal help, one substantive certificate and then give feedback; 
partners exchange files as well and then we can discuss law and 
courses we’ve been on at the weekly team meetings; and on a day to 
day basis I can and do ask * or * about my cases.   (Civil litigation 
specialist, Hillchester firm). 
 
The other recently qualified solicitor at this firm said: 
It’s so much more organised (than my old firm) and the file reviews 
cover everything - they’ve taken the guidance from the LSC and applied 
it to all files ..if anything is not satisfactory, there’s advice why not and a 
date by when it has to be rectified and it’s not just the administrative 
things and the LSC things, there’s also a box ‘is the legal advice 
satisfactory?’  (Civil litigation and Family, Hillchester firm). 
 
This firm was also distinct in that not only did it hold 6 monthly appraisals, it had also, 
in an apparent exemplification of the learning organisation, been decided that the 
partners needed training in how to conduct these.     
 
Other firms were less rigorous or reflexive.  The responses of one Training Principal 
suggested that whilst she took both training and supervision very seriously she was 
constrained by the prevailing culture which did not appear to accept that professional 
learning needed to be engaged in by all practitioners:  
Solicitors don’t like supervision yet they need that however long 
they’ve been qualified .. we need to incorporate more supervision – 
more regular supervision, really looking at the files, talking about 
difficulties we’ve had .. at the moment it’s very impromptu and ad hoc; 
it’s the same with appraisals .. staff development is very ad hoc here. 
(Employment specialist Chapelvale firm) 
 
A legal executive (Family specialist) with over 16 years’ experience said of her firm:  
There isn’t enough supervision for less experienced people .. they get 
virtually none. OK, their files are reviewed, but you need to review files 
carefully to make sure that someone is going down the right track and 
that the advice they are giving is right .. but the files that are picked are 
all Legal Help ones and they are not the most complicated and they are 
only reviewed to ensure they comply, from a procedural point of view – 
…. And the big ones on my desk, that have gone onto a legal aid 
certificate, which would indicate how good your strategy is, how good 
your advice, they’re not looked at.    (Legal Executive, Family, 
Chapelvale firm) 
                                                 
48 Reflection has long been regarded as key to developing a personal framework of understanding and hence learning (Schon, 1983) 
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This critique was endorsed by the commercial trainer:  
If you’re called a supervisor you have to take responsibility in the sense 
that every file in that area is your file .. we bang the gong about file 
reviews because they don’t do it – in fact no one does it properly.  We 
now say to solicitors, only ever look at closed files so you can look at 
them from cradle to grave.  Lots of people will pick out files that are 3 
weeks old so that they can quickly go down it and just tick the sheet and 
then they’ve done it.  I’m now in favour of doing it face to face at least 
50% of the time, which is now mandatory in crime.  I’d also incorporate 
the criteria for peer review into the substantive element of the file review 
so that the reviewer/supervisor would go through the whole thing, not 
just looking at whether the forms had been filled in correctly but also 
including the quality of advice and everything - the management intent 
behind it is that they’ve got to aim for excellence.  
 
Only two firms appeared actually to  implement the regular supervisory sessions as 
required by the LSC, although the requirement to cascade information to supervised 
staff, through circulation of texts, discussion in departmental meetings and arranging 
in-house training, did appear to be more commonly observed.   
 
However the potential of the LSC’s detailed risk profiling to pinpoint weak supervisory 
control, whilst it will not remedy the problem of lack of time and resources to train and 
supervise, should, especially in conjunction with Peer Review,  lead to a 
strengthening and deepening of existing training and supervisory systems.  As a 
result peer review was generally supported, including by the Legal Aid Practitioner 
Group (LAPG) representative who thought that ‘its reports (would) act as a form of 
training’.  It also has clear implications for CPD, and is therefore further discussed 
below. 
 
5.5  Continuing Professional Development (CPD)  
 
One function of training is, like regulation, to provide confidence in the service 
provider. If training is to fulfil this function, then not only must standards of pre-entry 
education and training be highly specified, ideally in terms of the competences 
deemed to be necessary for satisfactory performance; there must also be 
maintenance and evidence of maintenance of competence.  As a result, the Dearing 
Report  (1997) argued that learning must be a lifelong process. CPD is therefore key 
to the Government’s vision of creating a learning society, and hence to effecting a 
sustained and ongoing improvement of services  (Audit Commission 2001).   
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The following sections will focus primarily on CPD for the novice practitioner, as part 
of their ongoing process of professionalization, and much of the data echoes that 
discussed in the preceding sections. However, whilst some competences are 
consolidated and enhanced by experience, others are eroded or corrupted, and 
changing work practices require updating so that not only novices but also 
experienced practitioners need to engage in CPD  (Spouse, 2001, 16; and see Hales 
et al, 1998). We will also, therefore, touch on senior practitioners’ approach to their 
own CPD, given too the significance of this for good performance of the ‘master as 
role model’ approach as well as for promoting a learning organisation.   
 
5.5.1  Regulation and CPD provision49 
 
The number of CPD hours the Law Society requires practitioners to undertake 
correlates with their experience;50 for the first 4 years following qualification, s/he 
must undertake16 hours of CPD for each year in practice.   In addition the SQM 
guidance specifies that the annual appraisal must be able to identify training needs 
and development opportunities, that these should be identified throughout the year 
and documented in an individual’s training record, and that, as part of the supervisory 
requirements, legal knowledge be maintained and updated through training.  
 
At least 25% of CPD must be met by undertaking courses offered by authorised 
providers; however beyond that, a wide range of activities can comprise CPD 
including participating in accredited or unaccredited courses, in ‘courses offered by 
an authorised provider delivered by audio / visual means’, and even work 
shadowing.51  A variety of organisations offer CPD training, from HE institutions, 
national NFP agencies such as Shelter and Citizens Advice and local law societies; 
the main providers are commercial trainers BPP and CLT.  The practitioner must 
keep a training record detailing training activity, date undertaken, number of hours 
credit and comments on the activity. 
 
                                                 
49 The Law Society has been running a scheme for post-qualifying education since 1985; in 1992 its scope was extended to apply to 
all solicitors who had entered the profession from November 1982 onwards; the current regulations governing CPD are contained in 
Law Society (n.d)  A Guide to the Law Society’s CPD Scheme 
50 Senior solicitors are required to do 48 hours CPD over a 3 year period; at least 12 hours must be based on attendance at approved 
courses (Hales et al, 1998, p 3) 
51 in November 2005 it was announced that ‘The Law Society’s Standards Board has approved a proposal to allow solicitors to claim 
CPD ‘hours’ for undertaking certain types of work shadowing’  (www.lawsociety.org.uk)   
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Respondents identified various weaknesses in the current system including 
inadequate resources to undertake training; relative paucity of provision tailored to 
legal aid practice, and weak monitoring which also meant that CPD was not 
necessarily linked with either the occupational needs of the individual practitioner or 
of the organisation. 
   
5.5.2  Monitoring – issues of rigour   
 
Meaningful participation in CPD should entail more than ‘clocking up of time engaged 
in formal learning’; and rather engagement in a ‘system based on annual appraisal 
with the personal development plan’ (Swanwick 2005, p 859): just as caseload 
should correspond to practitioners’ competence, similarly, CPD should match 
practitioners’ learning needs, as identified in, for instance, supervisions and 
appraisals.  Further, CPD can only provide the same guarantee as pre-entry training 
if it is possible for practitioners to ‘fail’.  However, whilst the LSC may pick up on 
inadequate CPD activity through the audit processes and Peer Review (discussed 
further below), the Law Society has no rigorous verification systems in place, causing 
a Law Society Quality Monitoring Assessor to comment: ‘it’s very uncontrolled – 
people can basically do anything – and it’s self monitored; the requirements have no 
clout’. 52 As a result, she worried that training could be inappropriate, and its trigger 
ad hoc:  
There’s reliance on firms’ appraisal systems to ensure that the CPD is 
relevant but the reality is that often people go on anything to get their points 
rather than something related to the demands of the practice.   
 
Her concern was echoed by a supervisor who also implied that he would like to see 
an assessment element built into the courses: 
I suspect some of my staff see it as a day out when they go to some of 
these CPD things.  They come back and they’ve got the points but you’re 
not tested; nobody knows whether you’ve taken it in or if you’ve even been 
listening.  I have it on reliable authority that one lad I used to employ, he 
slept all the way through the session he went to.   
 
A related issue is the desirability of ensuring that CPD is strategic; that is, if a firm is 
to function as a learning organisation its training regime should not just operate to 
improve personal knowledge and occupational performance but should also be 
capable of being shared and utilised by the organisation as a whole. 
                                                 
52 Her fears are supported by Hales et al’s finding that (for senior solicitors)
 
 there was no indication of CPD compliance being 
monitored within firms (1998, p 46) 
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5.5.3  CPD: Provision and publicly funded practice 
 
There is a free market in providers of CPD for the legal profession, subject to 
approval by the Law Society, and a considerable degree of flexibility in how 
practitioners obtain the points required by Law Society regulations. However, as with 
the LPC, the majority of the courses address private client or corporate law issues; 
and although agencies like Shelter and Child Poverty Action Group (CPAG) run 
specialist welfare law courses, these tend to be located in London or other large 
urban centres, with the result that in practice provision for the publicly funded 
practitioner may be limited.53  This caused the Law Society Quality Monitoring 
Assessor to argue that CPD was ‘even more likely to be ad hoc if they are doing 
publicly funded work for which there are so few courses, which may also mean that 
practitioners have to travel long distances to attend them.’   
 
She considered that a further reason CPD tended to be random was because ‘most 
legal aid / High Street firms have none of the technical / admin. support, none of the 
dedicated training managers / staff who help people find the right courses and book 
them onto them’.54  Our data tends to support this argument; one of the striking 
aspects about one supervisee’s account is the infrastructure her firm had in place:  
The General Office will arrange the session for videos to be played and 
if you want to go on a course your Head of Department ticks the box 
which approves it and then it goes off to be booked, and you’re given a 
sheet to record all the courses that you’ve been on and the Office 
Manager’s got a central log of all the CPD points that we’re getting.  
(Employment specialist, Hillchester firm) 
 
This firm also had very good systems for the training contract and supervision 
generally.  However, some of the other firms did not enjoy the same kind of support 
systems.  This fact together with a general lack of resources meant that some 
supervisees were not attending as many courses as they would like or at a point 
when they needed them; for instance:  
The appraisal identifies training needs as it should but nothing happens 
and recently there’s budgetary constraints both from the point of view of 
                                                 
53 Although
 
as we have noted above during the research  the local LSC began putting on subsidised courses 
54 Until recently no full list of accredited providers existed, making finding the right training a very time consuming process; as a result 
a website was launched (January 2006) to help solicitors access information on available training courses.  Its  founders were 
motivated by the fact that ‘plenty of firms are too small to justify a dedicated training manager’, and as a result fee earners are often 
simply told ‘make sure you do 16 hours CPD’ (Cooper, 2006, p. 40) 
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the cost of courses and of releasing people.  It’s difficult enough 
booking your holidays ...  (Housing specialist, Boomtown firm) 
 
This complaint was subsequently confirmed at a team meeting we observed, where the 
solicitor’s Departmental Head told staff: ‘you shouldn’t be booking yourselves on courses 
because there isn’t any money in the Training budget’ (Partner and Head of Housing 
Department, Boomtown firm) 
 
Lack of money was put forward by several other employers as a constraint on training; one 
supervisor spoke of the importance of the LSC move to put on courses, both because it 
increased the local availability of CPD for public funded specialisms and also because ‘they 
are cheap, so we can afford to go on them’ (Solicitor, North Boomtown Law Centre). 
 
5.5.4  The design of CPD provision  
 
Much CPD provision appears to be traditional in terms of following a model of individualised, 
formal learning, and a concern with updates in substantive law, rather than training in skills. 
The welfare law courses run by NFP specialist providers, some of which are organised by the 
regional LSCs, also focus on updates, but tend to employ interactive and case-study based 
methods.  Most firms in the sample also engaged in various forms of in-house training / 
updating. 
 
Those firms which had good systems for the training contract and supervision also took CPD 
very seriously and undertook it in a variety of ways:  
We’ve got the LNTV videos here where you can sign up for various things 
so it’s basically a video and lecture notes from the College of Law – so we 
all watch the video – they can be done as CPD points if there’s more than 
one of you doing it so that you are able to have a discussion afterwards. .. 
you can go to the session and then every month we’ve got our 
departmental meeting anyway so as a matter of course (Head of 
Department) reviews the training needs and asks if anyone has been on 
any interesting courses and if they have then he arranges for them to be 
de-briefed or, you know, ‘are there any courses anyone wants to go on?’ 
so all the literature for the external courses is circulated as well .. so if I 
said I wasn’t very happy with – whatever – (Head of Department) will go 
‘fine, get the literature and we’ll find out what courses there are and let’s 
book them.  (Civil litigation solicitor, Hillchester firm). 
 
This supervisee was booked onto several courses which were entirely relevant to her work.   
This firm also obtained regular updates in employment law ‘2 or 3 a day – this has been 
decided in this EAT decision, this has been decided in that employment tribunal in Hull; and I 
use IDS brief’ (Senior Partner, Civil Litigation). 
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5.5.5  The potential for CPD in supervision    
 
There is an argument to be made for introducing mandatory CPD training in 
supervision for all supervisors.  The commercial trainer cited above argued:  
I agree with the LSC that the quality of the work will always be directly 
proportionate to the quality of the supervision, which isn’t a departmental 
meeting once a month, it isn’t a distribution of files every morning, it’s a 
multi-faceted process that requires you to develop new skills.  So, for 
instance, we train in a dozen techniques, some of them are control 
measures, some are support measures - ‘find what suits you and your staff 
and then get on with it.’  They must learn support, input mechanisms to 
assist supervisees, but in addition they must have a series of control 
measures to spot mistakes..   
 
One of these measures was a weekly or monthly inactivity report on all files for which a 
supervisor was responsible.  
  
His description of how he dealt with the issue of TFFs in his training sessions illustrates how 
self-regulation is necessarily the ultimate objective of training and supervision:  
I do a routine which is, ‘look Legal Aid clients can’t have what private 
clients have – they can’t have the cup of tea, the nice box of tissues – 
you’ve got to train your staff in the motto of the legal aid family lawyer 
(which) nowadays must be ‘shut up snivelling, give me your instructions – 
you’ve only got another 15 minutes’’ – in other words impressing on them 
the need to train / supervise in the business imperative behind break even 
practice on Legal help even though clients tend to be more difficult, more 
demanding and you’ve got to get across complex things in simple 
language, you’ve got to do it so your file looks excellent or competent 
plus, and you’ve got to keep up with all the unremunerated administration 
that the LSC imposes .. so they must be trained in how to supervise so 
supervisees can do all that for £50 an hour .. 
 
He went on to make similar comments with regard to the need for supervisors to be trained in 
file review, linking this with the need to be trained in an understanding of LSC requirements of, 
for instance, the SQM and the contract. 
 
5.5.6  CPD training on legal aid  
 
The popularity of a regional LSC course on legal aid, which, whilst targeted at 
trainees, was largely attended by solicitors, some of whom had several years’ post-
qualification experience (PQE), supports this suggestion of the need for training in 
how to comply with LSC requirements, side by side with, or as part of, the (weakly 
 110 
monitored) Law Society CPD. That such a need exists is also indicated by the 
popularity of the courses in LSC regulation offered by this commercial trainer, who 
had formerly worked for the LSC.  At the time of the research, he was being 
contracted to deliver training to the entire staff of legal aid practices (or departments) 
in the preferred supplier and peer review schemes.  Describing his Preferred Supplier 
CPD course, he explained how this involved training partners to produce a:  
clearly thought through business plan.  In the past you could get past your 
annual audit by simply taking last year’s plan, blowing the dust off, 
changing the date in the footer and passing it off as a forward plan. Now 
the LSC will want to see a thorough assessment of business performance 
over the previous period; you will impress them if you include a statistical 
analysis of their performance indicators .. if you’re doing things like 
monitoring average costs ..identifying efficiency savings, how you tie your 
business plan into your overall strategy for training and developing your 
staff. 
 
The objective of self-regulation revealed in this explanation recalls our argument in Chapter 
Three that regulation, especially of the particularly penetrative type represented by the LSC 
contract, can amount to a powerful form of training.  Peer review represents a significant 
development in this process because it moves beyond concern with file management to file 
review and therefore effectively represents ongoing regulation / CPD training in substantive 
work. Furthermore, given that its assessment utilises National Benchmarks, peer review 
conforms to the competence model of training and learning.  These points were illustrated for 
us by our observation of a training session the trainer ran on peer review in which he again 
emphasised the importance of internalising LSC requirements.  After a brief introduction 
delineating the history of legal aid franchising and contracting, he outlined the scheme, which 
he termed ‘less formalistic Transaction Criteria by peer review’, described the process, its 
outcomes and impact and what could be done to prepare for it.  The response of participants 
(and of other respondents) was ambivalent; on the one hand, the fact that work would be 
judged by people with indisputable insight into what it involved was welcomed; on the other 
hand, doubts, which may be related to professional autonomy, were expressed that because 
there was always more than one solution to a case, the appropriateness of the one chosen 
was largely dependent on context. 
 
5.5.7 Specialist accreditation  
 
Specialist accreditation represents a further development of training and regulation.  
Experienced solicitors and legal executives can apply for membership of a specialist group like 
the Solicitors’ Family Law Association.  A higher level of specialisation is demonstrated by 
membership of one of the Law Society’s specialist panels, such as the Children Panel and the 
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Mental Health Review Panel.   Evaluation of suitability for membership comprises a mixture of 
minimum number of years PQE, (compulsory) attendance at an approved training course, and 
peer review.  This last form of evaluation entails grading by independent practitioners of a 
submission to the Law Society of an application covering all aspects of the relevant area of 
practice and interview.  Accreditation is for a limited period, generally 5 years, after which the 
member must re-apply.  Membership of the advanced panels requires the member to ‘achieve 
and constantly maintain the level of knowledge and expertise’ in the specialism and therefore 
commitment to ‘extensive, appropriate training activities’.55 Just over half of the supervisors in 
our sample were accredited. 
 
5.6 NFP Training  
 
Training in the NFP sector tends to be tailored to the needs of the organisation and 
tightly defined by the competence demanded by the role.  It is therefore quite varied 
in form; nevertheless it is possible to talk of a distinctive ethos and approach.  We 
therefore begin by discussing this ethos, primarily in relation to CABx because of 
their numerical significance in the provision of publicly funded legal advice, before 
moving onto specific issues such as the process and focus of NFP training, the LSC 
contract as a form of training, NFP supervision, CPD and NOS4Advice.  
  
5.6.1  The NFP ethos and approach to training  
 
The objective of the NFP advice sector has been to provide a service that is uniformly 
available, without means testing.  However it saw its primary clientele as the poor and 
disadvantaged, and so, from its inception at the onset of the Second World War, the CAB 
movement was explicitly concerned to define a body of poor people’s law. 56  Goriely notes 
that, in order to provide information to the new Bureaux, the National Council of Social Service 
produced a 150 page volume of Citizen’s Advice Notes, representing a pioneering 
compendium of poor people’s law (Goriely, 1996, p 221).  At the same time, however, the 
Access to Justice movement, of which the NFP sector forms a central component, has looked 
to an idea of justice beyond the juridical model. The point was illustrated by a solicitor in the 
course of her account of why she had re-trained to be a lawyer:  
When I was in the CAB they’d use complaints procedures and negotiate 
whereas I would tend to look at an Act and say ‘look you’re not doing this 
                                                 
55 www.lawsociety.org.uk/professional/ accreditation panels
 
/
 
lawpaneladvanced.law p 2 
56 As we noted in Chapter 1: Parker, 1999, pp 35-8 
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properly because of this law’ - but the CAB method often obtained better 
results frankly . (Housing specialist, Boomtown firm).  
 
The concern with offering accessible advice rather than narrowly legalistic solutions and, 
correspondingly, a democratic model of working, required an approach to training which would 
not jeopardise this by demanding lengthy qualification periods for advisers.  As a result, as we 
have discussed in earlier chapters, training in the NFP sector, unlike that for legal practice, is 
characterised by loose control over the ‘entry’ input factor.  This was one reason for the 
controversy aroused by the advent of CABx, and although at the time there was collaboration 
with friendly solicitors and voluntary schemes, the relationship between the CAB movement 
(and subsequently other NFP agencies) and the legal profession was in general somewhat 
problematic.   
 
The movement has, by and large, retained its commitment to a non-professional volunteer 
workforce as the bedrock of its work, and to the provision of functional training in the law both 
to volunteers and the general public, and hence to the active involvement of the community 
and especially specific user groups.  Unless an agency is seeking paid specialists, access to 
work is through volunteering and therefore effectively has no accredited input measures; 
instead the focus is on induction processes, motivation and organizational ethos. 
 
Once the volunteer has undergone the initial training programme, there is a strong 
commitment to offering further and ongoing training, so that the adviser may thereby move up 
into second tier advice work.  Therefore much of this training embeds highly specialised 
expertise with the result that it now has a substantial history as qualifying CPD for solicitors; 
however in some ways accreditation can be viewed as antithetical to the NFP ethos of 
inclusivity and there was originally little interest in it.   
 
This situation persisted until the Further and Higher Education Act of 1992 stimulated a move 
to support the incorporation of varied instances and forms of training by mapping the 
occupationally determined requirements against NQF level descriptors; for instance NACAB 
has used Open College Network accreditation for its advice worker training.57  Nevertheless, 
accreditation of training in the sector as a whole remains patchy, although it would clearly 
bring benefits given the diversity of the sector (both in terms of types of organizations serving 
a range of clienteles and variously staffed by specialist advisers, who range in experience and 
                                                 
57 This approach has the benefit of providing specialised training in advice sector work in a flexible mode while also going some way 
towards achieving individual portability.  However the diversity of NFP training  impedes efforts to improve the quality of advice and 
labour mobility within the sector and  provides the rationale for developing NOS4 Advice and Foundation Degrees, which will develop 
sectoral training into a systematically accredited system. 
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credentials, and generalists, most of whom are volunteers, and in terms of its range of training 
regimes).  Some agencies are too poor to do in-house training at all; thus an Open College 
informant observed: ‘there’s a real need for training out there – especially by the small 
community agencies (whereas) the big, national agencies like the CABx often have very good 
in-house training’. The type and provision of this training varies, however, according to the 
remit of the agency, whether the adviser is voluntary or paid, and the level of service delivered. 
For instance Shelter’s provision ranges from ‘front line’ advice and help to specialist back up 
for other agencies.  Whilst therefore the common route and provision makes it possible to 
describe and critique solicitors’ training, it is more difficult to do this when discussing the NFP 
sector.   
 
Nevertheless, it is possible to speak of an NFP approach to training and to discern a synergy 
with current educational thinking in that it is generally work based, focused on competences 
and skills including relational skills (for instance Age Concern emphasises body language), 
and characterised by experiential and reflexive styles of learning, and co-operative learning 
and working. The sector has also incorporated the CAB emphasis from recruitment onwards 
on community involvement and accessibility.  The following description of the Shelter model 
exemplifies this approach: ‘The best housing aid services are those which take steps to allow 
and actively encourage a work style and culture in which ad hoc and day to day discussion of 
casework between advisers is the norm; in addition, advice services should develop informal 
networks of support both locally and beyond so that more difficult problems can be talked 
through with other practitioners’ (Shelter, 2003, p. 35).   
 
The table below compares training in the NFP and FP sectors across a range of key factors.  It 
is divided into two sections.  The data for the FP sector is generally easy to tabulate, with the 
exception of paralegal workers for whom the training picture remains relatively opaque.  
However, as we have just observed, NFP sector training options are less standardised, 
particularly in those agencies which represent a loose affiliation scheme, rather than a more 
tightly controlled membership.58 
                                                 
58 Not all training providers are listed in the table: some agencies do not just advise / inform etc, but also provide training 
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Table 5.1 A comparison of NFP training requirements 
 
Advice Sector Accreditor  
regulator 
Providers Initial Training 
requirements 
Length of 
Training 
CPD 
Requirements 
Mode Of 
Assessment 
Issues 
CABx Advice 
workers (A/w) 
NACAB 
LSC 
NACAB 
 
OISC 
 
Open College 
NVQ 
 
Shelter (also 
provision of 
specialist 
backup by 
National 
Homelessnes
s Advice 
Service) 
 
LAG 
CAB Certificate in 
Generalist Advice 
Work 
CAB specialist 
Flexible Trainer Adviser 
(RL4) – 
progression 
through stages of 
interview 
observations; 
assessed 
interview; solo 
interviews; self 
assessment, 
interleaved with 
courses, manuals 
& supervisions  
Approach to 
training, in 
common with 
other NFP 
agencies  
contrasts with 
lawyer training: 
skills through 
case studies 
requiring holistic 
solutions; work 
shadowing; 
reflexive 
learning; 
attention to EO 
issues, social 
policy issues, 
ethos of CAB, 
client 
empowerment 
Peer review 
Resources to 
develop 
training; ring 
fencing of CLS 
employees; 
Need to match 
LSC 
requirements 
may reduce 
social policy 
role, CAB 
ethos 
Shelter A/w Shelter - not a 
membership 
organisation, & no 
internal accreditation  
Shelter 
OISC 
Open College 
NVQ  
Advice 
Services 
Alliance 
Induction & individual 
training plans tailored 
to job specification for 
post / individual skills 
& knowledge; e.g. a/w 
with less than 6 
months experience 
has reduced caseload 
Flexible Minimum 6 hours 
training per 
annum of which 
50% must be on a 
housing law 
subject. 
Shelter offers 
public training 
Formative 
assessment; 
appraisals & file 
review; 
casework 
supervision; 
Peer 
assessment of 
Co-operative 
model of 
working 
Techniques:  
case 
conference; 
work 
shadowing; 
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But does require that 
Housing Advice 
Services comply with  
its quality assurance  
 
LSC  
& high level of 
supervision, which 
may include: working 
alongside another 
caseworker, checks 
on correspondence, 
independent file 
review of all or most 
new cases. 
 
courses. 
Managers briefed 
to recognise that 
CPD courses may 
be supplemented 
by work 
shadowing, local 
tuition, personal 
study, work 
experience. 
files; process 
based peer 
review 
applied, 
reflexive 
practitioner;  
social policy, 
EO issues; 
client focus. 
Age Concern 
A/w 
Paid & 
Volunteers 
providing I & A 
(may be in 
CABx etc) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Age Concern England 
(1998 Information & 
Advice (I & A) Strategy 
- Age Concern 
Standards) 
 
LSC 
Age Concern 
England 
Advice UK 
CPAG, LAG, 
CAB 
Induction Procedures  
based on I& A 
Induction Training 
Pack, mentoring & 
regular topic training 
sessions  
Quality of service 
offered by agency as 
whole self assessed 
by ‘Assessing the 
Quality of Advice – a 
model for technical 
audit’ (Waterhouse & 
Benson) 
Co-operation with 
other NFP agencies 
for supervision of I&A 
Manager  
 
 
  
Variable; also 
depends on 
level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No formal but 
ongoing training 
built in through 
supervision, file 
reviews, team 
meetings, 
appraisals – 
training & 
development 
plan, updates 
Supervision / 
monitoring; 
information 
bulletins; 
incoming post; 
independent file 
reviews 
Currently 
piloting Peer 
Review system 
of advice and 
information  
See CAB note; 
ad hoc 
development 
of I & A 
services 
resulted in 
different 
models; view 
that  this 
diversity may 
contribute to 
user choice & 
that agencies 
will self censor 
services that 
don’t fit LSC 
levels 
DIAL UK A/w DIAL UK DIAL UK Induction; individual 
training plans 
Flexible Appraisals; 
supervision 
meetings; 
updates; case 
Appraisal & 
supervision 
procedure 
The local DIAL 
produces 
reports of 
training 
processes & audits 
using own auditors.   
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meetings undertaken & 
evaluates 
individual & 
organisational 
impact ; EO 
training 
Youth Access 
A/w 
Youth Access UK – 
but no membership 
scheme 
 
LSC 
At present no 
access to an 
accredited 
training 
programme; 
therefore draw 
on other 
providers; a 
bid just put 
into National 
Youth Training 
Advice 
Programme 
OISC 
Shelter 
Advice UK  
CPAG, LAG 
Advice 
Services 
Alliance 
Most paid staff 
qualified Youth 
Workers 
Induction in line with 
training needs and 
occupational role 
(BAC accredited 
training) but must 
include EO training 
Encouraged to 
acquire legal skills 
Flexible   Ethos which 
emphasises 
informality & 
cultural 
accessibility. 
This  & ad hoc 
development 
& root in Youth 
Work resulted 
in  informal 
approach to 
training & 
regulation; 
workers tend 
not to regard 
work in terms 
of legal 
services  
Advice UK A/w 
(formerly FIAC) 
No detailed regulation 
by umbrella 
organisation 
 
LSC 
 
 
OISC 
Advice UK 
London 
Region is 
approved 
NVQ 
assessment 
centre 
Advice 
Varies from agency 
 
Operates  NVQ in 
advice accredited 
training  
Flexible   From basic 
Welfare Rights 
to file Review 
& supervision, 
learning to 
advise 
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Services 
Alliance 
Money Advice 
Trust  A/w 
(some in 
specialist 
agencies; 
others in, e.g., 
CABx); MAT 
also runs 
National Debt 
Line 
Money Advice Trust 
National body to which 
agencies can affiliate – 
commitment to general 
quality standards but 
no organisational audit 
Money Advice 
Trust 
Formal process 
though not 
accredited; training 
route: Volunteers – 
generalist level 
training up to 
specialist level; Paid - 
Learning Map  
Flexible  Peer Review of 
open & closed 
case files 
MAT sees 
formalisation 
of role and of 
links with CLS 
as way 
forward; 
currently 
involved with 
DCA project to 
co-ordinate 
training & 
accreditation 
of money 
advisers 
MIND:  
1) Legal 
adviser 2) 
telephone help 
line worker 3) 
information line 
adviser 
contracted out 
to 
Broadcasting 
Support 
Services  
 
MIND – Umbrella 
organisation which 
runs 2 lines: 1) legal 
advice line staffed by 
legally trained advisers 
& supervised 
unqualified advisers 
(generally Law / LPC 
graduates) - subject to 
Law Society & LSC 
quality standards (LSC 
Specialist Support 
Contract)  
2) Telephone 
Helplines Association 
Standard 
MIND 
Advice UK 
Accredited 
Providers 
CPAG 
Induction / initial & 
ongoing training 
based on analysis of 
need 
Flexible Individual training 
records & annual 
appraisals – 
targets set & 
monitored 
Supervision of 
varying levels 
depending on 
experience; file 
review; 
feedback.  
Emphasis on 
co-operative & 
experiential 
learning 
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5.6.2 Issues or weaknesses in the NFP training model  
 
As this table indicates, there is some commonality across the sector in 
terms of shared issues, and some of these replicate those revealed by our 
data from the FP sector.  
 
As with all work based training, comparability and quality assurance are a 
concern, and this is compounded by the diversity of the sector; for instance, 
our data indicated that the aim of close supervision is not always realised. 
On the other hand, a major objective for the sector is the maintenance of its 
distinctive ethos, and training is one of the primary mechanisms for 
embedding and sustaining this.  One concern therefore was that the 
dissonance between this ethos and the LSC contract pushing ‘NFP 
agencies towards the business model of solicitors firms’ (HoCSCCA, 2004, 
p 14), and, correspondingly, that a uniform approach to quality could 
jeopardise the NFP sector’s distinctive values and innovative,  flexible 
approach.  
 
However the primary concern was the lack of resources / insecure funding 
of agencies which obviously had a deleterious effect on the extent that 
training could be made available to workers (and see BRTF 2005, p 28). 
This connected with a further concern that the impact of LSC regulation on 
resources (both in terms of time and money), was exacerbating the pre-
existing problems. This complex of obstacles to meeting the chronic need 
for training is summarised by YIACS (Youth Access):  
Many voluntary sector services have developed on an ad hoc basis 
with histories of uncertain and often short-term funding; the quality 
available has also been subject to similar ad hoc standards. These 
difficulties were further compounded by the more general lack of 
professional regulation in the fields of advice and counselling. It is 
only in the past few years that nationally accredited training in 
advice and counselling has become available.  However, the 
qualification structures are only slowly becoming available to 
providers in the sector. Few agencies are able to attract funding that 
allows them to make a substantial investment in training and 
developing staff; a situation which must be remedied if services are 
to offer consistent levels of help. (Youth Access, 2001, p 2) 
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5.6.3 Entry into the Sector 
 
The most common route to becoming a specialised caseworker begins with 
volunteering.  As discussed above and in Chapter Three, this involves no 
formal entry barriers aside from an interview process and, according to the 
manager of one CAB, ‘we turn down very few who come to interview’.59   
Her further comments point to the potential QA issues endemic to loose 
entry:   ‘we try not to say to people ‘you’re hopeless, go away.’  It’s better 
they decide themselves that it is not for them.  Sometimes they don’t’. (CAB 
manager North Daleshire)  
 
The sector’s accessibility appears to stem in part from the view of volunteers as 
clients as well as workers: their adviser role fulfils the important function of both 
empowering them as individuals and building social capital in the sense of 
maintaining the direct links with the community the agency seeks to serve.  This 
was most explicit in the Women’s Centre in Chapelvale where clients were 
encouraged to, and frequently did, become volunteers as part of their ‘therapy’.   
As a women’s centre we encourage women to come in and 
have their needs met and then perhaps to go on courses, to 
build their confidence, to come and work here as volunteers, 
or then maybe as sessional workers. (Manager of Advice & 
Guidance Team) 
 
The diminution in volunteers represents another disincentive to tighten up 
entry barriers.  Echoing the views of one legal aid solicitor, who bemoaned 
the erosion of ‘social commitment’, one CAB manager said:  
There’s this tension … whether there should be more paid 
workers because really volunteering is – despite the 
government attempt to pump it up again – a bit of a thing of 
the past (Contract manager, Hillchester CAB) 
 
This trend was reflected in the age profile of our respondent sample: the 
youngest respondent was in her early thirties, and the mean age was 
around 45.  As a result, some managers expressed concern about whether 
it was going to be possible to replace the current generation of workers as 
they began to retire.  Many of the younger volunteers were seen to be using 
experience in the NFP sector as a stepping stone to a permanent job in the 
private sector: 
                                                 
59 see Home Volunteer volunteering FAQs, questions 1-3; this also sets out the initial volunteering / training process 
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We have an ever renewing pool of youth, which is lovely; it makes 
a huge difference to the atmosphere.  It doesn’t feel like a middle-
aged bureau because we have them - but they’re only here in 
order to get a paid job .. they wouldn’t say that if asked that, but 
that’s because you don’t say that when coming into a voluntary 
organisation.  You don’t say ‘well actually I’d just like you to give 
me a reference and a paid job’, but that is what most of them do.  
Most of them go on to get a paid job from here.  It could be 
something to do with advice work or something completely 
different (Contract Manager, Hillchester CAB). 
 
Another said:  
Some of them say ‘I’m really interested in this, can I go and do 
that’ or ‘I’d really like to … I’m looking for employment’, you know 
‘can I go and do all the debt worker courses’.  So you go and do 
money debts and the county court possession procedure…. Then 
you know that if a money advice worker job comes up in * , you’ll 
have all those on your CV to say you’ve done all those trainings 
now give me a job.  That’s the way the bureau gets its people into 
paid posts. (Manager, North Daleshire CAB).  
 
Apart from working up towards specialist status by volunteering and 
undertaking training, the other route into specialist paid casework tends to 
be via another agency. The various routes were exemplified by our 
respondents whose previous experience were in the advice or related 
fields, and included local advice services, local authority housing 
departments, volunteer experience, or administrative work in the agency 
they were actually employed or volunteering in.  Some had experience in 
social welfare fields other than the one they were currently working in, for 
example in an advice agency for Asian women with Mental Health 
Problems, or in a Youth Offending Team. 
 
NFP training does not divide easily into the stages which characterise legal 
education; instead, from induction on there is effectively a continuous 
process / interchange of various forms of work based learning through initial 
training, supervision and CPD and this has shaped our treatment of the 
data.  In the discussion below  we focus primarily on CAB training, both 
because the CAB is the major contractor with the LSC and also because it 
provided the majority of our NFP respondents; however we also draw on 
our interviews with, and observations of in-house training provided by, the 
Women’s Centre and two Housing Advice agencies.  Nevertheless it is 
inevitable that, at certain points, we will be generalising from a slim 
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evidence base, although, as we have already argued, there are significant 
commonalities between the main NFP agencies 
 
5.6.4 The volunteer training process: CABx  
 
The first stage of CAB training, scheduled to last from 6 to 12 months, and 
based on the volunteer working at least 3 sessions a week, consists of a 
‘comprehensive, free training programme’ involving ‘observation, working 
through self-study packs, and a 5 day course run by Citizens Advice’.  The 
modelling aspect of work based learning is fundamental to the training 
process: 
They have a lot of time sitting in with experienced advisors during 
their training period and we try to give them as many opportunities 
to see different advisers ..because there’s no right or wrong way 
to advise, just as long as you interact with the client and find out 
what the problem is and try and solve it with them’, supplemented 
by simulations: ‘they also have a lot of practice (in interviewing) on 
the course in L* offering a safe environment with other people who 
are training. (Contract manager, Hillchester CAB) 
 
The self-study packs are designed to develop skills and impart some 
technical / procedural knowledge through case studies requiring holistic 
solutions, which are then self assessed and at certain points also evaluated 
by a supervisor. In addition, the volunteer is regularly supervised.  These 
training mechanisms together with the requirement to compile a portfolio 
and keep a record of learning aim to produce a reflective and reflexive 
practitioner.  Further, the rhetoric of the training literature  depicts a learning 
organisation which provides ideal conditions for work based, experiential 
learning based on ‘collaborative relationships’ (Waddington & Marsh, 1999; 
Barnett, 1999): for example: ‘you need to be open minded, non-
judgemental, able to listen, learn and work in a team. Bureaux are learning 
environments and volunteering gives you the chance to learn new skills and 
build on existing ones’ (Manager, North Daleshire CAB). 
 
Both the literature and training programme place an equally strong 
emphasis on the other aspects of CAB ethos such as Equal Opportunity 
(EO) and social policy issues, and client empowerment.  The first workbook 
for the CAB Certificate in Generalist Advice Work sets out CAB aims which 
place an equal stress on ‘individual service and social policy work; its four 
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principles of free service, confidential work, independence and impartiality 
and two of its policies: community involvement and equal opportunities’ 
(Citizens Advice, 2002).  The salience of this ethos was underlined by one 
manager who explained that it meant everyone had to undergo the training, 
whatever their qualifications: ‘just because they have a law degree; they 
can’t just go and advise, they have to do the training as well’. (Contract 
Manager, Hillchester CAB). 
 
The intensive preparation for practice, with its combination of shadowing, 
graded tasks and self study, also contrasts with the experience recounted 
by some of our trainee solicitors: ‘the great thing is people are not let loose 
on the public until they’re deemed to be competent to a certain degree’.  
(Senior Adviser and supervisor, Housing Advice Agency, Hillchester).  
Furthermore, experiential learning is not seen as a ‘quick fix’ (Gregory, 
1994); once the volunteer is deemed competent to advise s/he will do this 
under supervision and, even when more experienced, there is: ‘always an 
advice session supervisor on duty so that volunteers are never left to make 
the decision themselves’ (Housing Adviser and supervisee, Hillchester 
Housing Advice agency).   
 
However, the data from some respondents cast doubt on whether 
supervision is always this thorough, especially as people progress to more 
independent work; for instance, a solicitor who had been a supervisor in a 
CAB said she had never felt ‘equal to the task of supervising volunteers’.  
She attributed this partly to ‘the huge range of queries people came with’, 
and partly to people’s ‘personalities - some volunteers for whatever reason 
would just go off and do what they thought’, lending support to the concern 
expressed by the LSC Regional Manager about volunteers’ involvement in 
contract work: ‘how do you deal with a volunteer who says ‘I didn’t come 
down here to fill in all these bloody forms for the LSC, I came here to help 
people’?’ 
 
Satisfactory completion of the workbooks (which generally takes around 12 
months) qualifies someone to be a general rota adviser, after which they 
can train themselves up further in particular specialisms.  A CAB manager 
described the process:  
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They’re trained in all the areas at a superficial level they’re 
likely to come up with and then  they start advising; they then 
go on to developmental areas so they can build on what 
they’ve learned in the first instance – on debt or benefits or 
employment or so on. (Contract Manager, Hillchester CAB) 
 
Again, the data suggested that both the availability, and quality, of this 
further training could be patchy, dependent on both resources and the 
interests of the CAB manager, with the result that the knowledge and skills 
of both volunteers and paid caseworkers could be sub-standard; this is 
discussed further below. 
 
5.6.5 Focus of CAB training: soft skills  
 
The main emphasis of the Generalist training is on ethos and interpersonal 
skills (the two are related) and the general view was that this was done very 
well:   
The CAB training is very good because  .. actually the whole 
thing that they teach you about empathy, which you get sick of 
because it is a bit touchy feely but all of that leads up to the 
fact that if the client feels they can talk to you then you’ll get 
the information provided you use the right questions and the 
right phrases . (Housing solicitor, former CAB worker, 
Boomtown firm) 
 
The CAB workbooks on advice set out a process which combines 
communication skills and knowledge.  The skills are approached through a 
four stage model: exploration, options, action and conclusion.  Grounded in 
the CAB ethos, these stages train the adviser to explore clients’ situation 
through active listening (adopting appropriate body language, giving them 
time to talk, acknowledging their feelings and, most importantly, looking 
beyond the presenting problem); outlining the options so that they can 
make informed choices and empowering them to do this (Citizens Advice, 
1999, p 8). The solicitor just quoted said she still looked back to her CAB 
training because ‘it was very useful in that I was used to interviewing, 
looking at the whole problem rather than just the surface, presenting issue’.  
Similarly, a CAB manager said:  
We train people to look at the bigger picture and not just 
presenting problems.  Yes J and L are essentially a debt case 
worker and welfare benefits case worker but they will take into 
consideration the other problems the client has ..so it’s a 
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different ethos from going to a solicitor. (Contract Manager, 
Hillchester CAB). 
  
Evidently this skill is central to the government’s social exclusion agenda 
and to the emphasis on holistic service; it is also vindicated by the findings 
of the Needs Surveys that problems tend to cluster. However it makes it 
more likely that case workers will do more for the client than the LSC 
considers necessary. 
 
Solicitors who worked in the same areas as NFP caseworkers argued that 
the emphasis on interpersonal skills could represent a problem; for instance 
a Housing solicitor who had originally worked in the NFP sector which he 
referred to as ‘a wishy-washy world’, described his paralegal assistant, 
whose background was CAB volunteering, as a ‘Mother Teresa’.  He went 
on to say: 
One of the problems with CAB workers is that there are 
boundary issues to do with their willingness to help people… 
she can’t give people bad news, and she sometimes writes 
people’s letters for them .. she’ll help them and not even give 
them legal advice. (Manager Housing Dept, Boomtown firm). 
 
There was also concern that other skills, most notably advocacy, were 
neglected in CAB training; this is discussed further below under technical 
skills. 
 
5.6.6 Training in smaller organisations: the Women’s Centre  
 
Training is of course more problematic in organizations which lack the 
national resources of the CAB and depend on obtaining external funding 
(BRTF, 2005, P 45).  The Women’s Centre, with QM contracts in Advice 
and Guidance and Domestic Violence Advice and Support, was a member 
of the Open College Network and ran its own volunteer training programme 
supported by funding from the Learning and Skills Council.  The 
programme aimed to ‘develop participants’ awareness of prejudice, social 
injustice, inequality and women’s issues’, and like the CAB model, 
comprised a:  
progression of volunteering: as people join the Centre, usually 
as generic Level 2 volunteers – they’re the people who would 
actually work with women, and therefore they would be trained 
with the volunteer training programme which is a 6 month 
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programme which involves a mixture of shadowing, 
competence assessment through workbooks and portfolio 
compilation and compulsory attendance of a 2 day intensive 
course (Centre Manager). 60  
 
The 2 day (14 hours) course component of the programme, run by the 
Centre’s own training team, comprised a core induction in the Centre’s 
structure, history and ethos, policies, procedures, Health and Safety, 
confidentiality and equal opportunities, and some training in administrative 
and interpersonal skills.  In addition the volunteer was required to do 6 
hours of private study, which included keeping a personal journal, and to 
attend follow on sessions totalling 6 hours, followed by a further 6 hours 
minimum private study.  
 
We attended the second day’s training which largely focused on confronting 
prejudices and developing interpersonal skills such as active listening.  
Despite the emphasis on empathy, one volunteer recommended more 
training in what was involved for women to come to the Centre, and how 
they could be helped to open up.  Echoing criticisms of the LPC, she 
commented that the training had been too academic:  
I don’t know any training that was done at the basic human 
interaction level – you know, the buzzer goes, this person walks 
through the door, what do you say to her? I’m thinking here of a 
volunteer who has actually said to me things like ‘what do you say 
when people first come in?’  Because you know when you open 
that door you have to react and you also have to work out quickly 
whether you should leave them there, or bring them into the main 
room which might be quite full, whether they’re going to burst into 
tears or what.  We could do with telling about that and training in 
how to do it. (Volunteer in Advice and Guidance Team, 
Chapelvale Women’s Centre). 
 
She also argued that volunteer advisers needed training in acquiring an 
appearance of confidence (Goffman, 1978), because ‘women are coming to 
you for professional advice and they need reassurance - you can’t say ‘oh 
this is the first time I’ve done this..’ ‘ 
 
An Asian paid worker who had also attended the programme was rather 
more critical, particularly of the exercise on prejudice.  Her comments 
suggest that if agencies are genuinely to function as learning organisations, 
                                                 
60 Accreditation was being sought for the course because it was seen as increasingly important in the competition for 
funding since it was evidence of ‘competence / being up with training’ (Centre Manager) 
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they need to ensure that they instil reflective practice into their systems, 
especially when their user community has traditionally been drawn from 
one ethnic group: 
There was no investigation of whether there was any truth in 
people’s views or what you might do about prejudice. Especially 
with so much Islamaphobia about – it needs to be addressed.  I 
also thought a lot of the training was very basic. (Domestic 
violence adviser, Chapelvale Women’s Centre). 
 
A further difficulty was caused by the fact that the course could only be run 
a few times a year, with the result that some volunteers had to be allowed 
to work in the drop-in area prior to attending it.  The Centre Manager 
explained that in order to overcome difficulties this might cause, the 
volunteer would be inducted and would then be part of a ‘team made up of 
at least one or possibly 2 very experienced volunteers and a member of 
staff who is on call’. However this was not how some supervisees described 
the reality of practice.  For instance, a woman who had been volunteering 
for 18 months said: ‘There was very little induction’ although she largely 
attributed this to the Centre’s recent relocation.  She was nevertheless 
doubtful that it had since been formalised.  Her comments point to the 
limitations of formal occupational training, underlining the inevitability and 
value of experiential learning and, consequently, the need for close 
supervision while this takes place:   
The thing is you can’t imagine what will happen until it happens, 
when you start to think ‘oh my god, what do I do here?’ So it 
doesn’t matter how much information you’re given, how much 
training occurs as things crop up you need to know there and 
then what to do. (Chapelvale Women’s Centre). 
 
She went on, however, to depict the familiar tension between the rhetoric 
underpinning supervision systems and the reality when under resourced 
organizations comes under the sort of pressure to which all NFP 
organisations, serving a needy clientele, are subject.  Asked what the team 
did if a difficult issue arose in the drop in area, she replied ‘you ring up the 
paid team, or the volunteer co-ordinator’ but then said that this did not 
always work.  She also thought there were ‘a lot of training gaps; for me, I 
had already acquired a lot of the skills you need, like confidence building, 
assertiveness, counselling; but there should be more of all that in the 
volunteer training, especially for the younger volunteers.’ 
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Completion of the volunteer training programme depended on being 
assessed ‘as appropriate’ and though it was possible to be assessed as 
‘not appropriate’  because, for instance, of ‘ongoing personal issues or 
ability problems’, the Centre still had ‘an open door and we have the option 
of level 1 volunteering’.  This option exemplified the NFP commitment to its 
client base:  
The thing is for us every woman who volunteers is a client of 
ours’ . .. we would be supporting her – working out boundaries .. 
we understand there will be conflict, potentially between her as 
client and her as volunteer ..(Centre Manager) 
 
As a result the Centre did not insist that volunteers took up accreditation:  
They still have to do the course and if you do all the training and 
are assessed to have completed it all, then you can be 
certificated through an in-house certification process.  But to be 
accredited, accreditation is a whole process of portfolio building, 
continuous assessment leading to a qualification – level 2 Open 
College Network. 
 
However it was recognised that the entwined goals of empowering clients / 
encouraging volunteers and providing quality training, could lead to 
tensions, especially as the external environment became increasingly 
competitive and concerned with professionalism: 
This does mean there’s a conflict; on the one hand there is 
accreditation, formal regulation and so on and these are very 
important to because they help establish our credibility with 
funders and yet in other ways we are all about inclusivity, open 
door and that world of formal qualifications can be quite 
excluding – so there are different pulls – we occupy a space 
between different worlds. (Manager, Women’s Centre, 
Chapelvale). 
 
Another manifestation of the continuing strength of the NFP ethos and the 
related focus on organisational need was expressed in the manager’s 
reservations about the individual nature of accreditation; ‘the idea of 
individual training, ongoing professional development can be at odds with 
our holistic approach.’ 
 
Once volunteers had completed the programme they could progress to 
Level 3, by volunteering within a particular team at General Help level 
where they could receive further training.  Training was triggered by both 
organisational and individual need.  The manager’s account of how this 
worked fitted the learning organisation model, and recognised the 
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importance of informal, experiential learning as well as formal work based 
training:   
Training is done in a team and incorporated into the day to day 
work.  Team managers can coach and are available in a much 
better way than tutors. But beyond that, each team manager will 
be identifying what their training needs are and then on top of that 
people’s training needs are also assessed in appraisals and 
supervisions.  
 
Sources of training included both the team and the in-house trainers who 
ran courses on, for example, assertiveness, and also:   
some college courses but it’s much more likely to be a variety of 
voluntary sector training like social service training and  
networking with other NFP agencies – for instance we are going 
over to * Women’s Centre which runs a specialist service so we 
can explore the issues around eating disorders. 
  
Some training was ‘mandatory – for instance the courses on domestic 
violence and child protection’, but a major training issue for the Centre was 
the lack of courses designed to meet their specific needs because their 
approach crossed different occupational / specialist boundaries:  ‘there’s a 
real vacuum in training – nothing exactly fits what we do and we’d like to try 
and develop and ring fence a qualification’ (Centre Manager). 
 
However the major issue was the lack of resources.  One volunteer had 
decided to do a certificate in counselling at her own expense, because she 
regarded these skills as ‘absolutely vital’.  An outreach caseworker with one 
of the LSC contract teams, who was located in a town some miles away 
from the Centre, stressed the need for particular training ‘in Welfare 
Benefits – it’s ever changing so I need constant updates in that – it’s 
essential’, but said that it was difficult both because of the Centre’s lack of 
money and also because she was only paid for 7 hours a week and ‘my 
work already goes way beyond my paid hours’.  
 
This worker went on to describe the training which was available as patchy: 
‘it’s the funding.  Quite often there will be training such as the Maternity 
Alliance and everybody in the team ought to go but there’s only enough 
money for 2 people’.  Since such CPD is viewed as primarily related to 
occupational need, those who had attended would then feed back to the 
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rest of the team, but, as this respondent explained, this was often 
ineffective because:   
We nearly all started off as volunteers and we don’t actually 
have enough know how to bring back what we’ve learned and 
feed it back appropriately – I can’t do it – it’s a very skilled thing 
– so people don’t really talk about the content, it’s just like the 
discussion we’ve just had in the team meeting about the drugs 
course which * went on – you just get ‘oh it was good’ or ‘oh I 
didn’t like it’.  Nothing about the technical bits, what it was 
actually about, because cascading down is a skill and we 
haven’t been taught it - and then the other thing is we’re not paid 
to do it either – we’re not paid to attend the meetings and feed 
back (Outreach worker, Chapelvale Women’s Centre). 
 
5.6.7 Training in specialist agencies   
 
The route into, and training within, specialist agencies differs from that just 
described. The two housing agencies in our sample articulated a distinct 
ethos which was described as holistic and  characterised by a strong 
commitment to the homeless client which involved giving both support and 
specialist advice.  Thus the Senior Adviser of the Hillchester agency said 
that they sought to combine the empathic approach of 1st tier work with the 
‘more sophisticated follow up work’.  However, despite this strong ethos, 
both agencies nevertheless preferred ‘to build upon what someone already 
knows rather than start afresh (with volunteers)’.  The Hillchester manager 
explained this on the grounds that  
You need skills and knowledge to be able to adequately 
understand someone’s holistic problems and to have somebody 
who’s less qualified, less trained, less experienced at the initial 
stages, quite often is disabling for a client, so we try and avoid 
that.   
 
Lack of resources and the need to get people quickly up to the level 
required by the LSC contract were put forward as further reasons for not 
taking volunteers: 
We had someone from the Job Centre, a Path Trainee, 
unemployed but with a law degree, but didn’t have any particular 
experience in advice and was a large burden on my time. Also, 
it’s all to do with reaching the specialist standard under the LSC. 
The preference is that * wants to build upon what someone 
already knows rather than start afresh. (Weavertown 
Caseworker). 
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Instead most caseworkers had come from an advice background; for 
instance the supervisor in one agency had come from a local authority 
Housing Benefit Department.   
 
As with other specialist caseworkers, the lack of formal legal training 
appeared to result in possibly greater commitment to ongoing work based 
training, supervision and CPD than is to be found in most of the respondent 
law firms.  For instance, one agency manager said that the whole system 
depended on  
The advice workers undertaking a minimum level of accredited 
training in their area of work. It also relies on the supervisor 
undertaking external training which is accredited and the same 
supervisor undertaking a minimum level of advice work. Now 
that’s supported by the structures, by the file reviews .. 
(Manager, Weavertown Housing Advice Agency). 
 
Describing her training in the Hillchester agency, a supervisee with a 
background in generalist advice said: 
They begin by sending you on Part A and Part B of the Housing 
Aid, the Shelter one, and that’s fantastic, because you need that 
really from basics to work your way up. But the only thing was I 
did Part A and then there was about a two day gap and then I 
did Part B, and that was a hell of a lot to take in - it was four 
days so it was really intense.  So I’d put it as a suggestion that 
any other advisers coming in would need a bit of a breather 
between the two sessions to absorb it all  … you just train 
yourself up and go on  sufficient training, but I think it’s mainly 
experience that makes you wiser. (Housing Adviser, Hillchester 
Housing Advice Agency). 
 
The Weavertown Housing Agency also started everyone off with the Shelter 
course together with ‘some form of Welfare Benefit Course’ (supervisor).  
 
Following this formal induction, the training comprises a mixture of 
experiential learning and modelling; the accounts of respondents indicated 
a greater resemblance to the training contract than to the CAB model:  
The rest of your training is sort of, a lot of its on the job 
learning, you know, open door and sort of being thrown in at 
the deep end during an advice session and then you just 
pick it up. (Adviser, Weavertown Housing Advice agency). 
    
However the comments of the Hillchester adviser indicated a gradualist 
approach to exposure to practice, and an open, equitable environment: 
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So within the year the first year you’re picking up the first hand 
experience because you’re shadowing - any adviser that 
comes in doesn’t go interviewing straight away, they do sort of 
take it steady.  So you shadow colleagues and go and 
observe in court as well.  But we don’t push the court too 
much at the moment because of the way things are… you 
don’t obviously have your full duty session.   The interviewing 
wasn’t a problem for me anyway because of the advice 
background.  The key is - what I always tell advisers is ‘just 
ask’.  I probably was a pest, but I’m just one of those that 
would rather double check that I’m giving the correct advice 
rather than just guessing, and I still do that now, although I’ve 
had nearly five years’ experience, I’ll still run it past him, 
because he’s been doing the job longer than myself. (Housing 
adviser, Hillchester Housing Agency). 
 
Also this sink or swim approach in both agencies was supplemented by 
checks on work and fortnightly supervisions (both gradually decreasing in 
frequency):  
When you first start, nearly all your work, every file you open, 
will be checked .. and now .. we look at the client register and 
Casetrak and say to people ‘you’ve seen 6 people and opened 
one file ..?’ (Advice Manager, Weavertown). 
 
As discussed above, these agencies combined an emphasis on technical 
knowledge with soft skills (such as interviewing and listening skills). A 
supervisor delineated other skills:   
A big part of the job is being able to control an advice session 
and deal with a good number of people who come in ..there’s 
also drawing the information out of your client, knowing what 
you’ve got to satisfy and then prove on the form, always 
making an attempt to satisfy the criteria. 
 
This respondent went on to emphasise the importance of legal research 
skills, but also being trained to recognise one’s limits.  His insight into the 
unevenness of his learning supports research into the processes of learning 
‘in action’ (for instance Eraut, 2004): ‘as time goes on and you learn more 
you realise that the way you thought about things in your first month to 6 
months, you now see things differently’ and as a result he considered that 
the six month training period should perhaps last a year, or even two.  He 
managed his own learning, in part through observation, discussing cases 
with colleagues both informally and at the monthly team meetings which 
also provided a forum for dissemination of courses,  and  reading all the 
journals and other materials the agency stocked.  He had come to 
recognise, however, that learning the law in this way was a skill in itself: 
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‘when you go on training courses like Case Law updates for both housing 
and welfare, they’re useful because they’re not really updates .. they’re 
really about the important cases’, and also that many skills and forms of 
knowledge could only be acquired on the job.   
 
Overall however the commitment to training manifested in both agencies 
meant that caseworkers were able to participate in regular courses 
including those which did not carry CPD points, for example, Advice 
Service Alliance training on the contract. 
 
5.6.8 CAB training in technical skills and knowledge  
 
In addition to the interpersonal skills, the CAB workbooks also deal with 
technical skills including using the information process and case recording, 
written skills61 and the process (such as key facts needed) involved in 
advising in the main enquiry areas.  The tensions discussed in Chapter 3 
between LSC regulation and the NFP ethos which is embedded in CAB 
training are exemplified by the directions in the workbook on the Main 
Enquiry Areas; for instance, in the section on Benefits, in direct 
contradiction of the LSC stricture that contracted workers should not 
complete forms for clients, the volunteer is instructed that ‘the adviser must 
always (help with filling in claim forms)’ and ‘attendance allowance and 
disability living allowance claim forms are complex to fill in’ (Citizens 
Advice, 2004, p 7).  The need to spend time with the client is also 
emphasised.62 
 
The CAB Certificate in Generalist Advice Work also provides some training 
in substantive law relevant to the main enquiry areas: debt, housing and 
employment, through detailed workbooks for each specialism which work 
towards competences.  This foundation is then supplemented by further 
courses many of which are CAB run (for instance, Contract Actions in 
Employment Law and updates), some of which, however, are only held in 
London or other large cities.  As a result the manager of one provincial CAB 
                                                 
61 These workbooks include a jargon-buster list as demystification of the language is seen as a key support for 
advisers in the early stage 
62 For instance, Section 2 on Debt states that the  ‘adviser may need to talk to the client at length in order to get an 
overall picture of client’s situation’ Citizens Advice, 2004,  p 14) 
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said ‘we have to go externally for a lot of the training now .. we get a lot of 
training from their support unit in (Boomtown)’, and spoke of the strain this 
could impose on bureau resources.  
 
Although solicitors whose work brought them into contact with NFP 
advisers generally lauded their expertise in welfare benefits and debt work, 
there was also a consensus that their knowledge of other areas, notably 
housing and employment, could be very poor; for instance a Chaplevale 
solicitor specialising in employment said:  
The quality of advice from the CAB here in * is absolutely dire – 
well at least in employment; the number of times you have to 
ring up the manager .. and say ‘I’m going to be writing to you 
about this file, you’ve missed the time limits, you haven’t done 
this’.  
 
Her subsequent comments also cast some doubt on the efficacy of 
volunteer training and / or supervision:  
You get people who’ve come to you and they’ve been to the 
CAB and some volunteer has taken one of their standard 
letters and actually queered the pitch of the case .. they don’t 
even type them up, they just get the proforma and at the top 
it’s got ‘use for …’ and at the bottom all the advice the CAB 
gives and they send that to the employer! 
 
Her criticisms were echoed in comments the Housing Solicitor cited in 5.6.5 
made about his CAB trained paralegal: 63  ‘her knowledge is limited and that 
causes real problems. There’s lots of things she just doesn’t understand 
which come up’.  Asked for an example, he said:  
Estoppel.  She hasn’t the faintest idea .. she advised a client 
to start paying off rent arrears when in fact this woman had 
acted to her detriment and paying could have undermined 
her defence (Partner and manager Housing Department, 
Boomtown firm). 
 
He further considered that lack of training in advocacy combined with poor 
legal knowledge meant that NFP workers were not equipped to act in 
Housing matters:  
Their possession cases never become disrepair 
counterclaims and they always settle, they under-settle their 
claims – it’s because they’re nervous or don’t understand 
the mechanisms, the law - and they don’t understand 
mortgage possession hearings. Basically they have no real 
                                                 
63
 
This paralegal’s perspective on her limited legal knowledge is recounted on p 97
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idea of how to conduct a case.  We’ve had people coming to 
us where they’ve been ill advised.  We’ve then appealed 
their case and unpicked what’s happened and frequently 
found that where a NFP person’s been involved no note has 
been made of the judgement.   
 
This concern was largely vindicated by the following account by the 
Hillchester Housing caseworker who had come from a generalist agency:  
I’ll tell you I was petrified when I was doing court work 
because I didn’t have a clue what it entailed - how hard it 
would be, but my supervisor he sort of did mini-coaching 
sessions and I went on a training for possession .. in the 
court work I don’t think you ever are confident.  I mean in the 
first year I think I was in a total panic, but I did it   
 
However further points made by the Housing solicitor at the Boomtown firm 
about the consequences of a lack of training go beyond the resulting 
inadequacies in the knowledge and skills of level 2 workers, and represent 
perhaps the most telling criticisms of the use of the NFP sector for more 
complex and particularly court based matters. His following explanation for 
his resistance to NFP involvement in a County Court Possession Scheme is 
grounded in the Rule of Law:   
In the court room it is important that you have people who are 
qualified .. the voluntary sector person feels as if they have no 
.. right (to be there) and that’s true.  They are there at the 
grace of the judge and that tempers how they behave .. they 
are over gracious, they don’t challenge, and that’s aside from 
whether they have the expertise.  The thing is if you go into 
court on licence that affects the way you behave .. they are 
uncomfortable about confronting the judge.  
 
5.6.9 Training and networking 
  
For the NFP sector, networking, both within a (learning) organisation and 
across a region, is a fundamental value both for their way of working, and 
also as a solution to the scarcity of resources for training and staff 
development.  
 
One worker spoke of the learning that took place as a result of working in a 
team and being able to ‘shout across the desk to * ‘what do you think about 
this?’’  However CLSP informants in the regional LSC office noted the 
problems in resourcing this form of ‘learning net’, both because of the ring 
fencing of CLS contracted workers and because Learning and Skills 
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Councils are only mandated to fund award-bearing courses, rather than 
coordinating roles.  A CAB manager said that her specialist case workers 
tended not to mix with the rest of the bureau any more because ‘they are so 
focused on the contract they don’t go to as many meetings’ (Welfare Rights 
adviser, Chapelvale CAB).  This was regarded as extremely unfortunate 
since, as we have noted above and in earlier chapters, mixing is viewed as 
beneficial to bureau volunteers and advisers as well as forming part of the 
CAB ethos.  
 
Networking within the agency was not only hampered by ring fencing, but 
also by the fact that there is no funding for the reproduction of the 
workforce:  
What I would like to see in the contract is an allowance for 
specialist workers to be able to train up volunteers and so 
on, because at the moment there is this huge jump between 
being a volunteer adviser and becoming a skilled case 
worker which often means working for the LSC and if you 
don’t have a mentor who can give you the time and the 
training to do it , then you never reach that and that’s why 
there’s a huge deficit of advice specialist case workers.  We 
are all just chasing the same few case workers (Contract 
Manager, Hillchester CAB). 
 
Respondents also claimed that networking with other agencies in a region 
had long played a valuable part in the training of NFP advisers and is a 
further aspect of the NFP community ethos: ‘we built up a network with 
other workers in the same field’ (CAB caseworker).  The key role played by 
such networks in the provision of training, by enabling agencies to form a 
learning net, is illustrated by the following account of the Women’s Centre 
Manager; she also emphasises the need for funding to support the net:  
In order to manage the difficult balance between generic skills 
and having some specialisms in house ideally you really do 
need to build networks .. in the Centre we’ve actually taken a 
leading role in the development of VOICE – Voluntary 
Organisations involved in Community Education – which 
includes all aspects of training provision.. Each area has a 
distinct forum for learning and training which the Learning and 
Skills Council set up as part of a model of joined up working 
but it’s very flawed because it rests on good will. It involved an 
incredible amount of partnership work and has no resources .. 
so we are currently fighting for, again through the Learning 
and Skills Council, a funded post attached to VOICE .. we are 
also tapped in regionally into * learning consortium which 
helps provide opportunities for the workforce .. anything that 
goes on regionally we get emails about and how to apply for 
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grants for specialist training.  There’s Business Link too 
(formerly the TEC) which we again link into for work force 
development (Chapelvale Women’s Centre Manager). 
 
A supervisor from one of the Housing Agencies described networking as 
the most useful form of training in which he had been involved.  Other 
advisers, however, said that they no longer had time to network:  
This (the contract) gets in the way. .. it’s a big downside 
especially in this job because I’m not part of a team, I’m very 
isolated.  And you do actually need that facility.  (Welfare 
Rights advisor, Chapelvale CAB). 
 
It also appeared that competition introduced as a result of LSC contracts 
could disrupt pre-existing networks: for instance, a Welfare Rights Advice 
Service had found that the good relations it had previously enjoyed with the 
local CAB seemed to have been disrupted because it had been ‘opposed to 
us getting a contract and so .. we’ve not had anyone to talk to about how 
you work ..’  However, although a representative of one of the national 
advice agencies agreed that contracting had introduced competition into the 
sector, she also asserted that there ‘had always been competition between 
networks and agencies: it’s easy to talk about the sector in rather utopian 
terms.’   
 
On the other hand, networking is clearly consonant with the CLS emphasis 
on the seamless web, and one of the CLSPs in the sample had worked with 
the Resource Centre in Weavertown to form an Advice Centres Group, the 
main objective of which was to provide a forum for sharing information and 
establishing a collective training programme.  As a result the Volunteer 
Advice Skills Training Programme was launched and, through a successful 
lottery application, had obtained funding for a training Officer. However, this 
initiative was relatively rare and the links between the NFP agencies in 
Weavertown contrast sharply with the situation in Linfield. 
 
Some agencies recounted how relationships with solicitors could involve a 
degree of training.  Similarly, the specialist telephone service offered 
through the Specialist Support Schedule by, for instance, the CPAG was 
regarded as an invaluable form of training by all NFP advisers, but most 
particularly by those in relatively isolated communities.  The decision to end 
this service (subsequently rescinded following representations) was greeted 
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with general dismay; as a national representative of another advice agency 
group said ‘the contract was a very valuable service – many of our 
members relied on it.’ 
 
5.6.10 The LSC contract as a form of training  
 
In Chapter Three, we noted the overlap between regulation and training, 
and also identified the ways in which various forms of regulation could fulfil 
a training function: this is particularly so with contractual regulation of the 
type represented by the LSC Contract.  The consensus suggested that the 
contract had entailed a steep (not necessarily swift) learning curve for the 
NFP.  One CAB supervisor commented:  
The LSC contract concentrates the mind and  so caseworkers 
are much more focused because some  in the old days were 
all over the place; now we know how many cases they have, 
who they are and at what stage they’re at and all that.  It’s 
great. (Director, Chapelvale CAB). 
 
For similar reasons, the Manager of a housing agency considered that 
contracting had improved supervision: 
when it comes to  the supervision of files which we do on a 
monthly basis it’s quite easy for the reviewer to monitor the 
quality of advice that’s actually been given .. whereas before, 
because we didn’t have the notes to support that it was quite 
difficult unless the person volunteered that they had a training 
issue.  Now it’s quite easy because we’ve got the documentary 
evidence. (Senior Case Worker, Weaverton Housing Advice 
agency). 
 
A CAB manager also thought that the LSC contract had made her more 
rigorous about supervision.   Some managers commented on the potentially 
educative role of the LSC audit: ‘I’m in favour of quality audits providing it is 
done in a way which is supporting the organisation to develop itself, rather 
than just a policing type of thing’  (Director, Chapelvale CAB). 
 
The data indicated a training need in skills congruent with LSC needs, such 
as file management, filling in forms; obtaining statements of means and so 
on; that is, in complying with the LSC administrative and regulatory 
requirements which (as discussed above) solicitors struggle with too, and 
which the LSC Trainee Solicitor Events are designed to address. For 
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instance a CAB Benefits adviser said that she found the sufficient benefits 
test  
An absolute nightmare.  I don’t even know what it means.  I went 
on a course on this earlier this year and about 15 of us on this 
course and we all had a completely different interpretation. 
(Welfare Rights adviser, Hillchester CAB). 
 
However, for NFP workers their difficulties also stem from the dissonance 
between these demands and the NFP ethos. This dissonance is revealed 
too in the account of a Welfare Rights Adviser’s reported difficulty in 
learning how to construct the sort of narrative acceptable to the LSC: 
I’ve always said the main part of my job is to be a good 
listener .. there’s no recognition of that on the LSC format 
and I think the first 12 to 18 months I literally spent an hour 
and a half to two hours with someone, wrote a couple of 
sides of that and claimed my 120 minutes.  But they won’t 
allow 120 minutes for that if you’ve only written 2 sides .. I’ve 
had to learn to write an essay ..I’ve had to fabricate essays 
like nothing on earth, to justify my time. (Welfare Rights 
Adviser, Hillchester CAB). 
 
One newly qualified solicitor who had worked in CABx for years reflected on 
the difficulty for CAB advisers: ‘Poor old CAB contract workers are stuck in 
this horrible situation, they’re neither legally qualified nor proper CAB 
workers’.  She proceeded to argue that this disjuncture had been 
exacerbated by a ‘shift in CAB training from a very fact based approach, 
geared to particular specialisms such as housing and debt, in the 1980s, to 
a strong emphasis on empathy.’  Apparently contradicting the idea that the 
contract is, as discussed in Chapter 4, colonising CAB culture,  and 
producing convergence between the NFP and FP sectors, she concluded: 
’as a result I think they’re out of synch with what the LSC wants.’   
 
Her subsequent comments, however, underline the need for all NFP 
workers, both volunteers and paid staff, to be trained in the LSC model:  
Also there’s only a very limited number of people who do paid 
work .. it’s still very volunteer based .. but this contrast 
between what the LSC want to do and what the CAB wants to 
do – you see CAB workers usually describe themselves as 
delivering a holistic service .. whereas a housing caseworker 
on the franchise as it was then .. it was narrowed down and 
narrowed down .. at first you could apply for grants from 
charities to reduce or wipe out people’s rent arrears then you 
had to identify what the legal issue was consistently so .. 
there’s a lot less creativity there .. that’s the effect the LSC has 
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had - if you’re a worker at the CAB relying on LSC money you 
now have to identify what the legal issue is and show that in 
your case notes at the start. (Housing solicitor, Boomtown 
firm). 
 
5.6.11 NFP Supervision  
 
As in the FP sector, the NFP sector relies heavily on the open door system 
for supervision.   However the sector also has a tradition of formal 
supervision, similar to the system in social work.  As a result, supervision 
appeared to be taken more seriously in our NFP sample than in many of 
our respondent law firms.  One Housing Agency manager said that 
supervisions were held regularly and followed a proforma check list that 
covered work load, file review and progress of cases.  A supervisor in the 
same agency said he had found the transition from advice worker to 
supervisor very difficult; his approach was both reflective and reflexive and 
suggestive of a supportive learning environment (Barnett 1999):  
Changing your priorities- it took a long, long time to sort of set 
my mind properly and change my daily habits. I mean advice 
giving isn’t an exact skill and one thing I fed into the file review 
process is I provide them with a sheet where they can confirm 
any corrective action that I’ve asked them to take on the files 
and also give me feedback – you know sort of like a carrot for 
them to disagree with me because sometimes we do disagree 
and it’s important to discuss. (Senior case worker, Weaverton 
Housing Agency). 
 
Supervision is maintained for all levels of workers in the CAB; so the 
volunteer is further checked / trained by the process of completing case 
sheets at the end of each transaction which a supervisor then reviews at 
the end of each day.  Asked to describe what supervision entailed, one 
CAB supervisor said:  
It’s an opportunity for them to take seriously any problem they 
may have.  The hours are discussed, where they’re at, the case 
load .. the training - they have to do a certain amount of training 
for the contract for which the hours don’t count – another bone 
of contention – and a general discussion of about 2 or 3 cases, 
those that are interesting or not interesting but they just bring 
them in, so it can last 45 minutes, but not longer than that 
usually .. and we have them every 2 months.   
 
However the supervisee in this case expressed a need to use the session 
to go through difficult cases, especially since she did not work in a team, 
and said that supervision did not fulfil this need because (unlike in the 
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Housing Agency) ‘the supervisors are not caseworkers – she hasn’t got the 
benefits background to say ‘have you tried this?’  I just tell her what I’m 
doing and why.  Whereas in my previous jobs my manager was a 
caseworker’. 
 
As we noted above, the data indicated that contracting had produced 
improvements in supervision: ‘The requirements to supervise and carry out 
file reviews are very good .. some agencies did lack those sorts of systems 
or at least they weren’t set out formally.’  However the subsequent 
comments by this national representative address the recurring theme of 
the tension between top down quality assurance and the community based 
flexibility and creativity which the NFP sector enshrines:  
On the other hand, it’s important to have things that work for 
the particular agency and some agencies did conduct 
supervision but not in the formal way required by the contract 
and the view of some of them is that it doesn’t quite work for 
them; they needed that flexibility .hopefully preferred supplier / 
peer review will address this (National Officer of a national 
advice agency). 
 
Finally, some recognised that supervision is a skill for which, ideally, one 
should be trained: ‘just because you’re elevated to a certain position 
doesn’t mean you know instinctively how to do it’ (Housing Agency 
Manager). 
 
5.6.12  NFP CPD  
 
CPD is required by the LSC to ensure that the specialist case worker is 
kept up to date; a common complaint however was that the training days 
did not count towards the contract hours.  The data suggested that, as we 
found with many in our FP sample, CPD training tended to be rather ad 
hoc; again largely because of a combination of paucity of provision and lack 
of resources: ‘we can’t really make strategic decisions about training.  The 
training usually depends on what’s on offer, especially in debt.  Benefits is 
easy – always something to go on for benefits ..’.   However the ad hoc 
nature of CPD is illustrated by a CAB debt worker who had previously 
worked for local government as a benefits adviser, where, despite the fact 
that she ‘always had this problem with widow’s benefits and maternity 
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benefits, in the 9 years I was there I didn’t go on one course on (those) 
benefits’.   
 
A supervisor in one of the specialist Housing Agencies expressed doubts 
about the agency’s approach to CPD reminiscent of those voiced by some 
solicitors: ‘I think a lot of CPD is just doing it to get your 6 hours in rather 
than .. you know it could be a lot more focused, there could be a lot more 
strategy behind it’ and his subsequent comments point to the need for 
training in context specific knowledge: ’we could do with a lot more in-house 
stuff as well, tailoring courses specifically for our needs .. ‘ (Senior case 
worker, Weaverton Housing Advice agency). 
 
5.6.13  NOS4Advice 
 
The lack of uniformity and comparability across training regimes and 
standards in the NFP sector is addressed by the NOS4Advice Project. This 
draws on the NQF, which underpins the universality of qualifications, 
providing a 5 level structure into which qualifications can be dropped.  The 
NOS have been defined as descriptors of performance – ‘what individuals 
are expected to do in their daily work.  They are practical statements of 
levels and types of individual competence that workers should meet’ and 
now incorporate ‘under-pinning knowledge’ and ‘context through range’ 
statements, and these are evident in the NOS4Advice standards.  
 
As the literature on assessment makes clear, a major difficulty with the use 
of ’standards’ in training and quality assessment is that the term standard is 
not unambiguous.  Occupational tasks, particularly in the professional 
sphere, are not susceptible to objective description and therefore generally 
require some form of normative qualifier when defined (such as 
‘appropriate level of inter-personal skills’).  This normative element in the 
specification demands verification of local judgements, and verification in 
turn demands the presence of material evidence which can be inspected by 
the verifier.  This has led to the criticism, analogous to that levelled against 
quality regimes (see for example, Benson & Waterhouse, 2001), that the 
education and training process begins to focus narrowly on the production 
of evidence, rather than on the real object of the education or training.  
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A national representative of one agency expressed concern about the detail 
of the units and their lack of flexibility: ‘I worry whether they are flexible 
enough to recognise the different values volunteers bring .. because the 
NFP sector is very diverse, has such a range of people in it, and that’s one 
of it’s strengths’. Another national representative said: 
I’m very sceptical that NOS4Advice will do what they say – a 
lot of money has been poured into it but for me what’s come 
out is a list of what an adviser does which doesn’t address 
what it actually takes to be a good adviser so they’ve listed all 
the functions but I think there’s something about aptitude – it’s 
not that you can’t learn things but there’s also inherent ability 
and what these standards do, they reduce everything to 
functions and sub-functions and don’t get to the nub of what 
makes a good adviser; in many ways they read like the QM 
which suffers from the same problems.  And I think if you were 
an inexperienced adviser and  faced with this massive pile of 
papers and huge list of things to do it would just be daunting 
and get in the way;  they’re not packaged in a way that’s 
useful to someone already under a lot of pressure which 
advisers are.   
 
On the other hand others welcomed the impetus the standards would give 
to the systematic development (and recognition) of skills in the NFP sector.  
An Open College spokesperson saw ‘NOS4Advice as positive in that it’s 
developing a framework which will benefit the sector in the long term’.  
However in the short term she saw it as an obstacle because: 
The only way it will work, in my view, is with new entrants to 
the sector who can be told ‘ take this pathway, take this 
placement’ and get it funded through a student loan, for 
example, for a Foundation Degree.  
 
Her views were largely echoed by another national spokesperson who 
Welcomed the workforce development side of the project .. I 
think if NOS did develop something like the foundation degree 
then that could help (draw people into the sector) .. but I don’t 
know whether we could address any of this without significant 
funding, like debt forgiveness. 
 
This concern with funding difficulties recurred in discussions of 
NOS4Advice, echoing the general concern in the sector with resources for 
training: 
Some of our members would argue that it’s for the agencies 
and trainers to turn (the standards) into training material but 
at the moment there’s no money for that .In the early days 
the hope was it would provide transferability of qualifications 
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but at the moment there’s no one in place to develop an 
overarching qualification.  
 
Concern was expressed that the resource implications of NOS4Advice 
would affect smaller agencies particularly badly. 
 
5.7  Personal Mastery and Organizational Learning  
 
The data discussed above indicates various lessons for the training of 
practitioners in publicly funded law and advice. It also suggests a need for 
further research into how organizational learning takes place.  The following 
represents a brief set of reflections on some of the learning / training issues 
raised by the data. 
 
Earlier we discussed the possibility of distinguishing the NFP and FP 
sectors on the basis of whether their training models are based on an 
individual human capital acquisition model, or a strategic organizational 
capital development model.  That discussion can be developed further by 
using concepts from studies of expert knowledge and organizational 
learning.  Senge argues that the sine qua non of organizational learning is 
individual learning, leading towards ‘personal mastery’ (1990, p 139).  The 
evidence from our respondents from both sectors suggests that personal 
mastery is achieved through a combination of formal and experiential 
learning, although a true sense of mastery is only acquired through the 
latter.  In the NFP sector, the entry level experience bar appeared to be set 
at two years, which of course is also the length of the solicitors’ training 
contract.  
 
This represents a formidable investment in the human capital available to 
the organization, since, as many senior partners in the FP sector observed, 
not only is the productivity of workers very low during this period, but they 
absorb a considerable amount of the time of supervisors and colleagues.  
The investment is also risky, since there can be no guarantee that the 
worker will ever achieve quality or productivity which will repay the 
investment, and there is also the risk that, having achieved the necessary 
skills and experience, the worker will sell them in the open market to 
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another organization – a possibility which is likely to be increased by the 
development of NOS4Advice.   
 
The implications of this analysis are manifold.  Firstly, an organization 
acting in accordance with economic logic will attempt to reduce the level of 
risk by employing staff trained by someone else.  Secondly, organizations 
will attempt to employ staff who are less mobile, where that is possible.  
Thirdly, training which in the NFP sector is generally very organization 
specific will reduce the mobility of labour.  Fourthly, organizations should 
seek to ensure that staff are embedded in a system where expensively 
acquired skills can be made available as widely as possible. 
 
One of our respondents, a senior advice worker in a housing advice 
agency, produced the following description of the knowledge and skills 
required to perform effectively in the role: 
There’s technical knowledge - by which I mean the content with 
some overlap on procedure. I’m talking about maybe the actual 
legal knowledge that a person is going to need of a particular 
field, it’s the actual technical content .. for instance, to illustrate 
the point, if you are advising somebody on their rights as a 
homeless person you need to know what’s in the legislation, 
what’s in the policy or case law etc and I mean more or less the 
same thing - it could cover any particular domain of knowledge 
within the housing field.  (Senior Adviser, Hillchester Housing 
Advice Agency). 
 
This emphasis on the importance of knowledge of doctrinal law was seen 
as distinct from the processes whereby legal knowledge was applied to the 
circumstances of particular legal problems: 
When I talk about procedural, what I normally mean by that is 
the way in which we may actually approach a problem that that 
person’s come to us with – how to put together the technical 
content of the field, organising it into some kind of principle of 
advocacy and how we might be able to move that person’s case 
forward.  So rather than just knowing the case law it’s how you 
might use it and it’s also how you may be able to use it in an 
actual formal process like a court of law.  So it’s not just about 
knowing the case law that applies to mortgage cases, it’s how 
you actually use that in the tactical way in court and knowing 
what the limitations are that the courts apply, for instance, in 
procedure in the courts.. the distinction is slightly artificial 
because the two generate each other to some extent.  So that’s 
technical and procedural and then there’s skills …  
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His subsequent definition of skills matched the description most 
respondents gave of the ‘soft skills’ necessary to fulfil the role of an 
adviser, though incorporating an index of efficiency which was more 
commonly found in the FP sector:  
(Skills) can be anything from a simple understanding and 
application of listening skills so that you can conduct an effective 
interview with the client, and this has all kinds of implications: 
whether or not you can actually get the knowledge that you 
need to be able to understand that person’s circumstances in a 
legal  framework, to how you could actually limit the length and 
scope of an interview in a way which is cost effective, given the 
implications of working within the LSC kind of regime .. we do 
now have to think more carefully about the way in which we 
conduct our interviews to make sure they don’t go on too long. 
 
As our preceding discussion of the data showed, several respondents, in 
both sectors, regarded the sorts of soft skills identified above as central to 
the fulfilment of the legal advice role, in that successful collection of the 
relevant information at the initial stage of a legal problem was key to its 
successful resolution.  A housing solicitor working in the FP sector with 
previous experience as a CAB worker, related rapport to diagnosis and 
commended CAB training for developing the ability to achieve this: 
The CAB training they do is very good because (they tell you 
that) you should isolate what the problem is and take it from 
there and ‘this is how you isolate the problem’ and they 
explain that if the client feels they can talk to you then you’ll 
get that information provided you use the right questions and 
the right phrases .. but if the client doesn’t feel any kind of 
connection with you at all then your chances of getting it are a 
lot less (Housing solicitor, Boomtown firm). 
 
These descriptions of the skills needed to do publicly funded work can be 
developed still further to include knowledge and awareness of features 
which might be described as contextual:64 knowledge of local agencies and 
their personnel (such as the local housing officers responsible for 
managing arrears and evictions), or of the functioning of the courts.  This 
point was made to us by several respondents in relation to District Judges, 
but was expressed most eloquently by the same Senior Housing Adviser 
cited earlier; as he says, there are clear implications for NFP training: 
                                                 
64 This skill / form of knowledge surfaced repeatedly in respondents’ accounts and is supported by the BRTF finding 
that ‘local knowledge, direct experience, empathy and trust enable them to be innovative and effective in meeting local 
needs’ (2005, p 19;
 
Sanderson & Sommerlad, 2002) 
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Courts have their own cultures and unless you’re quite robust in 
your own knowledge and in your advocacy skills the court 
culture will tend to make you go along with whatever the judge 
has perceived to be the done thing.  So let me give you a classic 
illustration of this, if I go to Hillchester County Court, I know that 
in most cases where there is rent arrears, in spite of good 
practice, any case law to the contrary, most of those district 
judges will make a suspended possession order quite regardless 
of the implications for the defendant because that’s their culture, 
it’s easy,’ that’s our take’ the judges would probably say ‘on the 
principles of justice and equity as they apply to rent arrears 
cases’.  Whereas when I go to Chapelvale the court culture is to 
give general adjournments wherever that’s deemed to be 
reasonable.  A general adjournment is the exception in 
Hillchester County Court unless you’ve got a good knowledge of 
the law’ and the confidence to speak with a sense of entitlement 
that solicitors are trained to have65.  But the chances are that 
you will just go along with what the court has as its prevailing 
culture.  So there is a great need for more resources and 
training to go into this area for people to be able to play their part 
in a way that doesn’t simply just condone what the judges are 
doing or seem to be doing. (Senior Housing adviser, Hillchester 
Housing Advice Agency). 
 
There is a considerable level of complexity in all the skill domains identified 
by this respondent. The literature on expert knowledge attempts to provide 
a structure for understanding this complexity through a number of 
conceptual frameworks.  Donald Schon writes of the ‘repertoire’ of the 
skilled professional, noting that skills and knowledge are deployed in an 
ensemble rather than singly (1983). The question arises as to whether the 
skills in this repertoire can be learned singly, and then ‘reassembled’ in 
practice, or whether they have to be learned as an ensemble (Eraut, 2004), 
and if the latter, what the optimal conditions for learning are.  One key 
focus for many writers on expert professional learning has been the fact 
that such knowledge is most often applied to processes of rapid decision 
making.  Approaches to decision making can be divided into two classes: 
algorithmic, where decision makers follow strict rules and procedures to 
reach decisions, and heuristic, where decision makers use knowledge 
which is often described as ‘intuitive’ (Eraut, 2004) or ‘tacit’ (Polanyi, 1968). 
 
The prescriptive certainty of algorithmic decision making holds attractions 
for novice decision makers and for those wishing to harness standardized 
                                                 
65 His subsequent points reinforce the comments, cited above in Section 5.6.8,  by a Housing solicitor on NFP 
workers’ sense of inferiority in court    
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knowledge models for educational, work management or software 
generation purposes.  It is generally held to produce slow outcomes, 
however, and other writers on expert knowledge (for example Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus, 1986) suggest a progression from rule-based to intuitive decision 
making as people become more expert.   This enables them to make 
swifter decisions, and also to cope with situations for which rules have not 
yet been generated.  The capacity to use the law creatively to develop new 
avenues in social welfare law (exemplified by the Hillchester lawyer cited 
above) would be one example, but the ability to meet the challenge of the 
kind of variation in court cultures cited by our housing adviser in this section 
would be a more mundane example. 
 
The TFR proposals and, though perhaps to a lesser extent, NOS4Advice 
addressed many of the training issues delineated above.  At the same time, 
however, it is important to note the continuing relevance of criticisms of 
instrumental competence based training, and in particular the argument that 
NOS4Advice does ‘not get to the heart of what makes a good adviser’ 
(spokesperson for a national umbrella advice organization).  Similarly it was 
argued that the TFR proposals did not address the concept of what it is to 
be a professional:  
Professional identity is reduced to demonstrating a series of abilities.  
Important though these are for the success of a solicitor’s business 
they provide little guarantee that entrants to the profession have been 
part of a collective enterprise where they have learnt with and from 
others the significance of the power and influence that such 
knowledge brings (UKCLE, 2005, p2). 
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Chapter Six  Conclusion 
 
In this concluding chapter, we will briefly summarize some of the key 
findings arising from the research, and relate them to the essential policy 
aims which we take to be at the heart of training and regulation systems.  
We will then explore some potential avenues for developing the relationship 
between regulation and training and will also identify areas which would 
benefit from further research. 
 
Regulation is a powerful means of influencing the culture of organizations 
and the behaviour of individual advisers.  It produces the internalization of 
values and rules which can be beneficial to organizational management 
and the relationships with clients.  Regulation can also be the only means 
of ensuring that individuals and organizations make the necessary 
investment in training.  However, restricting rights to practise in such a way 
as to provide this incentive runs the risk of constricting the labour supply 
and inflating its price.  The delicate balance to be struck in this equation is 
illustrated in part by the contrast in regulation and training regimes across 
the sector: in the FP sector, which still has a high demand from potential 
entrants, there is heavy regulation and high investment in initial training and 
CPD, whilst in the NFP sector, which is dependent on volunteers and 
specialist advisers who often graduate from the ranks of volunteers, entry 
barriers are low, and investment in training is patchy and subject to financial 
pressure from funding bodies, which are on the whole reluctant to meet the 
full economic cost of providing a workforce for the projects they fund or the 
services they purchase. 
 
There has been an increasing recognition that a minority of complex legal 
problems require specialist advice, while the majority of problems may only 
require help from advisers with a more general level of knowledge and 
expertise.  Striking the balance between the needs of specialist and 
generalist advisers is complex, as our research demonstrates.  Specialists 
have a wider role than simply working on cases: they provide advice 
agencies with the means of keeping abreast of technical details in rapidly 
changing areas of law and policy, and they represent a valuable resource in 
terms of their capacity to train and improve the skills of other advisers.  
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Strictly drawn contracts which attempt to focus on case work may have a 
harmful effect on the firm or advice agency as a whole.  Similarly, although 
it is wasteful to train general help workers to high levels of specialism, they 
do need to be trained sufficiently to fulfil their vital role in signposting and 
referral. 
 
The issue of training resources becomes even more significant when 
considering our respondents’ views on staff turnover and future labour 
supply.  In both the FP and NFP sectors anxiety was expressed about the 
increasing turnover of staff, the age profile of the workforce, the 
commitment of applicants, and the attrition seen as likely to result from the 
increasing debt burden on the young workforce and the downward pressure 
on salaries.  Both sectors required at least two years’ previous training or 
experience before appointment (and clearly the bar is set much higher for 
solicitors), and the pool of labour with this experience, and which is willing 
to enter the sector, was assumed to be shrinking.  Lowering entry 
requirements might increase the supply, but also risks compromising 
quality.  An alternative approach would be to incentivize training for 
organizations and individuals. 
 
Our respondents were largely unanimous in identifying the fact that the 
nature of publicly funded legal advice work, and the specific clientele in 
need of this advice, demanded special skills and knowledge, and equally 
therefore, specialized training.  In the NFP agencies that we studied, such 
training was generally available, although it could not be funded in the 
breadth and depth that respondents thought desirable.  In the FP sector 
however, the initial training provided by the LPC was regarded as too 
heavily biased in favour of commercial practice and generally felt to 
address inadequately the demands of this kind of work.  In spite of the 
cogent arguments against a ‘legal aid’ LPC, the fitness for purpose of the 
training is an issue which needs to be addressed. It appears that the 
introduction of LPC 3 may provide a solution; nevertheless the general 
adequacy of the training, including preparation for sustaining a contract with 
the LSC, is an issue which has received insufficient attention and is an area 
we would recommend as being suitable for further research.   
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Our results have reinforced the many other studies which have suggested 
that training and formal retrospective regulation of the kind represented by 
discipline and complaints procedures are necessary, but not sufficient, 
conditions for guaranteeing effective and competent performance in the 
publicly funded legal advice sector.  The profound impact of contractual 
regulation, as represented by the operation of the Civil Contract by the 
LSC, was recognized by all our respondents, as were the positive benefits 
in terms of agency and firm organization, case management procedures, 
client care and public confidence.  Some of the reservations expressed 
about the operation of contractualism (in particular over the time standards 
auditing characteristic of the audit regime in place at the time of the study) 
were the result of poor understanding of the accounting processes.  This is 
in itself a cause for concern, and indicates that organizations need more 
support than they currently receive in ensuring that their staff are trained in 
the details of the Funding Code.  Of equal concern is the perception on the 
part of some respondents that audit judgements and contracting decisions 
were not always driven by reliable and objective criteria.  In order for the 
relationship of trust between the LSC and its providers to be maintained, 
these perceptions need to be addressed. 
 
The reason that contractual regulation is so effective in transforming 
adviser behaviour is the extent to which it penetrates all levels of an 
organization.  Whilst other public sector funding bodies may be catching up 
with the LSC through the introduction of measures such as SLAs, our 
respondents identified the LSC as exercising an influence over their work 
which seemed to many of them disproportionate to the amount of financial 
support they received and which was not regarded as uniformly positive.  
For instance, there was a widely held perception that the contractual 
relationship was distorting an important aspect of the NFP mission (for 
example the CAB’s commitment to universalism, the key significance 
attached to tribunal advocacy and to an ‘holistic’ approach).  The potentially 
corrosive impact of such perceptions may need to be addressed, together 
with the way in which the terms of a contract may have ripple effects on the 
internal organization of some agencies (isolating specialist workers).  We 
would recommend that the LSC consider some form of RIA in relation to the 
Civil Contract and Funding Code and the NFP sector. 
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A final point concerns the limitations of even such a powerful regulatory 
mechanism as the contract.  In spite of the increasing sophistication of the 
tools with which the LSC can measure performance (such as Quality 
Profiles and peer review of files), and the strength of the sanction of 
terminating a contract, it is our observation that formal compliance neither 
guarantees the quality of advice and nor does non-compliance necessarily 
signal bad advice.  The Category One firms which we studied, and the 
compliant NFP agencies, appeared to us to share the characteristic of a 
strong service ethic, and powerful cultures where quality was maintained 
through the capacity of the organization to learn and adapt internally by the 
use of effective mentoring, role modelling, fluent informal communication 
systems and the sharing of expertise.  At its best, this approach also 
functioned between organizations in the way intended by the original 
CLSPs, to provide the local networks of advice that are also the objective of 
CLACs and CLANs.  Where these cultures do not exist, however, a punitive 
approach to audit and contract management is unlikely to bring them about, 
and we would recommend the development of, firstly, infrastructural 
support in terms of resources and training, and secondly a more gradual 
educational approach to audit, which sees performance management in 
terms of improving supplier performance as the primary objective, rather 
than threatening to withdraw those who are non-compliant from the market.  
We observed a high level of value commitment in the sector which 
contributes to the ‘added value’ which recipients of publicly funded legal 
advice often receive.  Our respondents (as one might expect them to) 
expressed the view that poor quality suppliers had, by and large, been 
eliminated from the market place but that there was a risk that the 
persistent downward pressure on costs, and a decline in trust and 
confidence in the relationship between the LSC and its suppliers, might 
have an adverse long-term impact on the ability of the sector to fulfil its 
ambition to meet legal need. 
 
The functioning of effective learning and support networks in good quality 
FP firms and NFP agencies was a phenomenon which our research design 
was not fully able to illuminate.  This is an area we would recommend as 
being suitable for further research.  Similarly, the extent to which the costs 
of operating a contract are fully met could not be determined on the basis of 
our sample.  It is nevertheless a key aspect of the willingness of agencies 
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to continue in the field effectively as providers of a quality service, and 
further research in this area is desirable.  Finally, many of the policy 
developments in the field, such as CLACs and CLANs, depend on 
relationships of trust and confidence within and between suppliers of legal 
advice, particularly with regard to the issue of matching client and level of 
specialist advice.  Further research into which kind of environment most 
encourages these relations of trust and confidence would provide a 
valuable resource in support of the construction of local webs of advice. 
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